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s u m m a r y
Since the war regional development policies have placed a great 
deal of emphasis on stimulating employment creation in the less 
prosperous areas of the UK by encouraging manufacturing firms to 
locate their new investment within such regions. Empirical studies 
have generally sought to identify either the employment and 
investment impact of government regional policy or the reasons why 
firms have moved production from the non-assisted into the Assisted 
Areas. Little attention has been given to the factors influencing 
the choice of location once a firm has decided to invest in a 
particular assisted region.
Since location considerations frequently operate only at a 
particular geographical scale there is no certainty that the 
reasons for a firm's choosing a specific location coincide with 
those which brought it to the region as a whole. This study, 
unlike previous empirical work in the UK, concentrates on the 
factors determining a. firm's choice of site within a specific 
Assisted Area. The analysis concentrates upon Scotland because 
it has been a large recipient of incoming industry during the 
1945-70 period, and is sufficiently large, in both employment and 
spatial terms, to be able to offer a wide choice of potential 
sites.
During the course of this period a number of distinct trends have 
become appa.rent in the regional distribution of incoming industry 
within Scotland, Until about I9G0 nearly three-quarters of the 
mobile jobs went to the ïïest of Scotland, but thereafter that 
region's dominance declined noticeably as industry moved into 
other parts of the country. The counties of Fife, Aest Lothian 
and Stirling proved particularly successful in obtaining new 
industry during the 1960s, although Lanarkshire continued to attract 
more new employment than any other area.
A number of hypotheses are generated to try and explain the 
changing distribution pattern of new immigrant industry.
Traditional location theory with its emphasis on transport costs 
and profit maximisation is considered to be of limited analytical 
value. Consequently the hypotheses tested in this study assume 
satisficing rather than maximising behaviour. Nevertheless 
location decisions are constrained by economic considerations so 
that a manufacturer will only locate within those areas where 
production is expected to be profitable. However, once the 
general area of search for a new site is identified an 
industrialist faced by uncertainties over future cost and market 
trends, possessing partial and imperfect knowledge and information, 
and under pressure to start production in the new plant as soon as 
possible, is likely to select the first suitable location. It is 
extremely unlikely that this will also be the place where profits 
can, in theory, be maximised. In practice, given all the 
uncertainties, it is doubtful if such a location can actually be 
identified. Consequently personal preferences and aspirations 
are likely to figure in the final choice of site.
This study, using multiple regression analysis, provides support 
for the hypothesis that the cost of factor inputs determines the 
general but not necessarily the specific location selected by 
immigrant industry. Although the availability of labour and 
factory space are significant factors in every period, the perceived 
image of an area, by affecting a decision maker’s psychic income, 
can also influence the location of new manufacturing plants within 
an Assisted Area such as Scotland, Personal considerations appear 
to have become increasingly important over time and a number of 
reasons for this trend are suggested. As spatial cost differences 
decline and competing areas begin to provide comparable facilities, 
so industry is able to choose from a v/ider range of potentially 
profitable locations. Changes in the spatial cost structure of 
factor inputs have allowed psychic cost considerations to assume a 
growing prominence for incoming industry.
Such trends help to explain the changing distribution of new 
industry within Scotland during the course of the post-war period. 
The pronounced cost advantage formerly enjoyed by Clydeside and 
Dundee as a result of their labour reserves and factory space,
much of it government owned or built, was steadily reduced. Labour 
became more generally available as unemployment rose in the 1960s, 
government financial assistance was extended to most of the country, 
and both new industrial sites and factories were widely developed 
within Scotland. Areas such as Glasgow, with high psychic costs, 
began to experience competitive difficulties in their efforts to 
attract new industry, unless they possessed sufficient offsetting 
economic advantages. Incoming firms moved into different parts 
of Scotland and away from many of the traditional manufacturing 
areas which they had previously preferred on account of their 
lower production costs.
PART I
INTRODUCTION, DATA AND HYPOTHESES
CHAPTER 1
MOBILE INDUSTRY AND REGIOW.AL POLICY
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF MOBILE INDUSTRY.
Regional development policies have been actively pursued and 
developed in the United Kingdom since the war, following their 
introduction in the 1930s in response to the mass unemployment 
concentrated in the older industrial areas such as Central 
Scotland, Northern England and South Wales. A persistent 
component of this policy has been the encouragement to private 
manufacturing firms to move either all or part of their 
production away from those areas where supplies of labour and 
other factor inputs are in relatively short supply to those where 
they are relatively abundant (Cameron and Clark, 1966).
Central government intervention 'was initially undertaken for 
social welfare and political reasons, but the rationale 
subsequently extended to embrace economic motives (McCrone,
1969; Sant, 1975). The presence of high unemployment rates with 
their associated problems of low per capita incomes and high 
out-migration generate strong political pressure on central 
government to take action in order to avoid the opposition 
parties' benefitting from any protest vote. Regional policy 
has sought to alleviate welfare problems of poverty and 
deprivation by income generation through employment creation and 
by spatially redistributing income it embraces the concept of 
social justice.
The shift of emphasis towards an economic rather than social 
welfare or political justification for policy began in the early 
1960s with the Toothill Report (1961), which was followed by the 
1963 White Papers concerned with programmes for development and 
growth in Central Scotland and North East England. All these 
documents emphasised the need to promote more rapid regional 
growth by encouraging development in the economically most 
favourable areas rather than in those with the greatest problems.
In the mid-1960s the economic case was greatly strengthened with 
the argument that regional policy could contribute to the growth 
of national output and the raising of efficiency since high 
unemployment and low activity rates are indicative of under­
utilised resources. The addition of extra capital inputs in the 
prosperous areas to fixed labour inputs, assuming full employment, 
will yield diminishing marginal physical output, whereas similar 
capital inputs elsewhere will bring additional labour inputs into 
use, so that marginal physical output will increase. Consequently 
there will be a net benefit in output terms to the country 
(Cameron and Clark, I966).
It has been estimated that if the unemployment rates in the less 
prosperous regions of the UK could be brought into line with those 
in the prosperous south there could be a rise of perhaps 2% or 3% 
in the national labour force (NEDG, 1963). By utilising spare 
resources in this way the cost of government intervention can be 
outweighed by lower public expenditure on unemployment and welfare 
benefits and gains to revenue in the form of higher income and 
Corporation tax (Needleman, 1968). In fact, Moore and Rhodes 
(1973b) have attempted to quantify these Exchequer flows on an 
annual basis between 1963 and 1970. They estimate that the 
increase in the budget deficit was only about £60 million, which 
has "minimal monetary implication". They further estimate that 
the gain to output, as a result of regional policy between 1963 and 
1970 was about £500 million per annum by 1970, which is double the 
non-recoveI able Exchequer costs of about £250 million in the same 
year.
Regional policy is si so justified on the grounds that it can reduce 
cost inflation by spreading the demand for labour more evenly
throughout the country, thereby maintaining national output 
expansion for a longer period than would otherwise be possible*
The alternative is excessive cost pressure on resources, especially 
of labour, in the prosperous regions if national demand is to be 
increased sufficiently to enable resources to be fully employed 
elsewhere in the country. Consequently the government is 
compelled to instigate a deflationary policy before the spare 
resources in the less prosperous areas are utilised, resulting in 
a potential loss of ourput and income (Cameron and Clark, 1966; 
McCrone, 1969).
Once the decision to implement a regional policy is taken, the 
government is faced with finding the most effective method of 
intervening and this depends on both policy objectives and the 
nature of the problem. In the UK the main priority has been to 
reduce unemployment (McCrone, 1969) and this gives rise to 
basically two policy options. Either employment opportunities can 
be expanded in the less prosperous areas ("v/ork to the workers") 
or people in these areas can be encouraged to seek work in the more 
prosperous regions ("workers to the v/ork"). Priority has been given 
in the UK to the first of these options, although they are not 
mutually exclusive.
This reflects the view that extensive and persistent out-migration 
has a number of undesirable spill-over effects and may be self 
defeating. Migration tends to be selective of the young and 
skilled, thereby draining the less prosperous areas of many of 
their most enterprising and ambitious people upon whom hopes of 
economic recovery are likely to be heavily dependent (Needleman, 
1968), It also decreases aggregate demand in the exporting 
regions both directly and indirectly via the income multiplier, 
thereby worsening the operating environment of firms dependent on 
the local market. In addition, by moving into areas of full 
employment such migrants add to inflationary pressures at least in 
the early years by adding to the demand not only for local goods 
and services but also for social capital expenditure (Needleman, 
1968).
Consequently policy has sought to stimulate employment creation 
v/ithin the less prosperous areas. During the study period of
1945-1970 this was attempted largely by seeking to redistribute 
einploymenL opportunities within the United Kingdom by diverting to 
such areas external growth generated in the more prosperous regions. 
In this way they stood to benefit from the new employment created 
and the diversification of their industrial structure (Cameron and 
Clark, 1966).
Firms can move their manufacturing activities to regions of low 
labour demand in a number of ways. They can either close a 
factory in one area and transfer production to a new location, or 
open a new branch plant, or shift additional production to a plant 
already established in one of the less prosperous regions.
Basically two methods have been used to encourage firms to under­
take such moves. Negative controls, in the form of Industrial 
Development Certificates (IDCs) , are designed to prevent firms 
building new factories in labour deficit areas, while positive 
encouragement is provided by giving financial incentives to firms 
moving to the less prosperous or assisted areas (McCrone, 1969).
This policy of encouraging the movement of manufacturing plants 
into areas such as Scotland from elsewhere has achieved a reasonable 
degree of success (Howard, 1968). In Scotland, for example, by 
1970 incoming manufacturing firms provided about 115,000 jobs, 
which was equivalent to 1 6v of Scottish manufacturing employment. 
This has helped to create new job opportunities to offset those 
lost by the contraction of established industry, although a 
deficiency of employment still persists. Howard (1968) provides 
some indication of the scale of the problem. He shows that by 
1966, although about 50,000 jobs had been provided in Scotland by 
outside industry which had come since 1951, this only counter­
balanced a net loss of 51,000 manufacturing jobs in established 
industry over the same period.
11 These were required, before new factory premises could be built 
for manufacturing purposes. The minimum size above which an 
IDG was required varied in the study period from 1,000 to 
10,000 sq ft, depending on the area concerned and the 
government policy at the time.
The importance of mobile industry to regional policy has been 
considered by a number of studies. Brown (1972), for example, 
estimates that about 40% of the jobs attributable to policy were 
provided by firms moving into the development areas. This, however, 
contrasts with the conclusion reached by Moore and Rhodes (1974) 
that nearly three-quarters of the jobs in Scotland generated by 
regional policy were provided by new immigrant industry, rather 
than in long established firms.
Although policy has recently begun to place greater emphasis on 
stimulating internally generated growth in the Assisted Areas it 
seems likely that efforts to attract mobile industry will remain 
important elements of policy. Consequently studies of such 
industry are of interest and relevance to regional policy.
1.2 TYPES OF MOBILE INDUSTRY
When considering mobile industry it is possible to identify two 
main types which Keeble (1971) has discussed in terms of a dual 
population hypothesis because of their differences in destinations, 
establishment characteristics, and the reasons for their choice of 
location. Both types of mobile industry have been utilised to 
pursue physical and regional planning objectives.
Keeble (1971) distinguishes between long distance movement to the 
2
peripheral areas from the prosperous centres of the South East 
and West Midlands of England, and relatively short distance moves 
from congested metropolitan areas to overspill towns in the 
surrounding region. Establishments moving to the peripheral areas 
tend to be larger, with an over-representation of plants in the
2 These coi'respond approximately to the Development Areas as 
they were defined in 1970 and comprise the standard regions 
of Scotland, Wales, Northern England, North West England 
and South West England.
electrical engineering, textile and clothing industries, and they 
comprise relatively more branch plants but fewer transfers than 
short distance overspill moves.
The actual reasons for undertaking a move are similar in both 
groups, with output expansion being the dominant motive. This 
puts pressure on local resources such as labour, land and factory 
space. If these become obtainable only at a prohibitive cost or 
are rendered unavailable by central or local government policy in 
the form of the refusal, of an IDC or planning permission, then 
output growth can only be undertaken by moving to a new location 
(Cameron and Clark, 1966; Keeble, 1968; ILAG, 1973).
Once the decision to move is taken, empirical studies suggest 
that different sets of locational factors operate on the two types 
of movement. Establishments locating only short distances from 
metropolitan areas seek to minimise the distance moved because 
proximity to the metropolis is of overriding importance to retain 
access to markets, inputs, skilled labour, information or for 
personal considerations (SE Study, 1971). By undertaking such 
moves establishments may harmonise with physical planning policies 
designed to overspill population and industry from the central city 
to the surrounding reception areas (Henderson, 1974).
From the point of view of regiona.1 policy, the decision to under­
take a long distance move to an Assisted Area is of greater interest 
and a number of interview studies and statistical analyses have 
examined the reasons for moving and for selecting a peripheral area 
location. Howard (1968) produced much of the basic data on inter­
regional industrial movement and this has provided the basis for a 
number of subsequent studies. The Department of Industry undertook 
a large scale inquiry in which they questioned all firms who opened 
a new manufacturing plant in the 1964-67 period in an area where 
they had not manufactured previously. The Inquiry into Location 
Attitudes Group survey, 1973 (ILAG) covered new plants in all 
regions including both Assisted Areas and non-assisted areas. It 
sought to determine a firm's reasons for opening a plant in a new 
loca.tion, the factors determining its choice of new location and 
its experience in tine new location. This has been the most 
comprehensive interview study and was preceded by more ]imited
studies. Keeble (1968) interviewed manufacturing firms which moved 
to the peripaeral areas from North West London and Cameron and Clark 
(1966) undertook a detailed analysis of those moving from non­
assisted areas in a different region during the period 1958-6].
A slightly different approach was adopted by Cameron and Reid 
(1966), who investigated firms which rejected a location in Scotland 
in favour of one in another Assisted Area. This study explicitly 
sought to identify the perceived locational disadvantages of a 
particular area instead of relying on determining this by 
implication from replies given to questions seeking positive 
reasons for the choice of location.
Statistical analyses formulating their hypotheses largely on the 
basis of micro-level interview studies have tended to provide 
complementary findings and suggest that the main reasons for 
inter-regional movement have been satisfactorily identified.
Keeble (1972) studied industrial movement from the V/est Midlands 
and South East of England to the peripheral areas and correlated 
the volume of movement with both the availability of labour and 
the distance of the reception area from the origin region. Sant's 
(1975) analysis covered movement between all British sub-regions 
and considered the influence of a large number of variables, which 
enabled him to identify the main factors influencing the volume of 
movement from and to sub-regions.
1.3 THE OBJECTIVES 0? THE STUDY
1.3.1 The Relevance of Different Scatial Scales
In considering the reasons why firms choose to locate a. new plant 
in a particular area it is necessary to distinguish between those 
factors which are important at one spatial scale but not another 
(Ureonhut, 1959). Haggett (1965) has pointed out that the 
explanatory variables responsible for a particular geogropuical 
distribution may vary according to the spatial scale upon which 
the analysis is based. He quotes McCarty (./.cCarty, Hook and Kmos 
1956) in suppoi't of this view: "In geographic investigation it is 
apparent toot conclusions derived from studios made at one scale
should not be expected to apply to problems whose data are 
expressed at other scales. Every change in scale will bring about 
the statement of a new problem, and there is no basis for assuming 
that associates existing at one scale will also exist at another."
A hierarchy of spatial scales can be identified, ranging from the 
international level, such as when an American company decides in 
which European country to locate (Forsyth, 1972), to the inter­
regional level, where the decision relates to the choice of a 
particular region within one country (ILAG, 1973), to the intra- 
regional scale, where alternative locations within the chosen 
region are compared (Keeble and Hauser, 1972), to the smallest 
scale of the intra-urban level, where alternative sites in a 
particular town are considered. As Haggett (1965) expresses it, 
"each explanation nests within the other and operates within the 
general restraints set by the next highest factor".
There may be a single overriding factor which dominates at every 
spatial scale or different reasons may operate at each. Interview 
studies often fail to clarify which scale is being referred to and 
therefore answers may be ambiguous since firms are not asked to 
rationalise their choice in this explicit way. The availability 
of government incentives, for example, may explain the reasons for 
choosing an Assisted Area, but not why one particular area was 
preferred to another. Similarly, labour availability may account 
for the choice of the Scottish Assisted Area, but it does not 
necessarily explain why one part of Scotland is selected instead 
of another, unless the firm moves to the largest labour market.
The role of different factors in operation at different scales can 
be illustrated by reference to American firms which have set up 
manufacturing plants in Scotland. Forsyth (1972) showed that 
demand factors such as access to the UK or European markets were 
the main reason for a location in the UK, but cost reducing factors 
such as government incentives were responsible for the preference 
for an Assisted Area. Scotland v/as favoured amongst such areas 
mainly for its labour supply and local market growth. The choice 
of location within Scotland was not examined in any detail, so it 
is not possible to see whether similar reasons also operated at 
this geographical scale.
I z ;.
The empirical studies explain in general terms why one particular 
region or sub-region has been preferred to another, but they are 
less concerned with the reasons for the intra-regional choice of 
location. There have been no detailed studies to examine why those 
establisJnments identified in the dual population hypothesis as 
moving long distances from the non-assisted areas to the peripheral 
regions located in one part of the chosen region rather than 
another, although this is of interest to regional planners and 
regional development agencies in the Assisted Areas. Although 
extensive attention has been devoted to the inter-regional choice 
of location, analyses of intra-regional locations have tended to 
concentrate on the decisions of establisliments moving within the 
same region (Keeble and Hauser, 1971; Henderson, 1974) and to 
ignore those made by plants moving into a region from elsewhere.
This study seeks to make a contribution to remedying this situation 
by examining the locations chosen by those plants which came to 
Scotland in the post-war period, betv/een 1945 and 1970. It 
discusses charges in the destinations selected within Scotland and 
examines possible reasons to explain why areas have varied in their 
attraction for incoming industry. The findings suggest possible 
policy options for trying to improve the quality of an area's 
resources in order to improve its ability to attract mobile 
industry within the context of an increasingly competitive 
environment.
1.3 »2  The Reasons for Concentrating on Scottish Locations
The analysis of the intra-regional location preferences of immigrant 
industry concentrates on Scotland for a number of reasons. The 
country has been a relatively large recipient of inter-regional 
mobile industry and Howard (1968) has shown that betwee.n 1945 and 
1965 Scotland obtained about 22;.' of all the establishments and 
employment that moved to the peripheral areas, being second only to 
the North A est region of England in the number of joes provided by 
incoming industry. In addition, Scotland attracted more plants with 
a foreign origin than any other region, gaining 58% of the employment 
created in the peripheral areas.
13 .
Jcotlond is also large enough botn in employment and in spatial 
terms to offer a wide range of potential locations as befits a 
place with about 25% of the insured employees and about 50% of the 
land surface of the peripheral areas. It can offer sites ranging 
from densely populated metropolitan centres to- remote rural areas 
and contains examples of all the main types of economic and social 
problem regions: a fact which has been recognised by the continuous 
designation of Clydeside, which is the most persistent of these, 
as an Assisted Area throughout the study period and by the steady 
increase in the size of the area eligible for government incentives 
Scotland encompasses wide variations in the characteristics of its 
factor inputs and in the quality of its resources both spatially 
and temporally. This is reflected in the relative economic 
performances of its sub-regions and in their varying ability 
to attract mobile industry during the course of the post-war 
period. This is illustrated by Table 1.1, in which the 
temporal and structural variations displayed by incoming industry 
are shown.
The temporal movement pattern reflects that of the peripheral areas 
as a wnole, namely a post-war peak succeeded by a reduced inflow in 
the 1950s and a revival in the 1960s (Howard, 1968; Sant, 1975). 
These fluctuations have been shown to coincide with tne vigour 
with which central government pursues regional policy, since an 
active policy diverts a larger snare of mobile industry to the 
Assisted Areas (Rhodes and Moore, 1975; Sant, 1975). The study 
concentrates on the period prior to the development of nortn Sea 
oil, which has introduced a new component into the factors 
encouraging inward investment, Many of the oil related projects 
are very large and, as in the case of oil platform producers, have 
specific site requirements. Consequently they will complicate any 
attempt to identify general location factors operating to attract 
firms to, or repel them from, specific areas.
Immigrant industry, in terms of both establishments and employment, 
is dominated by three sectors; mechanical engineering (dIC 7); 
instrument/electrical engineering (SIC 3/9); and clotning (SIC 15). 
These industries provided between half and three-quarters of 
incoming emnloyment in each period (Table 1.1). The prominence 
of the engineering sector can be explained in terms of the
14.
TABLE 1.1 INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OP IMMIGRANT ESTABLISHMENTS MOVING INTO SCOTLAND
1945-51 1952-59
Industry Esta.bs
Max Erap 
(000)
End Period 
Emp (000) Estabs
Llax Emp 
(000)
End Period 
Emp (000)
No % No fo No % No % No % No %
Pood, drink 
etc 12 8.3
2.2 3.5 0.6 2.4 8 10.6 4.5 15.0 2.6 18.4
Chemicals 8 5.6 1.7 2.8 ■ 1.5 5.9 5 6.7 1.3 4.4 0.5 3.5
Métal manuf 3 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.8 2 2.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.7
Mech Eng 18 12.5 17.8 28.2 7.3 29.0 9 12.0 7.4 24.8 3.0 21.3
Instr Eng 11 7.6 11.1 17.6 3.2 12.7 2 2.7 1.0 3.3 0.1 0.7
Elec Eng 20 13.9 13.6 21.6 2.9 11.5 11 14.6 6.0 20.1 2.9 20.6
Vehicles 3 2.1 3.0 4.8 1.2 4.8 2 2.7 0.9 3.0 C.4 2.8
Metals nes 15 10.4 2.5 3.9 1 .6 6.3 7 9.3 1.5 5.0 0,5 3.5
Textiles 22 15.3 4.3 6.8 2.8 11.1 6 8.0 0.8 2.7 0.6 4.3
Leather and 
clothing 16 11.1 4.1 6.5 2.8 11.1 6 8.0 2.7 9.0 1.8 12.8
Bricks etc 6 4.2 1.0 1.5 0.5 2.0 6 8.0 1.5 5.0 0.4 2.9
Timber
furniture 5 3.4 0.5 0.9 0.3 1.2 1 1 .3 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.7
Paper, prin­
ting etc 2 1.4 0.8 1.2 0.2 0.8 5 6.7 0.9 3.0 0.6 4.3
Other manuf 3 2.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 5 6.7 1.1 3.7 0.5 3.5
Total 144 100.0 63.0 100.0 25.2 100.0 75 100.0 29.9 100.0 14.1 100.0
1
1960-65 1966-70
Industry Estabs Max Emp (000)
End period 
Emp (000) Estabs
Max Emp 
(000)
End I 
Emp
eriod j 
(000) 1
No % No % No 'X No X No X No r= 1
Food, drink 
etc 8 5,9 2.4 6.0 1.1 4.6 9 5.3 0.5 2.0 0.3 1.6 ij
Chemicals 7 5.2 1.3 3.3 0.7 2.9 8 4.7 0,2 0.8 0.2 1.0 ;
Metal manuf 4 3.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 3 1.3 1.1 4.5 1.1 5.3 j
Mech Eng 22 16.3 4.1 10.3 2.4 10.1 19 11.2 1.1 4.5 0.9 4.7 i
Instr Eng 3 2.2 1.6 4.0 1.5 6.3 6 3.5 1.8 7.4 1.6 3.4 i
Elec Eng 14 10.4 9.2 23.1 4.5 18.8 31 18.2 5.0 32.3 6.7 35.3 1
Vehicles 10 7.4 8.8 22 .1 7.5 31.4 2 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 S
Metals nes 13 9.6 1.5 3.3 0.3 3.4 13 7.6 1,4 5.7 1,0 5.3 j
Textiles 4 3.0 1,5 3.8 0.6 2.5 10 5.9 0.8 3.3 0.5 2.6 j
Leather and 
clothing 27 20.0 6.0 15.1 2.9 12.1 36 21.2 6.0 24.6 4.1 21.6 ?
Bricks etc 6 . 5.9 1.2 3.0 0.8 3.4 10 5.9 0.6 2.5 0.4 2.1 ;
Timber
furniture
2 1.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 7 4,1 0.6 2.5 0.4 2.1
Paper, prin­
ting etc 3 2.2 0.4 1,0 0.2 0.3 6 3.5 1.3 5.3 1.1
j!
5.8 1
1
Other manuf 10 7,4 1.5 3.8 0,7 2.9 10 5.9 0.9 3.7 0.6 3.2 i
Total 135 100.0 39.8 100.0 23.9 100.0 170 100.0 24.4 100.0 19.0 IOC .0 li 
f
Key
Sstabs - Number of i;;::;:ig,rant ûs tabl iarments starting producticn in the period
:.iax E;np - Maximum enirloyment ar any time provided by ijmigrants starting in the period
ind' Period ployiaent provided at the end of the period in which production s tar te'
relationship between employment and/or output growth with mobility 
(Cameron and Clark, 1966; Howard, 1968). Howard (1968) showed that 
the mechanical and instrument/electrical engineering industries 
undertook the largest employment expansion of any industry groups 
in the UK between 1953 and 1966.
Cameron and Clark (1966) suggest that an additional reason for 
their prominence was that engineering firms were "most likely to be 
persuaded of the merits of Assisted Area development and most 
willing to establish new producing units separate from existing 
non-assisted plants". They attribute a readiness to consider an 
Assisted Area location to four main factors. Firstly, transport 
costs are only a small proportion of total costs; secondly, labour 
is more readily available than in the area around the main plant; 
thirdly, labour costs are likely to be lower, not so much because 
of lower basic rates, but as a result of a time lag before wages 
in the branch plant follow increases at the parent establishment; 
finally, additional management costs arising from a new and 
separate production unit distant from the main factory were not 
considered to be excessive, especially in the case of larger, more 
self-contained units.
In the case of the clothing and footwear plants (as there was only 
one of the latter this group will be referred to simply as the 
clothing industry in future references) a different explanation has 
to be sought because this was a contracting industry, in that 
employment declined nationally between 1953 and 1966 (Howard, 1968) 
Its prominence can probably be explained by its labour intensive 
nature and the need for female labour, since "a shortage of labour 
in existing locations is frequently the motive for moving and this 
situation sometimes arises in industries where employment is 
contracting, Moves underta.ken primarily for this reason tend to 
be cases where labour accounts for a substantial proportion of 
inputs" (Howard, 1968).
Several important changes have occurred in the structure of the 
immigrant industry moving to Scotland since 1945. Some industries 
have increased in prominence, some have decreased and others have 
fluctuated in importance (Table 1,1). The best examples of the 
first type are the electrical engineering (mostly electronics) and
clothing industries, while mechanical engineering, chemicals and 
textiles have decreased in importance. In contrast, food, drink 
and tobacco (1952059), instrument engineering (1945-51 and 1966-70) 
and motor vehicles (1960-65) were prominent only during certain 
periods.
These changes in the industrial structure are important because 
they can affect the demand for factor inputs so that a different 
set of locational factors become significant. This is considered 
further in later chapters, although it is pertinent to note that 
such changes have coincided with a pronounced shift in the regions 
selected within Scotland by incoming industry (Table 1.2). 
Immediately after the war about three-quarters of new industry, 
measured either in establishment or employment terms, moved into 
West Central Scotland, with most of the remaining jobs arising 
on Tayside. Throughout the 195Cs West Central Scotland continued 
to attract three out of four of the incoming jobs and it was not 
until the 1960s that this persistent pattern began to break down. 
Incoming plants began to display a greater willingness to select 
locations away from the heavy industrialised areas of the Clyde 
Valley, especially at the other end of the central belt in Fife 
and West Lothian. After 1965 the movement of new immigrant 
plants away from West Central Scotland.con tinned and there was a 
wider dispersal over the whole country rather than simply to Fast 
Central Scotland. Since it was the smaller establishments whicn 
were the most willing to locate outwith Central Scotland this nev/ 
pattern v/as less pronounced in employment terms.
During the course of the post-war period three main trends in the 
regional distribution of incoming industry stand out. These are 
the dominance of West Central Scotland until about I960, the 
growing prominence of East Central Scotland in the 1960s until it 
vied v/ith West Central as the most favoured region for immigrant 
industry in the late 1960s, and the relative move away from tnese 
tv/o regions into the rest of Scotland after 1965. Some idea of 
the,relative magnitude of these shifts can be given by quoting a 
fev/ figures. .7est Central's share of incoming emplo,y..iont more 
than halved from about 73,7 down to about 35%, whereas East Central 
increased its snare from about 3% up to about 37%. After 1965 
Falkirk/dtirl ing attracted about 12/. of immigrant industry
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TABLE 1,2 THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OP IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY
1945 -1951 1952 -1959
Region Estabs
Maximum
Employment
(000)
End Period 
Employment 
(000)
Estabs
Maximum
Employment
(000)
End Period 
Employment 
(000)
No, No . fo No. % No. No . % No .
W. Central 109 75.7 45.1 71.5 19.6 77.8 46 61.3 23.0 76.9 11.5 81.6
Falkirk/
Stirling 2 1.4 0.1 0.2
* * 4 5.3 2.0 6.7 1.1 7.8
•E. Central 9 6.2 1.4 2.2 0.9 3.6 8 10.7 1.8 6 . 0 0.4 2.8
Tayside. 15 10.4 14.5 23.0 4.3 17.0 7 9.3 1.3 4.3 0.5 3.6
Borders 3 2,1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.8 2 2.7 0.4 1.3 * *■
South vYest 1 0.7 0.1 0.2 * * 1 1.3 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.7
North East 3 2.1 1.4 2.2 0.2 0.8 2 2.7 1.0 3.4 0.3 2.1
Highlands 2 1.4 0.1 0.2 * * 5 6.7 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.4
' Total 144 100.0 53.0 100.0 25.2 100.0 ' 75 100.0 29.9 100.0 14.1 100.0
I960 -1965 1966 -1970
Region Es tabs
Maximum
Employment
(COO)
End Period 
Employment 
(000)
Estabs
Maximum
Emnloyment
(000)
End Period 
Employment 
(000)
No. % No. % No. 9o No. No. No. 7c
V/. Central 77 57.1 22.3 56.0 11,5 48.1 63 37.1 9.2 37.7 6.4 33.7
Falkirk/
Stirling a 5.9 0.8 2.0 0.6 2.5 15 8.8 2.7 11.0 2.4 12.7
E. Central 35 25.9 14.7 36.9 10.9 45.6 49 28.3 8.6 35.2 7.3 33.4
Tayside 4 3.0 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.3 6 3.5 0.7 2.9 0.5 2 . 6
Borders 1 0.7 * * * * 10 5.9 0 . 6 2.5 0.3 1.6
South West 7 5.2 1.4 3.5 0.6 2.5 8 4.7 0 . 6 2.5 0.5 2.6
North East 2 1.5 * * 8 4.7 0.7 2.9 0.5 2 . 6
Highlands 1 0.7 0.1 0.3 -K- 11 6 . 5 1.3 5.3 1.1 5.8
Total 135 100.0 39.3 IGG.O 23.9 100.0 170 100.0 24.4 100.0 19.0 100.0
*■ less than 0.1
employment, compared with only 2% in the previous period, while 
the Borders, North Bast and Highlands also increased their combined 
share of new jobs from about to lO'Jc (Table 1,2), Basically,
therefore, there has been a centrifugal character to the pattern 
of movement, with an outward spread away from the immediate post­
war core area of Clydeside into the rest of the country, with 
particularly heavy concentrations of new industry on the east side 
of Scotland stretching from Falkirk/Grangemouth into best Lothian 
and into I'ife.
Industries have differed in the extent to which they have followed 
this general pattern. Table 1.3 shows this for the three dominant 
industries and for the three most successful regions of the 1960s. 
The main points of note are that after I960 immigrant electrical 
engineering employment was under-represented in West Central and 
over-represented in East Central Scotland compared with incoming 
employment as a whole. Clothing industry employment was over­
represented in ,7est Central until 1965, after which the Falkirk/ 
Stirling region proved particularly attractive. In contrast, the 
predominantly male employing mechanical engineering industry was 
the only sector to show a bias towards West Central after 1965.
The number of establishments actually involved in providing this 
employment is too small to draw any statistically significant 
conclusions, so the finaings need to be treated in tentative rather 
than definitive terms.
This shifting distribution of incoming industry also applies at the 
level of the individual town or city as can be illustrated by 
reference to the old cities and nev/ towns. Glasgow's share of 
immigrant industry employment slumped after I960 and Dundee's fell 
after 1951, while neither Edinburgh nor Aberdeen proved very 
attractive to incoming plants (Chapter 10). Consequently, after the 
immediate post-war period, when tney obtained 33/- of new plants, 
there was a relative move away from the cities, with a fall to about 
9/i in the late 1960s. Conversely, the nev/ tov/ns began to offer 
increasingly attractive alternative locations to the older cities 
during the ISbCs, partly as a result of their increase in numbers 
but also partly a reflection of the development of additional 
facilities as they grow in size. Between 1952 and 1970 they 
attracted one in six of all immi.rant establishments.
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TABLE 1.3 THE REGIONAL LOCATIONS OF THE MAJOR IMMIGRANT INDUSTRIES IN
THE MAJOR RECEPTION REGIONS
Indu stry
Period Region Mech Eng
El ec Eng Clothing All Industry
Employ
(000) %
Employ
(000) %
Employ
(000) %
Employ
(000) %
fl. Central 10.9 61.2 12.9 94.9 3 . 6 87.8 45.1 71.6
Falkirk/
Stirling - -
0.1 0.7 - - 0.1 0.2
1945-51 E. Central 0.3 1.7 0.4 ■ 2.9 - - 1.4 2.2
Other 6 . 6 37.1 0.2 1.5 0.5 12.2 16.4 26.0
Total 17.8 100.0 13.6 100.0 4.1 100.0 63.0 100.0
ÏÏ. Central 7.1 97.3 5.1 85.0 2.6 96.3 23.0 76.9
Falkirk/
Stirling - - - - - - 2.0 6.7
1952-59 E. Central X- 0 , 6 10.0 0.1 3.7 1.8 6.0
Other 0.2 2.7 0.3 5.0 '■ — 3.1 10.4
Total 7.3 100.0 6.0 100.0 2.7 100.0 29.9 100.0
W. Central 2.2 53.7 4.1 44.6 4.3 71.7 22.3 56.0
Falkirk/
Stirling 0.1 2.4 - -
* * 0.8 2.0
1960-65 E. Central 1.6 39.0 5.0 54.3 0.9 15.0 14.7 37.0
Other 0.2 4.9 0.1 1.1 0.8 13.3 2.0 5.0
Total 4,1 100.0 9.2 100.0 6.0 100.0 39.8 100.0
.V. Central 0.6 54.5 2,6 32.5 2.0 33.9 9.2 37.7
Falkirk/
Stirling - - 1.4 17.5 1.0 16.9 2.7 11.1
1966-70 E. Central 0.4 36,4 3.5 43.8 2.0 33.9 8.6 35.2
Other 0.1 9.1 0.5 6.2 0.9 15.3 3.9 16.0
Total 1.1 100.0 8.0 100.0 5.9 100.0 24.4 100,0
* less than 0.1
NB Employment is the maximum attained
1.3.3 The Structure of the Paper
This study concentrates upon the intra-reglonal locations within 
Scotland selected by incoming industry and it analyses the various 
factors which are hypothesised as having contributed to the 
changing distribution of the new locations. Part I of the paper 
continues by discussing the data sources and the methods of 
analysis to be used before considering in Chapter 3 the potential 
contribution of industrial location theory to explaining the 
evolving distribution pattern identified in Chapter 1. Traditional 
theory with its emphasis on transport costs is considered to be of 
limited analytical value, but an approach based on a variable cost 
model is considered to be useful, provided that it incorporates 
psychic costs and therefore by implication also recognises the 
validity of a behavioural type analytical framework. Prom this 
a number of hypotheses are formulated and these are considered in 
detail in Parts II and III of the paper.
Part II concentrates on the individual explanatory variables 
identified by both theoretical and empirical studies and incor­
porated within the hypotheses. No attempt is made at this stage 
to isolate the relative importance of the individual factors, 
although the conclusions of other studies are discussed. Evidence 
for their effect on managerial location decisions is presented in 
the context of firms which have moved into Scotland. Chapter 4 
considers the relevance of transport costs, which are stressed by 
location theory, and finds evidence for their influence on intra- 
regional location decisions. Chapter 5 examines the impact of 
government policy, not in terms of its effect on the volume of 
movement, since this has been analysed in detail by a number of 
recent studies, but in the context of why firms have chosen 
Scotland and more particularly why they selected one area in 
preference to another. The analysis proceeds to labour supply, 
which has been identified in empirical studies as a major location 
factor at the inter-regional level. Chapter 6 discusses its 
relevance to location choice within Scotland and considers whether 
changes in the industrial structure of incoming industry have had 
an impact on the demand for a particular type of laoour. The 
importance of an available site or factory to mobile industry is 
the subject of Chapter 7. Changes in the spatial distribution of
Ithese resources are identified and advance factories are shown to 
have become valuable inducements to immigrant industry. Chapter 3 
examines evidence for the growing importance of non-economic 
factors in location decision making and these can be affected by 
the activities of local authorities, which are the subject of 
Chapter 9. The final two cnapters are devoted to the changing 
attitudes towards a location in the older cities, in Chapter 10, 
and the nev/ towns, in Chapter 11. Possible reasons for cnanges in 
their relative attractiveness are discussed.
Finally in Part III these individual factors are brought together 
as potential explanatory variables in a statistical analysis based 
on multiple regression techniques. This has basically two 
functions, being concerned with trying to assess whether or not 
the major influences on location decision making at the intra- 
regional scale within Scotland have been incorporated within the 
analysis, as well as assessing the relative importance of each 
factor when considered in conjunction with all the others. In this 
way it is possible to show how their individual influences have 
fluctuated over time and with them the relative attractiveness of 
different competing areas. Finally an attempt is made to explain 
the changing location pattern of incoming industry in terms of 
changes in the relative cost advantages of individual areas.
CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS AND DATA
Research concerned 'with industrial mobility is heavily dependent 
on data maintained by the Department of Industry (Howard, 1968) 
and this has formed the basis for most interview and statistical 
studies (Cameron and Clark, 1966; ILAG, 1973; Keeble, 1972; Sant, 
1975). For the purpose of this study the basic data source was 
ini'or*ma.tion kindly provided by the Economics and Research Section 
of the Department of Industry in Glasgow^, who keep amongst their 
records information on every immigrant manufacturing plant in 
Scotland, The Department define an immigrant as a new manufacturing 
establishment set up by a firm which did not manufacture in 
Scotland prior to 1945 and to which a non-Scofctish manufacturing 
origin can be attributed. At some time in its history the 
establishment must have employed eleven or more people in order to 
be included in the record. The definition of immigrant therefore 
excludes companies new to manufacturing, take-overs of local 
plants by non-Scottish companies and new branches set up by 
externally owned firms which manufactured in Scotland before 1945, 
such as, for example, Rolls Royce.
The Department of Industry’s Office for Scotland produce a list of 
immigrant firms which have come to Scotland since the war and they 
have supplemented this with additional information. Unfortunately,
* Now part of tne Scottish Economic Planning Department
however, they are unable to provide detailed employment breakdowns 
for cross-tabulations where there is a danger of disclosing figures 
for individual establisimnents, since this would infringe the 1947 
Statistics of Trade Act, Because data for individual establishments 
was required for this project it has been necessary to use alternative 
sources for employment information. The most important of these is 
the Glasgow University Record of Industrial Establishments (GURIE), 
which contains establishment based data for manufacturing plants 
in the Clydeside conurbation. This was supplemented by other 
establishment based information which is held in the Department of 
Social and Economic Research at Glasgow University and has been 
generated over the years by various research projects.
In addition, employment information on the new towns was kindly 
made available by mr R Steele, a Canadian post-graduate geography 
research student, who is undertaking a research project on employ­
ment structure and growth in the Scottish new towns. Further 
employment gaps were filled in with the assistance of the Scottish 
Council Information Bank, local authorities, newspaper information 
and the firms themselves. As a result of the difference in sources 
the employment figures produced here are likely to differ from those 
made available by the Department of Industry in Scotland.
As well as employment data, the industry order (SIC), year of
opening, origin and employment of each establishment, together with
information on the type of site and factory occupied were put on to
a computer file held by the Scottish Universities Regional Computer
Centre in Edinburgh. Data on sites and factories was culled from
a range of sources, of which the most important were the Scottish
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Industrial Estates Corporation , the Department of Industry’s 
Office for Scotland, the New Town Development Corporations and 
local authorities.
From the data bank, detailed changes in the structure and location 
of immigrant plants have been identified and correlated with 
changes in a variety of variables which are hypothesised as possible
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Row part of the Scottish Development Agency
influences on the location decision. The analysis has been con­
cerned „'it:i three spatial levels: the Scottish planning region ; 
city or county; and (on occasions) individual employment exchanges 
01’ groups of exchanges.
Inevitably in a project of this type subjective judgment is 
necessary in deciding both hov/ to measure the particular variables 
hypothesised as being relevant, and also the particular year to 
take the measurement. It seems desirable, therefore, to discuss 
some of the decisions which were made.
A basic assumption is that in order to identify changes over'time 
it is valid to divide the study period into four sub-periods: 
ie 1945-51; 1952-59; 1960-65; and 1966-70. This basically follows 
the' precedent set by Howard (1966) in his analysis of UK post-war 
industrial movement. The periods were differentiated mainly by 
changes in government regional policy and this project has added 
a furtner period (1966-70) to those used by Howard, This period 
coincides with a yet more active policy, as heralded by the 1966 
Industrial Development Act and it ends before the extension in both 
spatial coverage and the incentives available which occurred with 
the 1971 legislation. It also precedes the influx of oil related 
employment into Scotland which adds a new dimension to the 
immigrant industry scene, especially as some of the major projects, 
such as production platform sites, are distinctive in that the 
overriding locational consideration v/as the availability of a 
coastal site. The sheer size of these establishments will affect 
the employment figures and make a meaningful correlation analysis 
highly unlikely.
The spatial sub-divisions are also important since they determine 
the geographical scale at which the results will apply. The 
objective has been stated as examining location decisions at the 
intra-regional level and it is necessary to concentrate on smaller 
spatial scales than previous studies concerned witn the wider UK 
context. Ideally the level of the employment exchange or travel 
to work areas would have been most suitable, but there are two 
severe drawbacxs from the poini of view of tnis study. Firstly, 
there would be a large number of zero observations ,■ especially 
in the early periods wnen incoming industry was concen traced in
only a few areas. Secondly, there is a problem of fitting Census 
of Population data to employment exchange boundaries. As a result 
of these difficulties it has been decided to undertake the analysis 
at the level of the individual cities and counties, or, in the case 
of some of the smaller ones, a group of adjacent counties. This 
has two advantages, because Census of Population data is readily 
available at this scale and in the vast majority of cases travel 
to work areas, based on groups of employment exchanges, coincide 
with county boundaries or else extend beyond them into sparsely 
populated areas, which for analytical purposes can be overlooked. 
The twenty-three areas upon which the statistical analysis is 
based are shown in Table 2.1.
Immigrant employment has been measured at three dates: the end of 
the period in which the establishment started production; at its 
maximum total; and at 1970. The end of period figure was selected 
to represent employment in the initial growth period, whereas the 
1970 figure indicaited the extent of subsequent expansion or decline. 
The former figure is biased towards those plants which set up early 
in the period concerned and therefore have had longer to build up 
(except in the 1966-70 period), whereas the latter includes firms 
whose employment has shrunk well below a previous peak. Both 
figures exclude closures which occurred before the relevant 
terminal year. By contrast, the figure for maximum employment that 
can be attributable to immigrant plants. However, the year of peak 
employment varies from plant to plant so that resources released 
by a contraction in one immigrant may be re-utilised by expansion 
in another one, and the maximum figure does not refer to employment 
at any one moment in time.
Unemployment figures have also been taken for selected years in 
each period, usually towards the start of the period concerned; 
ie in 1943, 1954, 1963 and 1966. The first two years were also 
used by Keeble (1972) in his statistical study of industrial 
movement. The year 1963, which is in tne middle of the 
1960-65 period, was taken because it was a time of very high 
unemployment and influenced the Government's decision to 
strengthen regional policy through the Local Bmployuent Act of 
1963. In addition, this year saw the extension of Development
TABLE 2.1______THE COUNTY GROUPINGS USED FOR THE
STATIoTICAL ANALYSIS
1. Glasgow city
2. Lanarkshire
3. Dunbartonshire
4. Renfrewshire
5. Ayrshire
6. Stirlingshire
7. West Lothian
8. Midlothian’
9. East Lothian
10. Edinburgh city
11. Fife/Kinross
12. Roxburgh/S elkirk/Peebles/Berwickshire
13. Dumfriesshire
14. Wigtownshire/Kirkcudbrightshire
15. Perthshire
16. Dundee city
17. Angus
18. Aberdeenshire/Kincardineshire
19. Aberdeen city
20. Banff/i.ioray/Nairn
21. Argyll
22. Inverness-shire/Ross-shire
23. Caithness/Sutherland
District status to areas in Fife and. south Stirlingshire which 
were able to take advantage of their increased attractiveness to 
mobile industry. In fact the Development Districts remained 
virtually unchanged in area from 1963 until the 1966 Industrial 
Development Act.
Census of Population data was used to try and obtain a measure of 
the physical image of an area, in terms of the quality of its 
housing stock. Whether or not this is a satisfactory surrogate is 
debatable and requires further work. Ideally, it would be 
preferable to undertake a principal components analysis on a wide 
range of variables thought to be relevant to an area's image and 
then areas would be classified on the basis of their factor scores
CHAPTER 3
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION THEORY
AND HYPOTHESES PORIVIULATION
The complex array of factors influencing location decisions has 
prevented the formulation of any single comprehensive theory of 
industrial location. Difficulties arise in identifying all the 
relevant variables, the way they exert an influence and their 
relative importance. There are also uncertainties over the goals 
of decision makers and the influence of non-economic factors. 
Nevertheless a theoretical underpinning is necessary to assist and 
strengthen empirical analysis because it provides the basis for 
hypothesis formulation. There are essentially three principal 
theoretical approaches which have been used in industrial location 
theory. The first two assume that decision makers seek to maximise 
profits so that the optimum location is where total revenue exceeds 
total costs by the largest amount. This means that both supply 
(cost) factors and demand (revenue) factors need to be considered 
as both can vary spatially. However, it is difficult to identify 
the effect of each without making simplistic assumptions which 
involve holding either supply or demand factors constant over 
space. There has also been much debate over the validity of the 
profit maximising assumption and this has led to the development 
of non-optimising behavioural theories of industrial location.
These throe strands of location theory are each considered in turn 
by examining some of the ideas of the principal contributors.
3.1 LEAST COST LOCATION THEORIES
3.1.1 The Contribution of V/eber
The first major contribution to industrial location theory was 
made by V/eber in 1909 and although it has several theoretical and 
practical weaknesses it is a valuable starting point.
V/eber made three basic simplifying assumptions in his theory 
explaining the location of a new plant. Firstly, the location of 
inputs is given; secondly, the market is seen as a set of given 
points and is not evenly distributed over space; thirdly, labour 
is found only at selected locations where supply is unlimited at 
a given wage. Perfect competition is assumed with no producer 
able to influence the market.
Although transport costs, labour costs and agglomeration factors 
were held to dominate the location decision, transport costs were 
seen to be the most important. The basic issue considered by V/eber 
is where to locate production given the location of raw materials 
and the market. He considers this by means of his familiar 
locational triangle, which has as its three points the market and 
two raw material sources (Pig 3.1). The optimum location is 
identified as the one where total transport costs are minimised 
since he assumes that production costs are constant over space. 
Costs are viewed as a function of the weight both of raw materials 
to be moved to the production site and of finished goods to be 
carried to the market, as well as of distance. They are measured 
in ton-miles (weight x distance).
- source of materials 
= market
- least cost production point 
distance over which materials 
have to be moved
“ distance over which finished 
product has to move 
“ weight of materials needed 
per unit of output
- weight of unit output
Pig 3.1 5 L o c a 11 o n T r i a n r:l e
v/eber wont on to identify material or market orientated industries 
by means of a locational weight index, whicn expresses the ratio of
the weight of materials to that of the finished product. If the
weight of localised materials used exceeds that of the finished 
product the firm should locate at the material source, but if the 
reverse occurs it should locate at the market. In order to make the
theory more realistic, costs rather than weight per mile need to be
considered and Weber recognised this by introducing the concept of 
ideal weight, which is a function of actual weight and transport 
rates. Typical examples of material orientated industries, where 
costs of moving the raw materials exceed those of the output are 
metal manufacture, bricks and cement, pulp and paper and food 
products. Conversely, examples of industries where the latter 
costs are higher, resulting in a market orientated location, are 
bread-making, brewing, ice and glass production and oil refining.
Weber went on to rela.x the assumption of spatially uniform pro­
duction costs, but then only applied this in the case of labour 
costs. He argued that where labour is relatively cheap a firm will 
be attracted to the area if the saving in labour costs exceeds the 
marginal increase in transport costs. He illustrated this by means 
of isodapanes, which are lines drawn around the minimum transport 
cost location and which join places of equal additional transport 
costs. The isodapane within which the savings in labour cost equal 
the additional costs of transport, enabling one to be substituted 
for the other, is termed the critical isodapane (Fig 3.2).
critical
isodapane
C ” market 
i.i'i -h Mp = material sources 
P “ least cost point 
L cheao labour location
critical isodapane - isodapane 
where savings in labour costs 
ecual extra transport costs
F ig 3.2  C r11ic nl Is o d a cant
v/eber also suggests that agglomeration economies could act in a 
similar way to divert a firm from the point of minimum transport 
cost, if the savings in cost offset the additional transport costs. 
This is illustrated in Pig 3-3, where three firms are located at 
their minimum.transport cost location at A, B and C respectively. 
These firms will only move together to a new location if all their 
critical isodapanes intersect, indicating that they will all gain 
a financial advantage from moving. In Pig 3.3, where the critical 
isodapanes are shown, each firm's costs will be reduced by moving 
to the shaded area. This approach has been criticised by Palander, 
who argues that firms will only move to gain agglomeration economies 
if they are certain that the other firms will do the same. Since 
this cannot be guaranteed, the value of this concept as expressed 
by Weber is suspect.
minimum transport 
cost locations
Critical Isodananes and 1omeration Sconomies
Source; Smith (1971)
In fact Weber's theory has given rise to a great deal of criticism 
attacking his simplifying assumptions /meCrone (1969); Richardson 
(1969); Smith (19712/' The more important weaknesses pointed out 
by later theorists are discussed in the following sections, where 
subsequent modifications and improvements to the original theory 
are discussed. Nonetheless Weber's work has provided a number of 
useful insights into industrial location decisions and has provided 
the starting point for much additional work in this field. Smith 
(1971) has argued tnat the model can be fairly easily modified to 
provide a more general variable cost theory and this is considered 
in more detail below.
3.1.2 The Contribution of Palander (1935)
Palander made the next important contribution in 1935, when he 
dealt with two basic issues. Firstly, where to locate a factory 
given the location and price of materials and the position of the 
market, and secondly, the effect of price on the size of the 
market area. vVeber was concerned only with the first of these, 
although Palander introduced greater realism into the theory by 
recognising the existence of tapering freight rates.
Palander argued that price is a function of production costs and 
transport costs. The market area is delimited by those places 
where customers are indifferent as to which producer they buy from, 
since they are able to purchase products at the same delivered 
price from rival firms. Total profits are held to be dependent on 
the size of the market area, which in turn depends on the location 
of competing firms, their relative production costs and transport 
costs. By introducing the concept of spatial competition into the 
model, Palander shows tnat by reducing either production or freight 
costs a firm will be able to enlarge its market area, but at the 
expense of its competitors. In Fig 3.4, B enlarges its market 
area at the expense of producer A by obtaining lower freight rates 
which result in a lower delivered price.
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3.1.3 The Contribution of Hoover (1937. 1948)
Hoover's approach is also basically a cost minimising rather than 
revenue maximising model and he initially follows vVeber in arguing 
that the optimum location will be the point of minimum transport 
costs. However, Hoover proceeds to make several important 
modifications to and improvements upon Weber's theory by rendering 
it more realistic.
Hoover, as with Palander, recognised that transport costs are more 
complex than suggested by Weber and that this has implications for 
the location decision. He adopted a more realistic attitude by 
accepting that transport costs are not directly proportional to 
distance. He also preferred to use the terra transfer, rather than 
transport, costs since the costs of movement are not fully expressed 
by the freight rate because other additional indirect costs have 
to be met such as insurance, interest charges, clerical costs, and 
those incurred by deterioration, loss or damage in transit.
Since terminal and other indirect charges occur regardless of the 
distance of movement, the transfer charge will rise less than 
proportionately to distance because such charges represent a 
smaller share of total transfer costs as distances increase. In 
practice rates tend to rise in a series of steps, each being 
successively longer and shallower than the previous one. In 
addition there are a variety of other elements that affect trans­
fer costs. Competition between alternative methods of transport 
will depress freight rates on certain routes, as will the prospect 
of return loads or the guarantee of regular large loads. The 
nature of the product being moved can also affect the situation, 
with higher rates charged where specialised requirements have to 
be met, such as purpose built containers (for liquids or 
refrigerated goods) or careful handling (for fragile or valuable 
loads) or rapid movement (for perishable goods). Hoover also 
recognised that transport is not equally feasible in all 
directions, so that lines of equal transport cost will extend 
radially along the main routes.
These considerations have important ramifications for the location 
decision because Hoover, following Palander, showed thax the
relaxation of the assumption of transfer costs proportional to 
distance results in a greater probability of a location eitner at 
the source of materials or at the market, rather than at an inter­
mediate point. If the latter is chosen, Hoover suggests that it 
is likely to reflect a lower production cost, such as low wages, 
rather than a transport orientation, unless it happens to be a 
break of bulk or trans-shipment point.
Hoover also adopts a more realistic approach than Weber towards 
production costs, Weber only relaxes the assumption of spatially 
uniform production costs in the case of a cheap labour location or 
possibly of agglomeration cost advantages. Hoover considers 
external economies in much more detail, regarding them as part of 
production costs. He recognises localisation economies, which 
are external to the firm but internal to the industry. Examples 
are labour skilled in the industry's requirements, specialist 
suppliers and services sucn as repair and maintenance, technical 
education, finance, and research and development orientated to 
the industry's needs. He also discussed economies of urban 
concentration which are external to the industry and benefit all 
firms in the area. These include access to both a large market 
and labour supply, presence of a wide range of business and 
conmiercial services, extensive transport linkages and good social, 
educational and recreational facilities. The firm is saved the 
cost of internalising these services which might be necessary at 
the minimum transport cost location.
Hoover also realised that production costs could vary with the 
level of output. Internal economies of scale lead to a falling 
marginal cost of production and enable a producer to extend his 
market area if the rate of decrease exceeds the marginal increase 
in transport costs which arise from serving a larger market. This 
may squeeze out the smaller higher cost producers, who were 
formerly able to compete in areas of relatively high delivered 
prices. Hoover shows how different sectors of the market will be 
served by locations with different production costs, something not 
considered by ./eber (Fig 3.5). The market area boundaries are 
determined by tue points of equal delivered price from each 
producer.
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Although Hoover refers to market areas and suggests ways of 
identifying their spatial extent, including changes in their size 
as delivered price changes, his prime concern is with cost rather 
than demand factors. Costs of movement, in this case transfer 
rather than simple transport costs, remain the main explanatory 
variable of location decisions.
3.2 MARKET AREA THEORIES
Classical least cost theory is rooted in Weber's work and includes 
much of both Palander and Hoover. The basic assumption is that 
demand is spatially constant and locational interdependence or the 
activities of other firms are ignored. When this assumption is 
relaxed the least cost location does not necessarily yield maximum 
profits, since the sales potential may be far higher elsewhere.
To try and overcome this drawback a number of theories have been 
developed which concentrate almost exclusively on demand factors.
They assume imperfect or monopolistic competition with spatially 
uniform production costs but dema.nd widely scattered. Profits are 
therefore maximised whcz-e sales and revenue are greatest and a 
firm will seek to control tiio maximum possible rnorket area within
which it has a monopoly selling at a lower price than its 
competitors. Costs to consumers equal production costs (constant) 
plus transport costs (variable) so that the market area will be 
defined by the points where consumers can buy more cheaply from 
producers in other locations. Thus plant location is seen as a 
function of spatial variations in demand and the location of rival 
producers. Unfortunately by ignoring spatial differences in 
production costs these theories go to the opposite extreme of the 
least cost theories and are equally, if not more, unrealistic.
3.2.1 The Contribution of Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlain (1936)
Hotelling and Chamberlain made important early contributions to a 
market area analysis of location decisions and these were later 
elaborated and extended by Lbsch (1954). Hotelling showed how 
equilibrium would be reached in a linear market with inelastic 
demand, citing the now well-known example of two ice-cream sellers 
on a beach. He concluded that firms would agglomerate together in 
the centre of the market (Pig 3»6b) since a location anywhere else, 
such as B in Fig 3.6a would lose the firm concerned sales to its 
competitor. Agglomeration is therefore viewed as an important 
locational factor, even in the absence of both external economies 
of scale, such as were discussed by Hoover, and of spatial 
variations in costs, such as '//eber tentatively considered.
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This argument has been criticised by Chamberlain (amongst others) 
who has argued that agglomeration is in fact far from certain. Two 
firms can share the market equally without occupying the centre of 
the market, provided they are equidistant from the centre. If an 
additional firm enters the mai'ket, dispersal will occur, since the 
firm in the middle will find its sales area squeezed by the other 
two and it will move to a new location offering a larger share of 
the market. Under conditions of elastic demand it becomes 
necessary to keep transport costs to a minimum to increase sales 
and even if there are only two firms they are likely to disperse 
and locate at the quartiles.
3.2.2 The Contribution of Lbsch (1940, 1954)
Lbsch developed the first major location theory that had demand as 
the principal spatial variable. He argued that the optimum location 
is where revenue is maximised and, in order to evolve a manageable 
theory, production costs were held constant. This arose from his 
assumption of a homogeneous plain, with an even distribution of 
both raw materials and of population and uniform transport rates 
in all directions.
Costs vary simply as a result of transport rates, and increase 
proportionately with distance from the point of production.
Assuming that demand is elastic there will be a price level where 
demand falls to zero, when consumers decide they obtain 
insufficient utility to justify tne cost or else they can produce 
the product for the same cost themselves. This results initially 
in a circular market area, but this is modified by competition to 
a hexagonal shape as new producers continue to start production 
until the whole area is served and excess profits are eliminated.
At the boundaries of tne market areas consumers will be indifferent 
as to the producer they buy from, since prices will be equal, as 
both Hoover and Palander also assumed. A hexagonal shaped market 
area is the most efficient since it maximises dcixand per unit area 
while minimising total transport costs. l8sch also introduces a 
dynamic element into his analysis by examining the effect of 
raising tne pi-oduction costs of a particular factory upon its
market area (Fig 3.7). In Fig 3.7b, firm A loses its market 
completely to B as a result of a large rise in production costs
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Bosch recognised that there will be a hierarchy of market areas, 
varying in size from product to product and he assumed that each 
type of market area has at least one production centre in common 
and this is wiiere the largest city develops. By rotating the 
market areas Bosch showed it is possible to produce six sectors 
with many potential production sites and enjoying external 
economies, and six sectors with few suitable sites.
This model has many weaknesses, and as numerous writers have 
pointed out this greatly reduces its practical application 
/ivlcCrone (1969); Ricriardson (1369); Smith (1971j_/* Ir reality 
resources are not evenly distributed and production costs are not 
uniform over space. As with the least cost theories of Aeber and 
others, there is excessive reliance on transport costs as the 
determinant of location. Furthermore demand is not spatially 
uniform and a large market may be able to provide economies of 
sccile for several producers without their need to locate within 
separate market areas. In practice there are few instances of 
industries where the firms have a monopoly within their own sales 
areas, although possible examples are local newspapers and bread 
making. Tne theory also ignores agglomeration economies, which
cause firms to locate together to reduce costs, although LBsch was 
aware of such tendencies in his identification of sectors rich and 
poor in sites. As a result of these wealcnesses the theory is only 
of limited value for the analysis of a few market orientated 
manufacturing activities, but it probably has more relevance for 
the service sector.
3.2.3 The Contribution of Greenhut (1956)
In 1956 Greenhut made the first significant attempt to integrate 
least cost and market area theories by including both cost and 
demand considerations. He distinguished several types of location 
factor, notably transport costs, processing costs, demand factors, 
cost reducing and revenue increasing factors.
He follows previous location theorists in considering transport 
costs to be an important influence on the choice of location, but 
he criticises the lack of a clear distinction in location studies 
between market and transport cost considerations. He claims that 
explanations of a market orientation in reality often simply 
reflect a location designed to reduce transport costs and the 
decision is really made on cost saving rather than revenue 
increasing grounds. Greenhut stresses the need to differentiate 
between a market location attributable to market advantages, such 
as its actual or potential size and proximity to customers, or to 
a saving in transport costs.
He felt that the most significant processing costs were labour, 
capital and taxation, which will be important where neither 
transport costs nor demand considerations dictate a location at 
the source of inputs or market. Particular attention is devoted 
to demand factors and he argues that production will become more 
dispersed as either elasticity of demand or transport costs to 
market increase.
Greenhut argues that the type of expansion being considered by an 
industrialist is important and that different locational factors 
will be considered by an industrialist when deciding in which area
to locate a new branch plant, as opposed to deciding between a 
branch plant in a new location and an in situ expansion. He 
claims that most firms have several markets and the most attractive 
will be the one with the greatest total demand for the products of 
the new plant. This may not be the largest market in terras of 
overall aggregate demand, but will be from the point of view of 
the new plant.
Greenhut also felt that agglomeration economies can be seen either 
as cost reducing, such as access to specialist suppliers, or 
revenue increasing, as a result of close contact with potential 
markets. He also makes a significant contribution when he 
recognises the existence of uncertainty and the importance of 
personal considerations in the location decision and this is 
considered further in the discussion of behavioural theories.
Smith (1971) has suggested that the comprehensive nature of 
Greenhut's theory makes it one of the most useful general state­
ments on industrial location, although the approach tends to 
concentrate on demand at the expense of supply factors. This, it 
is argued, reduces its value for analysing location decisions, at 
least in the UK context.
3.2.4 The Contribution of Isard (1996, I960)
Isard (1956, I960) sought to integrate location theory with 
general economic theory and stressed the importance of the 
substitution principle to both. Like earlier theorists he places 
great weight on transport considerations, and emphasises their 
crucial role to both production and consumption. He showed how 
transport inputs could be viewed within a substitution framework 
with one source of inputs being substituted for another. Isard 
also examined how the movement of a firm from the lowest transport 
cost location to a site with cheap labour or agglomération cost 
advantages will involve substituting cheaper production costs for 
higher transport costs. /.hen deciding upon a new location a firm 
is likely to substitute plentiful low cost factors for scarce high
cost ones. Consequently some parts of the market will be served 
from market orientated sites and other by sites with cheap labour 
or material inputs.
Isard has also argued that the regular pattern of hexagonal market 
areas suggested by Losch is unlikely to occur in practice. He 
showed graphically that because of the high density of population 
in metropolitan areas, the size of the market areas will be smaller, 
but will increase as density falls away from the major nodal centres 
Isard, unlike Losch, recognised the importance of agglomeration 
economies and showed that it is impossible to retain hexagonal 
market areas if such economies are allowed for.
3 .3 BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES
The classical location theories have been heavily criticised for 
making unrealistic assumptions about the real world because they 
assume that firms choose among fixed and known alternatives, to 
each of which is attached known consequences (Simon, 1959). Such 
theories are based on the actions of rational "economic man", who 
is assumed to be a profit maximiser, possessing complete information 
and perfect knowledge of alternative courses of action. Risk and 
uncertainty are assumed av/ay, although Losch (1954) did recognise 
that "dynamically there is no best location because we cannot 
know the future". In reality industrialists do not act in the 
rational manner of "economic man" for very good reasons, and Simon 
(1959) has pointed out that "when perception and cognition inter­
vene between the decision maker and his objective environment, 
this model no longer proves adequate".
Furthermore, Simon (1959) has even drawn attention to a logical 
inconsistency in the basic assumption, arguing that "the central 
difficulty is that rationality requires one to outguess one’s 
opponents, but not to oe outguessed by them, and this is clearly 
not a consistent requirement if applied to all the actors". The 
inability to predict the actions of others under conditions of 
imperfect competition is a serious flaw in the classical models.
Simon (1559) sought to develop a more realistic behavioural 
approach to location decisions by introducing the concepts of 
bounded rationality and satisficing behaviour. He argued that 
firms operate in a complex economic environment where alternatives 
are not given, but have to be actively sought. The real wo id d is 
too complicated to comprehend fully, so that maximising theories 
seeking an optimum location have little relevance to decision 
making. Decisions are based on perceptions of, and responses to, 
the subjective environment which is a simplified version of reality, 
rather than the objective environment in which the decision maker 
actually lives. Consequently decision makers may behave rationally 
in respect of the perceived reality, which Simon terms "bounded 
rationality", but their actions may not be optimal in the context 
of the real world.
Simon argues that business goals are formulated in adaptive and 
satisficing terms and that problem solving is based on meeting 
certain aspiration levels rather than searching for the best 
alternatives in terms of specified criteria. Aspirations tend to 
adjust until goals reach practically attainable levels and, 
according to Simon, when "the firm has alternatives open to it 
that are at or above its aspiration level, the theory predicts 
that it will choose the best of those known to be available",
Fred (1967) has followed Simon’s view that decision makers tend to 
be satisficers rather than optimisers and has argued that location 
decisions are taken against a background of variation in both 
information and the ability to use it. As both diminish so the 
probability grows that the location will be markedly different from 
the economic optimum. According to Pred "the apparently cnaotic 
qualities of the spatial distribution of most manufacturing 
production at any one date is ascribable to the fact that the 
real world is populated by a broad spectrum of bounded, rational, 
satisficing locational actors and not by undifferentfated profit 
maximisers".
recent empirical work has provided abundant evidence that the 
concept of industrialists acting in the likeness of rational economic 
man is unrealistic. Galbraith (1967) has argued that even large
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corporations whose management might be thought to be less swayed 
by non-economic considerations may not necessarily be profit 
maximisers5 preferring instead to maximise market share or 
turnover and possibly seeking security by minimising risks and 
controversial decisions. This latter consideration may explain 
a preference to locate new plants close to established industrial 
centres, where the potential error costs, as well as profits, may 
be lower than in an untried location.
A number of extremely useful contributions to an understanding of 
industrial decision making have been made in recent years by 
Townroe (1969, 1971). He sees the decision as a management 
problem directly connected with the problems of investment 
planning. Townroe feels the decision needs to be seen within the 
context of the organisational structure of the firm and the motives 
and goals of the decision makers. In a study of the decisions made 
by fifty-nine firms setting up new plants in the vVest Midlands and 
horth East of England, Townroe found there was little evidence of 
the theoretical rational economic behaviour. The non-routine 
nature of the location problem and the lack of personal experience 
led to a great deal of uncertainty for management, who are faced 
by imperfect knowledge, partial and biased information, the cost 
of data collection, doubts about the correct time horizon to plan 
for and about future costs and revenues.
Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there is 
an absence of both a systematic approach and of clearly defined 
objectives, but an aoundance of opportunities for an 
impressionistic assessment. Such uncertainties and the higher 
priority frequently accorded to the non-locational aspects of the 
investment decision result in companies selecting the first 
location that matches their aspiration levels, resulting, as Simon 
argued, in the choice of a satisfactory, rather than the elusive 
optimum, site. Townroe found that only 36,7 of his sample made any 
attempt to cost different locations and he concluded tnat "for a 
majority of companies alternative locations are not evaluated on 
explicit cost ,:rounds and the financial assessment comes after 
the locational choice". This appears to support Hiche.i^dson ’ s 
(1969) suggestion that "firms, in full recognition of the 
unpredictability ox future cnanges in spatial costs and prices and
the difficulties of measuring external economies, will not go to 
extreme lengths to find the most profitable location, but instead 
will opt for a location that seems viable in the long run and rely 
on increasing efficiency in other respects to raise their 
profitability".
It is possible to view a satisficing solution as equating with the 
maximising of utility by means of the concept of "psychic income", 
which was introduced by Greenhut (1956) to express the non- 
financial benefits obtainable by an industrialist from a particular 
location. He argues that the optimum location is the one where 
total satisfaction, in the shape of both financial and psychic 
income, is maximised. Personal attractions to a particular area, 
as expressed by its "psychic income" may be sufficient to outweigh 
the profit advantage of an alternative location. This concept is 
difficult to handle within the traditional theoretical context with 
its emphasis on the least cost or maximum revenue location, 
although Smith (1966) has suggested that it is possible to incor­
porate satisficing behaviour by utilising the framework of his 
space cost curves, Townroe (1971) has shown that in reality 
personal considerations can have a strong bearing on the location 
decision. His study found that nearly half of the companies paid 
some attention to their staff's wishes and considered the general 
amenities and facilities of the short listed areas. In so doing 
"these companies explicitly allowed personal feelings to become a 
part of the input to the final choice".
3.4 SYNTHESISING THESE THEORIES - A VARIABLE COST MODEL
3.4.1 The Contribution of Smith (1966, 1971)
Smith (1966, 1971) argued that many of the major theoretical 
statements have very limited scope in terms of their practical 
application, but he suggests that it is possible to overcome the 
two main weaknesses of classical theories, namely the concentration 
on transport costs and the preoccupation with identifying an optimum 
location. He proposes two basic modifications to the least cost 
model. Firstly, the substitution of total costs foi* transport
4>.
costs. Secondly, the use of the concept of spatial margins to 
profitability, which was originally introduced by Rawstron (1358). 
Smith extends this idea by identifying the margins by means of 
space cost curves, which represent the average cost of a unit of 
production at any point in space, and rise away from the least 
cost location.
Smith's model offers a number of valuable concepts for analyses 
and his approach is closely followed in this study, since his 
claim seems valid that "the great advantage of the total cost view 
is that only in this kind of model can revenue be inserted to show 
spatial margins to profitability, as well as an optimum location. 
This is impossible in an isodapane model where the locational 
costs of some inputs, such as labour, are not included" (Smith, 
1971). A valuable feature of this model is that it reveals not 
only the optimum location at which profits may be maximised, but 
also spatial margins beyond which profitable operation is not 
possible. V/ithin these margins profits can be made and the firm 
is free to locate anywhere, providing it is not seeking to 
maximise its profits. This enables the model to incorporate 
sub-optimal behaviour.
Smith goes on to suggest that a useful distinction can be made 
betv/een basic and locational costs. The former represent the 
minimum cost at which the input can be obtained anywhere, while the 
latter is the marginal cost incurred in utilising an input away 
from its cheapest location. Since basic costs are spatially 
constant the least cost location is where locational costs are 
minimised. Both the relative importance of an input in a film's 
cost structure and its spatial variations in cost will be important 
to the location decision. The larger both of these are, the 
greater their influence on variations in total cost and on 
comparative locational advantage.
Smith's initial simplifying assumptions are that firms seek to 
make a profit, but not necessarily the maximum one, and they have 
some, but not necessarily perfect, knowledge about spatial 
differences in costs and revenue. There are no barriers to the 
entry of new firms into the industry and location decisions are 
independent of the location of other producers, apart from the
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extent to which they are reflected in the prevailing cost of 
inputs. Sources of inputs are fixed, their supply is unlimited 
and they are mobile, being obtained at a price equal to basic plus 
location costs. None of these assumptions is subsequently relaxed, 
unlike the ones which follow.
Demand is held to be spatially constant with no price advantages 
in alternative locations. The model applies to a single point in 
time, so that price, input costs and technology cannot change.
All entrepreneurs are of equal ability, there are no agglomeration 
economies, no factor substitution and no economies of scale since 
all firms produce the same level of output. finally the location 
decision is not affected by personal considerations. The effect 
of modifying some of these assumptions is illustrated later when 
the importance of particular locational factors is considered in 
detail.
In this model total costs are a function of the sum of the basic 
and locational costs of each quantity of inputs required for a unit 
of output. The least cost location is the place where total costs 
are minimised and since total revenue is spatially constant this 
location is also the one of maximum profits. The spatial margins 
to profitability are delimited by the points where total revenue 
equals total costs.
Smith shows how the model can be applied by means of notional cost 
and distance figures applied to three inputs. This enables him to 
derive cost isolines for each input and a total cost surface is 
derived from the sura of the individual isolines. He also 
illustrates these concepts in graphical form, as shown in Fig 3.8, 
whero average total costs rise away from point 0, until at M-] and 
Mp they equal average revenue, which is constant over space.
Beyond these spatial margins losses will be incurred and so 
locations there will be avoided.
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Smith recognises that in reality demand, and therefore revenue, 
vary over space and can be influenced by a plant's location. He 
proceeds to relax the assumption of revenue being spatially 
constant, so that the maximum profit point will be where average 
revenue exceeds average costs by the greatest amount. This is 
shown in Pig 3*9, where average cost increases away from A, but 
revenue falls with distance from B, where demand is maximised.
In practice the maximum profit location is not necessarily at 
either the maximum revenue or least cost location.
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This type of analysis shows that as the spatial variation in costs 
or demand increases, so the slopes of the curves steepen, and the 
area within which it is profitable to manufacture is reduced. 
Therefore if costs or demand vary markedly within Scotland incoming 
industry is likely to be concentrated in relatively few locations, 
whereas if the spatial variations are small the firms are likely 
to be more widely dispersed. The fact that immigrant industry was 
initially concentrated in the West of Scotland and Dundee, but then 
selected a wider range of locations in the 1960s, suggests that tne 
spatial cost (or revenue) curves became less steep and the spatial 
margins to profitability were extended. In this way the profit 
advantages formerly enjoyed by Clydeside and Dundee were 
diminished.
3 .4.2 The Advantages of a Least Cost Model
Since the model is basically a least cost one attention will be 
focussed on changes in spatial costs, since Smith (1966) argues 
that for practical application in empirj.cal research this approach 
has certain advantages. The most important, according to Smith, 
is the ability to assess the effect on the location decision of 
spatially variable supplies of materials and labour. He argues 
that under the conditions operating in an advanced industrial 
economy with a high degree of geographical specialisation the 
least cost approach to the search for a profitable location seems 
to be more realistic than one based on market area analysis and 
the locational interdependence of fiimis. In such economies few 
industries consist of plants surrounded by their own local market 
area. The major industries tend to be concentrated in particular 
locations serving national or international markets. Smith (1971) 
feels that much of the theoretical attention given to demand 
factors stems from a desire to extend the theory of imperfect 
competition, rather than any attempt to match theory with 
empirical findings.
It is, however, possible that there are differences in this respect 
between the American and British situations, since Chisholm (1966) 
has pointed out that market access appears to be more important in
American studies. He suggests that this reflects the greater 
spatial dispersion of alternative markets in America. Chisholm 
has also argued that a uniform delivered price is more common in 
Britain than f.o.b. pricing, with the exception of certain basic, 
but weight losing, products such as coal and iron ore. Evidence 
for this comes from Luttrell's (1962) finding that materials and 
components are usually supplied at a uniform delivered price, and 
also from Toothill (1961), who found that 70>o of firms in Scotland 
obtained more than half their purchases at a uniform delivered 
price. Since market prices do not vary to a significant extent 
between the major centres of economic activity, firms are likely 
to try and raise profit levels by seeking low cost locations.
Only in this way will they be able to maximise the difference 
between costs and revenues.
Location studies of mobile industry in the UK also support Smith’s 
view that cost rather than demand factors have been the more 
influential. There is little evidence to suggest that the Scottish 
market has proved a major incentive for firms to establish new 
production units in Scotland. Not only is the market relatively 
small (5.2 million people), but it has been less prosperous than 
the national UK market when measured by GDP per head, which only 
increased from 89.6/c to 91.5^ of the UK average between 1961 and 
1971. Cameron and Clark (I966) found that companies which moved 
to sell either to the consumer or producer markets in the UK 
Assisted Areas between 1953 and 1963 were responsible for only 5:7 
of the jobs created by incoming industry to these areas, although 
they represented 17f- of the establishments. They also found that 
14% of employment (35A of establishments) moved as a result of 
decisions to reduce costs, whereas Sl/j of employment (417 of 
plants) was provided by establishments which only selected an 
Assisted Area as a second best decision after their initial choice 
to minimise costs by developing in situ or close to their existing 
plant had been rejected by the government’s IDC policy.
Consequently these firms sought the Assisted Area location which 
resulted in the smallest increese in their production and transport 
costs. These findings suggest that the location of incoming 
industry in ocotland is likely to be determined by cost rather 
than revenue factors.
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3.5 h y p o t ::û 5I3 f o x ï u l a t i o n
This paper has argued that the reason for choosing a Scottish 
location may be different from the one deciding the firm in 
favour of a particular community within Scotland. Interview 
studies may indicate which location factors predominate at any 
particular spatial scale, although several scales may share a 
common factor.
Industrial location theory suggests a possible method of handling 
this problem analytically. Although industrialists are likely to 
seek a. satisfactory rather than the optimum location where profits 
are maximised, the influence of cost factors is still likely to be 
of major importance since they determine the spatial margins to 
profitability within which a satisfactory location can be sought. 
From this it is possible to hypothesise that the general location, 
in terms of choosing between alternative regions, is likely to be 
determined by economic considerations in that a region outwith the 
spatial profit margins will be excluded. The steeper the 
locational cost gradient the greater the cost differences between 
alternative locations and the smaller the area within which 
profitable production is possible. In response to such a 
situation, industry will concentrate within a limited number of 
regions, such as Clydeside and Dundee in the 1545-51 period.
In contrast, when deciding between places in the same region and 
all offering the prospect of potentially profitable production, 
theory suggests that since a satisfactory, rather than optimum, 
location will be chosen there is a higher probability of the 
decision being affected by non-economic considerations. These are 
often identified in location surveys as minor factors, but in fact 
may be the critical ones at the intra-regional level. There is 
also a dynamic aspect to the situation to be considered because 
theory also indicates that as spatial cost differences narrow 
non-economic or psychic cost considerations are increasingly 
likely to become the marginal determinants of location. Even if 
costs are everywhere equal an even distribution of incoming
industry is improbable since psychic costs and the satisfaction 
derived from an area by an industrialist arc likely to vary 
spatially.
It has already been shown that the distribution of incoming 
industry varied between the four sub-periods into whicn the post­
war era,has been divided, with a wider spread of plants throughout 
Scotland occurring in the 1960s. The variable cost model suggests 
a number of potential hypotheses to explain these changes, of 
which the most marked have been the declining attraction of the 
West Central region and the growing preference for eastern 
Scotland. According to the model this is a function of the erosion 
of spatial cost differentials within the country as a whole, and 
especially within the central belt, causing the area within which 
profitable production is possible to widen. This has enabled 
incoming industry to consider alternative locations away from the 
West Central region.
Any of three possible changes may h ave occurred. Areas such as 
Clydeside and Dundee, which initially dominated the distribution 
pattern, may have had their cost advantages totally overturned, so 
that firms in these areas now experience a cost penalty relative 
to other parts of Scotland. Alternatively, the earlier advantage 
may have been eliminated, without becoming negative, so that 
spatial production and distribution costs are relatively constant 
at least within Central Scotland. Consequently location decisions 
are determined by non-economic considerations. Finally, West 
Central’s cost advantage may still remain but at a sufficiently 
reduced level to be outweighed by lower psychic costs elsewhere.
In the latter two scenarios psychic costs are hypothesised as 
becoming increasingly important during the course of the post-war 
era, enabling industrialists to obtain higher levels of 
sa.tisfaction in other parts of Scotland.
The main components of cost suggested by the variable cost model 
are transport and production costs and it is necessary to decide 
which variables best represent these factors and how they can be 
measured. The theories indicate that as far as transport costs 
are concerned access to both inputs (raw materials and components) 
and to marhe ts (producer and consumer) will be relevant
considerations. The cost and efficiency of the factor inputs 
will determine production costs per unit of output and this 
suggests that the important variables are likely to be the cost/ 
availability of land; labour; capital (assumed here to be fixed 
capital investment in the shape of factory buildings, plant and 
machinery, the cost of which is reduced by the availability of 
suitable premises and of government incentives); and enterprise, 
in the form of management skills, which are assumed to be more 
cheaply available in areas with lov/ psychic costs. The activities 
of local authorities can be incorporated either within land or 
capital costs, via their provision of serviced sites and factories, 
or within the cost of enterprise in that a dynamic local authority 
can create a favourable image with an industrialist, thereby 
effectively reducing his psychic costs. In addition, costs can be 
reduced by taking advantage of agglomeration economies, so that 
access to large urban areas is likely to be a relevant factor, but 
since the actual benefits are notoriously difficult to quantify 
they are discounted, in this analysis.
Consequently the location of incoming industry to Scotland is 
hypothesised as being a function of the three different cost 
elements of transport costs, production costs and psychic costs.
The main constituent parts of these costs will be discussed in the 
succeeding chapters, where special attention is paid to changes 
within a spatial, context in order to consider the implications for 
individual areas.
PART II
THE EIPLAHATORY VARIABLES
CHAPTER 4
TRANSPORT COSTS AND ACCESSIBILITY FACTORS
4.1 INTRODUCTION,
Classical location theory depends largely on transport costs for 
its underlying rationale to explain why costs or demand vary 
spatially. Although the principal features of the major theoretical 
contributions have been discussed in Part I, certain of their 
concepts relating to transport costs are reiterated here because 
they are relevant to formulating the hypotheses.
According to Weber (1909) the optimum location is the one where 
transport costs are minimised, since production costs are assumed 
to be spatially uniform. Access to both inputs and market is 
important and the cost of movement is proportional to distance and 
the weight of the product being moved. Consequently the greater 
the weight loss in processing the more important is access to 
material inputs, while if a weight gain occurs a market location 
will be sought.
The market area approach to location theory advanced by LÜsch (1954) 
also gave prominence to transport costs and assumed spatially 
constant production costs. However, the optimum location was 
viewed a.s the point of maximum demand, and since demand is a 
function of market price, which varies geographically as a result 
of traîisport costs, a firm is assumed to locate close to the 
market to minimise transport costs. Greenhut (1956), however, has
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argued that a market location may reflect a desire to be close to 
customers for reasons of market information and contacts, rather 
than the need to reduce the cost of transport.
When greater realism is introduced into the simplifying 
assumptions by recognising that transport costs are not pro­
portional to distance and that freight rates are not a satisfactory 
measure of movement costs (Hoover, 1948), there is a greater 
probability that a firm will locate either at the source of inputs 
or at the market, rather than at an intermediate point.
4.2 CHANGES IN TRANSPORT COSTS OVER TIMS
Despite the significance of transport costs in location theory, 
such costs have decreased in relative importance over time 
(Chisholm, 1966; McCrone, 1969). Paster and more efficient 
transport, especially by road, has reduced transport costs as a 
proportion of total costs and goods can now be moved further, 
faster, and in larger quantities, allowing economies of scale to 
operate. This has led to a sharper decline in costs of moving 
bulk goods than of finished goods (Haggett, 1965).
Technological developments have consistently reduced the quantity 
of raw materials required per unit of output and components and 
semi-manufactured goods are increasingly used as the major inputs, 
especially with the growth of assembly industries (Estall and 
Buchanan, 1973; Riley, 1973). Consequently access to a particular 
input has become less important. In addition the newer and 
growing industries, which have been particularly mobile, are 
characterised by products which are less bulky and heavy in 
relation to their value than is the case with the older industries, 
with the corollary that they are less influenced by considerations 
of transport costs.
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4.3 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES
As a result of these developments a number of studies have 
concluded that many industries choose a new location with little 
regard to transport cost considerations. Klaasen (1965) suggests 
that "many industries have become 'footloose' in a sense that 
their location in the different areas of a country gives rise to 
only minor differences in production and distribution costs".
In fact Luttrell (1962) has argued that two-thirds of all 
manufacturing might be called potentially mobile and he concluded 
that large relatively self-contained units with "full local 
management and technical services for day to day operation and 
their own production programme can go any distance within the 
practical limits of Great Britain". Luttrell felt that a firm's 
organisational arrangements have a greater impact than transport 
costs on the cost of production in different locations.
The Toothill Committee (1961) in their study of the Scottish 
economy took the view that transport costs now constitute a 
rela,lively insignificant barrier to economic development since 
they represent only about 2$-47 of total costs and can be offset 
by lower rent or labour costs in Scotland, Government subsidies, 
which are shown in the next chapter to represent about 57 of total 
costs in the latter 1960s, therefore outweigh the additional cost 
of transport for many industries. A similar view has been put 
forward by Needleman and Scott (1964), who argue "Britain is, 
after all, a small densely populated island with an efficient and 
ubiquitous transport system. The distance between the most widely 
separated centres of industry, London and the Central Area of 
Scotland, is only about 400 miles - an inconsiderable distance 
compared with those over which freight is transported v/ithin say
the United States ..... (moreover) higher transport costs in the
peripheral region may well be more than offset by the lower costs 
of other inputs, particularly lower rents, rates and labour costs.
Traditional location theory suggests that mobile industry will 
locate either at tne source of inputs, at the market or a trans­
shipment point but empirical' studies provide little support for 
this contention. The ILAG survey (1973), for example, showed that 
fewer than one firm in four moving; to the Assisted A.reas considered
any of these factors to he of major importance in their choice of 
location. Although material inputs constitute the largest element 
of total costs (Table 4.1), most materials are obtained at a 
uniform delivered price. This means they have no location cost 
and therefore exert no influence on the choice of site.
4.4 ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPORT COSTS
Although transport costs are less important than formerly this 
does not mean either than they are insignificant or that industry 
is necessarily less constrained in its choice of location than 
previously. After all, as Klaasen (1965) has pointed out, industry 
is footloose only in respect of certain factors than need to be 
specified. Industry may be more footloose only in terms of 
transport costs and not as a general rule, because other factors 
may then operate to constrain mobility.
There are in fact a number of reasons for rejecting the view that 
transport costs are no longer a significant location factor even 
though their relative importance has declined. It may be mis­
leading to consider them purely in terms of their share of total 
costs since this ignores the distinction between basic and 
locational costs. The largest elements of labour, capital and 
input costs are basic in that they occur in any location and tiiere- 
fore exert no influence on the location decision. It can be argued 
that the marginal transport costs incurred away from the optimum 
location should really be assessed as a proportion of locational, 
not total, costs. If this is done their relative importance in a 
firm’s cost structure will increase markedly. In any case, if 
other costs are equal transport costs will then become the critical 
marginal factor and will be significant. Even if transport costs 
are a relatively small proportion of total costs they may still be 
large in absolute terms and may represent a high percentage of 
total profits (Edwards and Townsend, 1953),
But Edwards (1970) has az'gued that even when conventionally measured 
transport costs are under-estimated and should be more than the 3.5v 
of total production costs as measured by the value of sales ind^c„ted
TABL E 4.1______TOTAL COST SUMMARY (COST CATEGORIES AS
PERCENTAGE OP TOTAL COST)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UK Industry Labour
Costs
Capital
Costs
Pur­
chases
Trans­
port
costs
Fuel
Costs
Other
Costs
Pood, Drink & 
Tobacco 14.1 9.1 66.4 4.1 1.6 4.8
Chemicals & Allied 14.1 10.2 64.3 2.6 3.7 5.2
Metal Manufacturing 20.8 7.7 57.8 2.1 9.4 2.2
Engineering & 
Electrical Goods 35.1 11.5 46.6 1.4 1.7 3.7
Vehicles 27.8 6.8 60.2 0.9 1.7 2.6
Metal Goods 
(sundry) 22.9 6.8 64.0 1.6 1.9 2.8
Textiles 23.0 8.2 62.6 1.2 2.4 2.6
Leather Goods 20.9 6.5 66.8 1.2 1.5 3.1
Clothing & Footwear 31.4 6.1 57.2 1.0 0.8 3.5
Bricks & Pottery 32.1 13.4 33.1 7.5 9.6 4.3
Timber & Furniture 30.7 4.6 56.3 3.3 1.3 3.9
Paper & Printing 34.4 11.4 43.5 3.1 2.9 4.6
Other Llanufactuning 29.1 8.2 53.6 2.1 2.6 4.4
Construction 44.5 5.4 41.4 3.0 1.0 4.6
Distributive Trades 74.6 25.4
Miscellaneous 
Services 76.6 23.4
SOURCE: Moody and Smith (1973)
in the Census of Production. This is because further transport, 
usually b^ the distributive trade, is required before the product 
of an industry is consumed and there is some double counting in 
the sales figures but not those for transport costs. Edwards 
claims that transport costs constitute about 77 of value added and 
if distribution costs are allowed for then it is likely that 
transport accounts for at least 97 of the total cost of producing 
and distributing. This figure is about three times as high as the 
one suggested by the Toothill Committee (1961).
It also seems likely that transport costs as conventionally 
measured greatly understate the true costs of distance because, 
as Klaasen (ISop) argues, "the concept of distance to be bridged 
in a physical sense does not in many cases coincide with the 
concept of distance that is implicitly or explicitly used by the 
entrepreneur". Klaasen feels that communication costs, which 
include time, are likely to be more relevant to decision making 
because "the importance of direct, quick and often personal 
contact with related activitiesbusiness services, retailers, 
wholesalers and bankers may exert such a decisive influence that 
costs of 'physical transportation are, relatively, of negligible 
importance".
Communication, rather than transport costs, are basic to the concept 
of agglomeration economies, which were recognised, although 
understated, by V/eber (1909), who thought they were only critical 
where neitner transport cost savings nor labour cost differentials 
were dominant (Richardson, 1969). It is within this context tnat 
studies by Caneron and Clark (1966) and Cameron and Reid (1966) 
need to be viewed. They showed that distance is a factor which 
exerts a significant influence on mobile industry's choice of a 
new location. Foi- an assembly industry, in particular, there are 
advantages in being in daily contact with suppliers of materials 
and components, and for a wide range of industry access to market 
information by personal contacts is also of considerable 
importance. The lack of such face to fcce contact can adversely 
affect sales and therefore revenue. The fact that incoming plants 
originate outwith Scotland suggests that communications between 
parent establistiments and their Scottish unit are likely to be 
particularly significant in terms of administrative and mo-nagerial
convenience. Management control may be impaired or require a 
duplication of facilities, both of which impose cost penalties.
Such problems may be reduced if the location enjoys urbanisation 
economies such as STD telephone links, Telex, Confravision, main 
line rail terminals and airport facilities.
Cameron and Clark (1966) concluded that accessibility was one of 
the three location factors of particular importance to mobile 
industry and that companies sought to establish units in the nearest 
areas with suitable supplies of labour. They found that Merseyside 
and South V/ales were the Assisted Areas most favoured on 
accessibility grounds and this is reflected in their success in 
attracting mobile industry which originated in the UK (Howard,
1968). By contrast, Scotland, which was regarded as "remote", has 
been much less successful in obtaining such employment in comparison 
with its share of Assisted Area unemployment (Cameron and Clark, 
1966). The critical factor, according to Cameron and Reid (I966) 
is not the absolute, but the comparative cost of transport in 
competing locations, so that "there is little point in minimising 
the importance of the incremental costs associated with a Scottish 
location if other assisted area alternatives exist which make 
additional costs appear to be comparatively large".
The fact that Scotland’s distance from the main industrial centres 
of Britain is perceived to be its major disadvantage relative to 
competing areas is shown in the studies by Cameron and Reid (1966) 
and ILAG (1973). Cameron and Reid stressed that Scotland's 
geographical position in relation to the main origin areas of 
mobile industry aud to the main markets and suppliers put the 
country at a relative disadvantage in attracting English based 
firms and it was the most frequently mentioned defect of a 
potential location in Scotland. The ILAG survey corroborated this 
view and found that 38/ of firms rejecting Scotland did so for 
reasons of communication costs, in terms of moving personnel and 
information, while 337 rejected it because of the difficulty of 
moving goods, as reflected in transport costs.
The effect of distance considerations on mobile industry led 
Cameron and. Clark (1966) to conclude that "the general geographic 
pattern is trio main centres of incus try spreading outwards, with
the distant peripheral areas receiving weaker and weaker waves of 
job creation". Additional statistical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that a distance decay function affects mobile industry 
has been produced by Keeble (1972) and Sant (1975), who both show 
there is a significant negative correlation between the amount of 
industry moving into an area and its distance from the place of 
origin.
4.5 THE IMPLICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY FACTORS FOR LOCATIONS 
WITHIN SCOTLAND
Since both theoretical and empirical evidence show that distance 
exerts an important influence on the locations selected by mobile 
industry, it might be expected that those areas of Scotland 
furthest from the main transport routes or centres in the 
communications network would attract the least industry. The 
central belt of Scotland enjoys an accessibility cost advantage 
since it contains the bulk of Scottish industry and population, 
and the West of Scotland is particularly favoured in this respect.
It is the main focus of both internal Scottish and external 
communications, being the destination of the prime road and rail 
links with England. It possesses both a major national (Glasgow) 
and an international (Prestwick) airport and provides a wide ran^e 
of industrial inputs and markets, together with a comprehensive 
array of commercial and business services.
Consequently the West of Scotland's decreasing attraction for 
incoming industry during the course of the 1960s seems unlikely to 
be explicable in terms of unfavourable accessibility costs relative 
to the rest of the country. Within Scotland the opening of the 
Forth road bridge in 1964 benefitted Fife in particular, although 
the advantage was probably less in terms of reducing transport costs 
for mobile industry, and more a result of its effect upon personal 
and psychic costs. E'ife no lon.^^er appeared to be out on a limb 
and it was brought more effectively within the city region of 
Edinburgh, enabling the county to benefit from the city^'s 
favourable image. However, the bridge is unlikely to have adversely
affected Clydeside's predominance within Scotland's communications 
network. In fact during the study period this dominance is likely 
to have grown as a result of improvements to road, rail and air 
transport.
4.6 THE EFFECT OF TRANSPORT COSTS ON INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES
The influence of transport cost considerations is likely to vary 
from one industry to another, with different implications for their 
location preference within Scotland. In itself, the process of 
industrial mobility is likely to be selective because those 
industries most affected by transport costs are the least likely 
to move to Scotland, whereas those which come are likely to be the 
least affected. Nonetheless there are likely to be different 
preferences shown towards locations according to their 
accessibility cost advantages and to whether transport costs bear 
most heavily on the inputs or finished products.
Edwards (1970) has identified those industries which are the most 
likely to be consti*ained by transport costs in their choice of 
location by ranking them according to the importance of such costs 
in relation to net output (Table 4.2), while Moody and Smith (1973) 
have calculated transport costs as a percentage of total costs 
(Table 4.1). These show that building materials, food, drink and 
tobacco, and timber and furniture are the most affected, while 
clothing, vehicles, shipbuilding and engineering, and electrical 
goods are the least constrained by transport costs. Edwards then 
ranks industries on the basis of cost per ton-mile and shows that 
those ranked highly are not necessarily those where transport costs 
represent a high proportion of production costs. This is because 
their impact may be offset by a high value added.
The Census of Production figures used by Edwards (1970) do not 
indicate whetuer inputs or finished goods bear the brunt of 
transport costs, but it is possible to attempt this distinction by 
reference to the ILAG survey (1973). In the former category are 
food and drink, buildin^ material s a n d  chemicals and in the 
latter building materials, paper and printing, food and drink, and
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TABLE 4.2 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES RANKED ACCORDING TO TH: 
IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPORT COST IN RELATION TO NET OUTPUT
1. Bricks, pottery, etc.
2. Food, drink, tobacco
3. Timber, furniture, etc.
4. Chemicals and allied
5. Metal manufacture
6. Paper, printing, etc.
7. Metal goods n.e.s.
8. Other manufacturing
9. Leather, leather goods, fur
10. Textiles
11. Engineering and electrical goods
12. Clothing and footwear
13. Vehicles*
14. Shipbuilding*
* Indicates industries abnormal in their transport needs
SOURCE: Edwards (1970)
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timber and furniture. There is a conflict in these findings in 
that t,70 industries appear in both groups. However, SIC industry 
groupings conceal major differences v/ithin them which might explain 
these results. For example, food processing is likely to be 
located close to tne food producing areas or at a port, whereas 
drink is likely to be market orientated given the weight gain in 
production. Similarly with building materials, bricks are usually 
produced at the source of clay, whereas glass will probably be made 
close to the market given its fragile nature and the difficulty of 
transporting it. In the case of a product such as cement, the 
actual site will probably be at the mineral source, whereas the
general location might be determined by accessibility to market.
The location patterns of these industries can be examined according 
to whether or not they selected an Assisted Area location. Prior 
to 1965 the Assisted Areas, with the exception of the Highlands, 
were mostly confined to areas accessible to the major markets 
v/ithin Scotland, notably Clydeside, Dundee, Fife and West Lothian. 
Therefore establishments locating for market reasons would be 
indistinguishable from those more "footloose" (in terras of transport 
costs) industries locating in similar areas in order to obtain 
government assistance. Those mobile industries under-represented 
in the Assisted Areas are likely to have faced serious cost 
penalties there, despite the provision of government subsidies.
The cost penalty presumably relates to the cost of obtaining 
inputs, given that most other factor inputs were more readily 
available in the Assisted Areas.
There is support for this hypothesis in the case of the food
industry because between 1945 and 1965 only 61$ of the immigrant 
establishments located in the Assisted Areas, compared with 817 of 
all mobile plants. The difference is significant at the .05 level 
for a Chi Square test, which suggests that the food industry was 
constrained in its choice of location in Scotland by its need for 
access to inputs.
There was insufficient evidence to suggest that the building 
material industry suffered similar constraints to the same extent, 
because although it was under-represented in the Assisted Areas, 
the numoers involved were too sraall for significant conclusions
to be drawn. Perhaps not surprisingly, the chemical industry 
displayed a preference for the Assisted Areas similar to that of 
industry in general. As the inputs were less frequently Scottish 
based, unlike the food or building material industries, there were 
different constraints operating. The most important of these were 
specialised site requirements and port access, both of which could 
frequently be met in the Assisted Area (ILAG, 1973).
Another industry that displayed an above average reluctance to 
take advantage of government subsidies was textiles, where only 
59$ (19) of the plants located in an Assisted Area. This differed 
significantly (at the .01 level) from the overall industry pattern. 
The reason seems to lie with industry specific agglomeration (ie 
localisation) economies. Incoming textile establishments displayed 
a strong preforence for the traditional textile areas, especially 
the Borders and Central Ayrshire. ILAG (1973) showed that 
textiles differed from most otner industries in their emphasis on 
labour, the availability of industrial and commercial services and 
managerial considerations such as "maintaining contacts". The 
traditional textile areas provided skilled labour, services geared 
to the industry’s needs and contacts with other firms in the 
industry.
A final exanple where transport costs appear to be relevant in 
explaining the locations selected within Scotland is the clothing 
industry, which was the only sector to be significantly over­
represented in the Assisted Areas within Scotland. Between 1945 
and 1965 they attracted about 947 of the clothing plants. This 
number was significantly (.05 level) greater tnan that expected on 
the basis of the overall pattern for industry. Reference to Table
4.1 and to ILAG (1973) indicates not only that transport costs are 
a very small proportion of net output, but that access to both 
inputs and to markets is less important than for any other industry 
group. Consequently the lack of accessibility constraints meant 
that clothing establishments were particularly footloose, in the 
conventional transport cost sense, and they were therefore able to 
select locations where they could take advantage of government 
subsidies.
CHAPTER 5
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE
LOCATION OP INDUSTRY WITHIN SCOTLAND
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of government regional policy can be assessed in 
terms of either its impact upon the generation of additional 
economic activity and employment or its influence upon the 
destinations chosen by immigrant industry. Although both factors 
are discussed in the course of this chapter, the prime concern is 
with the latter consideration in terms of identifying the reasons 
why firms have chosen Scotland, and in particular why they have 
been attracted to different parts of Scotland,
The effect of government financial inducements upon the relative 
cost advantages of different areas is discussed because, as McCrone 
(1969) has pointed out, "the purpose of the inducements is to 
attract development to locations where resources are available and 
this can best be achieved by influencing the costs of operating in 
those locations". ouch changes in spatial comparative costs are of 
particular interest in the context of the variable least cost model, 
which has been used to generate the hypotheses to explain the 
changing destinations within Scotland selected by incoming industry. 
The chapter begins by discussing how government financial induce­
ments can be incorporated within the theoretical framework and then 
considers some of the main policy instruments in order to assess 
their effect on costs. It then proceeds to consider the implication 
for different a;c’cas and particular industries within Scotland.
5.2 THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY
Government policy has incorporated basically two approaches 
(McCrone, 1969). There has been the negative one of controls on 
industrial building in the more prosperous areas, primarily by 
means of Industrial Development Certificates (iDCs) and the positive 
one of providing financial incentives for firms expanding in the 
Assisted Areas. Although the latter is of prime interest in the 
context of this study, both can be incorporated into the modified 
least cost theoretical framework. This is because building 
controls can effectively make the cost of a factory infinite if 
permission is refused, while financial inducements are designed to 
reduce costs in the Assisted Areas. They have the effect of 
either increasing the profit obtainable in places within the 
spatial profit margins or of bringing new areas within the margins 
by changing a loss making situation into one of profit (Smith,
1 966) .
This is illustrated by means of space cost curves in Fig 5.1, 
which is based on Smith's (I966) work. In the area between X and 
Y a firm would be making a loss, so that to reduce costs below 
the average revenue (price) line it is necessary to have a subsidy 
of at leat £p per unit output in the case of the highest cost 
location at X. In oz'der to bring costs at X down still further 
and into line with those at Y an additional subsidy of £q is 
required. Such a situation occurs in practice because the level 
of government assistance varies according to the designation of 
the area (Intermediate, Development, Special Development Area).
The success of policy, therefore, will be closely connected with 
the impact of subsidies upon costs in the Assisted Areas for if 
financial incentives are pitched at too low a level they will 
extend the spatial profit margins insufficiently to incorporate 
the desired areas. In Fig 5.2 a subsidy of £20 per unit output 
will extend the margin from to but the area between X
and Y will still be unprofitable and consequently will fail to 
attract mobile industry even though government assistance is 
available. A further subsidy of aoout £60 per unit output would 
be needed to tuim X into a profitable location.
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5.3 THE IviAin POLICY IliSTRUMENTS M W  THEIR EPF EC T OH COSTS
The evolution of regional policy has been discussed in detail by 
McCrone (1969) and lie Call urn (1972) and will not be reviewed in 
detail here, other than to identify the main instruments of policy 
in order to assess their effects on the relative costs of operating 
in the Assisted Areas,
In the immediate post-war period of 1946-51, as Cameron and Clark 
(1966) have pointed out, there was a strong desire to expand 
output to meet the consumer expenditure boom expected to arise 
with the lifting of wartime controls and as a result a large 
volume of industry was potentially mobile. A shortage of factory 
space owing to war damage and restricted wartime investment on 
factory modernisation enabled the Government, by use of IDCs, 
building licences and controls over the allocation of scarce 
building materials, in addition to the release of former munition 
factories and the construction of advance factories, to exert a 
powerful influence on industry's investment decisions. Conseque?itly 
the cost subsidy represented by the availability of a government 
factory was extremely large given that the likely alternative was 
no factory at all.
Wartime controls were lifted in the early 1950s, no further advance 
factories were built and IDC policy was extremely lax (llcCrone,
1969). This weakening of regional policy meant that the cost 
advantages obtainable in the Development Areas were more limited 
and restricted largely to the readier availability of serviced 
sites and government factories either released by a previous tenant 
or newly built to a firm's requirements (Cdber and Bowden, 1958). 
Moore and Rhodes (1973a) contend that the provision of factory 
premises represents a large hidden subsidy, which is a part of 
regional policy. They concluded tnat the subsidy element is 
equivalent to 75>-^  of the cost of the building since the discounted 
present value of rents payable in 21 years was only about 25,1 of 
the construction cost.
A more active period of regional policy began in the early 1960s 
(i.Iooro and ,Rhodes, 1973a). New financial incentives were introduced 
by the i960 Local- Employment Act in the form of building grants,
the size of which depended on a somewhat complicated formula and 
BOÏAC advice, although it averaged 177' in the Development 
Districts (I.îcCrono, 1969). It was also possible to obtain BOTAG 
special grants and loans if certain cost per job limits were met. 
Wilson (1964) has calculated that the value of government 
incentives represented, on average, a differential in favour of 
the Assisted Areas equivalent to about 10^ of capital costs or 
about 2}C of total costs, assuming annual capital costs are 
equivalent to 20;t of total costs.
The incentives were simplified by the 1963 Finance and Local 
Emplo;yment Acts, which introduced a standard 257^  building grant, 
a IO7C plant and machinery grant and accelerated depreciation 
(iVlcCrone, 1969). This has been estimated by Wilson (1964) as 
being equivalent to a subsidy in favour of the Development
Districts equal, on average, to 12yu of capital costs or 2.4% of
total costs.
Expenditure on regional policy was greatly increased in the 1966 
Industrial Development Act, which retained 25% building grants 
but introduced Investment Grants of 40yc for new plant and machinery 
(45% in 1967-68). This gave a marginal cost advantage to the 
Assisted Areas worth, on average, about 15% of capital costs 
(Wilson, 1967). In addition, a subsidy to labour was introduced 
for the first time in 1967 in the form of the Regional Employment 
Premium (REP) paid to manufacturers at the rate of £1.50 per week 
for each male employee, which approximated to 7i% of wage costs 
(îlcCrone, 1969). According to Alison (1967), "at a rough guess, 
therefore, the combined effect of the capital grants, BOTAC 
assistance and the employment premium may be put at 5% of the 
total costs of a pmfitable firm which has been following an active
investment policy". The split between the three types of
assistance is about 3%, 0.5% and 1.5% respectively.
If the BOTAC assistance is assumed to be worth a constant 
proportion (C.5%) over time the value of subsidies as a percentage 
of total costs in each pez'iod can be estimated as 2.5% (1960-62),
2.9% (1963-65) and 5% (1966-70). Tnese estimates are slightly 
lower than those made by Thomas (1971), wno suggests the 
Development Areas had an annual op c m  ting cost advantage of 5.5%
over non-assisted areas between 1966 and 1970, compared with 3.6,. 
in the 1963-65 period. Nonetheless tney provide an approximate 
indication of the potential cost advantages enjoyed by an Assisted 
Area location compared with one elsewhere in Scotland,
Another innovation in 1967, apart from REP, was the creation of 
Special Development Areas in a limited number of places severely 
affected by the closure of coal mines and where alternative job 
opportunities were very limited. Their appeal for incoming 
industry v/as limited, so that to bring them within the spatial 
profit margins of more firms they were given especially favourable 
cost subsidies by means of a 357-' building grant, assistance to 
cover operating costs and a five year rent free period for 
government factories (lîcCrone, 1969).
5.4 THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE ON LOCATION DECISIONS
A number of studies have been concerned with the impact of regional 
policy and have concentrated on three main issues, namely the 
generation of industrial movement, employment growth in the 
Assisted Areas, and the attraction of industry. The factors 
generating movement have been identified using both interview and 
statistical techniques. The importance of output and employment 
expansion has been noted by Cameron and Clark (1966), Keeble (1963) 
and ILAG (1973), while Moore and Rhodes (1976) examined the 
importance of regional policy relative to other factors in 
generating movement to the Assisted Areas. They also considered 
the impact of the individual policy instruments and concluded that 
on average 80-90% of moves can be attributed to regional policy 
measures. These conclusions have been challenged by Ashcroft and 
Taylor (1976), who argue that the effect of regional policy is 
over-estimated. A slightly different approach has been adopted by 
Sant (1975), who analysed why individual regions generate different 
volumes of movement. Sant concluded that the main factors 
responsible are the size of the origin areas as measured by their 
manufacluring employment and areal extent, the density and relative 
importance in spatial terms of their urban areas, and the regions' 
indu s' t rial s tru ctu re .
Moore and Rhodes (1973a) have sought to estimate the employment 
generated in the Assisted Areas by regional policy between 1963 
and 1970. They identify a net contribution of between 200,000 
and 250,000 jobs (30,000-35,000 per annum), after allowing for 
multiplier effects. Using a different technique Brown (1972) 
has obtained broadly similar results, arriving at an estimated 
policy effect of some 35,000 jobs per annum. Such results suggest 
that government inducements and controls can significantly 
stimulate employment growth in the Assisted Areas,
Studies of the specific influence of incentives upon the location 
decisions of mobile industry, as opposed to firms already in the 
Assisted Areas, support the theoretical argument that by spatial 
selectivity in subsidising costs the attraction of certain areas 
to immigrant industry can be enhanced. The ILAG survey (1973), 
for example, showed that the availability of government inducements 
is one of the tv/o outstanding factors deciding a firm in favour of 
moving to Scotland, and Forsyth (1972) has shown that this is also 
an important consideration with USA firms moving into Scotland.
Sant (1975) found strong evidence for the effect of interventionist 
policies designed to influence the destinations chosen by mobile 
industry. From this, Sant argued that it can be inferred that wnen 
such policies are in operation the location pattern can be predicted 
with some confidence by observing where they apply.
These findings help to explain why Scotland is chosen instead of 
a non-assisted area, but not why it was either preferred or rejected 
when the competing locations are also eligible for government 
assistance. Some of the possible explanations for this are 
discussed in the rest of Part II. They provide support for the 
argument that financial incentives extend the area within which 
it is profitable for a firm to operate. Therefore incentives are 
particularly important at the international or inter-regional scale 
of location decision making when they focus the search for a new 
site upon the Assisted Areas. However, sucn inducements are 
irrelevant.when the next spatial scale of decision making comes 
into operation, since all the Assisted Areas offered equal cost 
subsidies during the study period, with the exception of the smell 
Special Development Areas from 196?. This is recognised by Camu:'on 
and Clark (1966) and, to a lesser extent, by Keeble (1972), since
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they arc- concerned only with this geographical scale of movement, 
thereby allowing the effect of regional policy to be held 
spatially constant, Keeble, in fact, explicitly assumes that 
government inducements are "most unlikely to account for spatial 
variation in movement within the set of peripheral areas". But 
such an assumption can be disputed, at least in the Scottish 
context, because it is argued that when only certain parts of a 
region are eligible for assistance the availability of financial 
incentives can then become significant at the intra-regional level. 
But, as the coverage of the Scottish Assisted Area increases so the 
effect of regional policy on location decision diminishes, finally 
vanishing when the whole country enjoys Development Area status.
5.5 GOVERKMEDT ASSISTANCE AND THE LOCATION 
OF INDUSTRY AITillN SCOTLAND
The effect of regional policy is most pronounced and has been most
studied at the inter-regional scale, where it is a major
explanation for the movement of industry to the assisted regions. 
However, its influence on the choice of locations within areas such 
as Scotland has received less attention, although much of the 
country was ineligible for government assistance until the mid-
1960s. From Table 5-1 it is apparent that until 1963 between 36%
and 4 5% of the country's insured employees were outwith the 
Assisted Areas and the proportion remained as high as 28% until
1966.
As a consequence of the lower costs made possible by the 
availability of government incentives, the Assisted Areas within 
Scotland should be more attractive to incoming firms than elsewhere, 
although their relative appeal is likely to fluctuate depending on 
their marginal cost advantage. Since it was lowest in the 1950s 
the Assisted Areas' attractiveness for incoming industry is liable 
to have grown during the 1960s, particularly after I965, as a 
result of the increased cost subsidy to firms expanding in the 
Development. Areas.
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Any attempt to test these hypotheses is complicated by changes in 
the boundaries of the Assisted Areas. If they had remained constant 
any rise in their share of incoming industry could perhaps be 
attributed to the increase in financial assistance, assuming that 
other explanatory variables stayed constant. In fact their 
boundaries have steadily extended since 1959 away from the 
immediate post-war core region of Clydeside, with outlying areas 
around Dundee and Inverness. Betv/een 1945 and 1959 the Assisted 
Areas contained about 63% of the unemployed and 55% of the insured 
employees in Scotland (Table 5.1).
In i 960 the definitional basis of the Assisted Areas was changed 
to coincide with Employment Exchange boundaries since the new 
Development Districts were designated on the basis of their 
unemployment (McCrone, 1969). Between I960 and 1963 the area 
eligible for financial assistance was extended across the central 
belt of Scotland into fife, as well as southwards to Stranraer 
and northwards to cover the whole of the Highlands and Islands, 
with outliers in North East Scotland. In 1963 the Development 
Districts accounted for 81% of Scotland’s unemployment and 72% of 
its insured employees, but these proportions were to rise to 96% 
and 90% respectively in 1966, when the boundaries were further 
enlarged and the term "Development Area" was reintroduced. Only 
the Edinburgh, Leith and Portobello Exchange areas were excluded 
from assistance.
One method of identifying the effect of government regional policy 
within Scotland is to compare, by means of a Chi-Square test, the 
actual volume of incoming industry attracted to both the non­
assisted and the Assisted Areas with a notional "expected" figure 
based on their share of Scotland’s insured employees. Table 5-1 
compares the actual and expected amount of industry and Table 5*2 
shows that the difference between them was significant in every 
period, although it was least pronounced between 1952 and 1959 
when regional policy was at its weakest. This supports the 
hypothesis that the Assisted Areas enjoyed important cost 
advantages which significantly impi-oved their ability to attract 
incoming industry.
TABLE 5.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OP THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
ACTUAL AND 5/IECTED DISTRIBUTION 0? INDUSTRY IN THE ASSISTED 
AND NON-ASSISTED AREAS IN EACH PERIOD
Period.
Level of Significance: 
Expected figures 
Derived by Insured 
Employee Method
Level of Significance: 
Expected Figures 
Derived by 
UneraplGunment Method
1945-51 .001 .001
1952-59 .02 -
1960-65
(a) 1961 .001 .01
(b) 1963 .001
1966-70 .001 .01
The 1966-70 period is somewhat peculiar in that all the immigrant 
industry went to the Development Area. This, even allowing for 
the fact that by this time most of the country had Assisted Area 
status, is significantly greater than expected (.001 level).
An alternative explanation for the Assisted Areas* relative success 
in attracting industry at the expense of other parts of Scotland is 
that they enjoyed a competitive advantage, not so much from the 
availability of financial incentives as from the presence of other 
cheaper or more efficient factor inputs. The quality of the labour 
resources is particularly important in this respect, as the next 
chapter shows, and it is possible to examine the contention that 
their attraction for mobile industry has been a function of labour 
availability rather than government assistance. If unemployment 
is assumed to. be a satisfactory measure of the labour supply, then 
the actual volume of industry locating in the assisted and non­
assisted parts of Scotland can be compared with the expected 
quantity, based on their respective shares of unemployment in 
Scotland (Table 5.1).
This hypothesis is tested and rejected as the major explanation 
of success in attracting industry because in every period, except 
for 1952-59, the amount of industry moving into the Assisted Areas 
was significantly larger than expected, even after standardising 
for labour availability (Table 5.2). The results, however, 
indicate that some modification is needed to the initial findings. 
They suggest, for example, that in the 1950s, once the labour 
supply advantages of the Assisted Areas are taken into 
consideration, the cost advantage from government regional policy 
was insufficient to exert a significant diversionary effect on the 
flow of incoming industry towards the Assisted Areas. This 
supports the hypothesis that during this period the influence of 
government inducements on the choice of location in Scotland was 
weakest.
Another qualification is that in the 1960s part of the reason for 
the Assisted Areas' attraction le.y in their abundant labour supply, 
because once this is allowed for the significance level falls, and 
actually vanishes if the expected share is based on the high 
unemployment year of 1963.
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The immediate post-war period is comparable to the early 1960s in 
terms of the share of incoming industry locating in the Assisted 
Areas, but as their boundaries had been increased it can be argued 
that the diversionary effects were relatively greater in the 
earlier period. Support for this aO.so comes from the finding that 
the difference between the observed and expected volume of 
industry v/as more highly significant (.001 level) for the 1945-51 
period than between I960 and 1965 (.01 level) after allowing for 
labour supply factors.
In Table 5*1, the amount of industry is measured in terms of the 
number of plants and by both the maximum employment provided and 
employment at the end of the period. If the latter is used, then 
the Assisted Areas attra.cted about 7,300 more jobs than expected 
(1,050 per year) between 1945 and 1951, falling to 2,180 jobs 
(270 per annum) between 1952 and 1959, rising again to 2,250/3,400 
jobs (380/570 a year) between I960 and 1965. The final period saw 
only an extra 780 jobs (160 per annum) but, as has been shown, the 
Assisted Areas attracted all the new industry.
The decreasing number of additional jobs attributable to financial 
incentives, on the assumptions stated, provides evidence for the 
earlier argument that as the size of the Assisted Area grows the 
impact on intra-regional location decisions diminishes. Once most 
areas are able to offer similar cost subsidies, none enjoys any 
advantage over the others.
5 .5.1 The Impact of Government Assistance on the Attractiveness 
of Individual Areas
The impact of government inducements on the locations chosen within 
Scotland can be examined in more detail by comparing the amount of 
industry attracted by an area both before and after it became 
eligible for assistance. A marked increase suggests that its 
attractiveness to immigrant industry was significantly enhanced.
This is well illustrated by Fife in Table 5*3. Prior to 1962, when 
the whole of south Fife became a Development District, the county
TABLE 5.3 THE EFFECT OF ASSISTED AREA STATUS ON AN AREA’S
ATTRACTION TO MOBILE INDUSTRY
Period Share of Immigrant Industry
1) Pre AA
2) Post AA
Establish­
ments
Maximum
Employment
1970
Employment
Fife 1) 1945-61
2) 1962-70
3.3%
16 . 5%***
2.6%
19.3%
3.3%
20.8%
Falkirk/
Grangemouth
1) 1945-62
2) 1963-70
1.1%
9.3% ***
0.4%
9.1%
0.5%
10.2%
Borders
1) 1945-65
2) 1966-70
3.1%
8.2% **
1.3%
3.8%
1.4%
2.9%
Special
Development
Areas
1) 1962-67
2) 1968-70
3.3% 
8.2%*
3.0%
4.0%
3 .4%
4 .6%
NB The increase in the number of establishments v/as significant 
at the:
* .05 level (Difference of proportion test)
** ,01 level (Chi Square test)
*** .001 level (Chi Square test)
attracted only 3.3% of the immigrant plants moving into Scotland, 
and only 2.6,1 of the ein pi oyaient (at maximum). After becoming an 
Assisted Area it could boast dramatic increases in these figures 
to 1 6 .5% and 19.3% respectively. The volume of industry moving 
into Fife increased nearly sixfold after 1961, whereas in Scotland 
as a whole the number of establishments slightly more than doubled. 
The differences are highly significant (.001 level) and confirm 
that Fife’s attraction to incoming industry grew significantly 
after it became a Development District.
Several other areas experienced a similar increase in immigrant 
industry once they became Assisted Areas, particularly the Falkirk/ 
Grangemouth area, the Borders, and the Special Development Areas 
(Table 5.3). The Special Development Areas are especially 
interesting because between 1962 and 196? they were all Development 
Areas, but once the inducements were substantiafly increased the 
number of plants moving to them increased significantly (.05 level),
It seems probable, on the basis of this evidence, that the changing 
distribution pattern of incoming industry within Scotland can be 
partly explained by the effect of government financial inducements. 
They allowed the recipient areas to enjoy cost advantages over 
competing locations. Consequently the extension of the Assisted 
Area away from Clydeside allowed firms to operate profitably over 
a larger part of Scotland than formerly. The cost advantages 
previously enjoyed by Clydeside, Dundee and Inverness were no 
longer confined to these areas and as a result a wider distribution 
of incoming industry was to be expected after 1959. This raises 
the question of whether the relative shift towards the east of 
Scotland has been excessive, or whether it was to be expected when 
spatial cost differentials were reduced by governnient policy.
5.6 THE EFFECT OF GQVBPaVMENT POLICIES ON INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES
Once it has been established that priority from government policy 
enables an area to attract a disproportionately large share of 
Scotland's incoming industry, there remains the question as to 
whether all types of industry arc equally influenced in their choice
of location. There are theoretical reasons for expecting 
differences between industries because government incentives have 
for the most part taken the form of subsidies to capital (REP 
being the major exception). It might be expected that those 
industries in which capital costs represent a larger than average 
part of total costs would be particularly attracted to the Assisted 
Areas since their costs would be the most heavily subsidised.
Brown (1969) has in fact shown that the more capital intensive an 
industry is, the larger the proportion of its investment that will 
be undertaken in a Development Area.
Table 5.4 shows that the industries where capital costs were the 
highest proportion of total costs (over 10%) were bricks, pottery, 
etc; engineering and electrical goods; paper and printing; and 
chemicals and allied industries. However, there is no evidence to 
show that these industries displayed a greater than average 
preference for an Assisted Area location in Scotland. This is true 
of any particular sub-period as well as 1945-65 as a whole 
(1966-70 is excluded because no firms located outwith the 
Development Area). About 82% of establishments in these sectors 
located in an Assisted Area, and this is similar to the figure for 
all industries. ILAG (1973) has shown, in fact, that there is no 
obvious relationship between attitudes towards government 
assistance and the proportion of total costs represented by capital 
investment. The survey identified the industries giving greatest 
weight to incentives as vehicles, textiles, clothing and footwear, 
and electrical engineering. Those least influenced were paper and 
printing, timber and furniture, bricks and cement etc, and food, 
drink and tobacco.
This finding is not really surprising when the various components 
of capital cost are considered. Between 1945 and 1959 government 
incentives primarily took the form of subsidies to sites and 
factories, rather than to plant and machinery. This meant that 
industries such as chemicals, with high capital expenditure on 
plant and. machinery, obtained relatively little advantage from an 
Assisted Area location. Table 5.4 shows the principal elements of 
capital expenditure in 1963 by industry and identifies those 
industries most likely to benefit from regional policy because their 
expenditure on buildings and land is relatively high. Timber and
TABLE 5.4 COMPONENTS OP CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY INDUSTRY 1963
SIC
Order*
% of Capital Expenditure on
New
buildings
Land & existing 
buildings
Plant & 
machinery
Vehicles
3 20.2 4.0 67.2 8.6
4/5 15.9 1.2 76.4 6.5
6 17.9 1.3 77.9 2.9
7/8/9 19.2 5.8 66.6 8.4
10 30.4 3.8 60,9 4.9
11 27.9 2.1 66.4 3.6
12 19.3 6.7 62.6 11.4
13 10.8 3.5 78.9 6.8
14 17.7 8.8 50.0 23.5
15 18.5 8.2 49.3 24.0
16 19.0 3.6 61.3 15.7
17 26.6 9.8 34.6 29.0
18 19.3 5.5 66.5 8.7
19 16.2 3.6 72.0 8.2
* SIC Groups converted to 1968 classification 
SOURCE: 1963 Census of Production
furniture, shipbuilding, vehicles, instrument and electrical 
engineering, clothing and footwear, leather goods and metal goods 
all devoted 25% or more of their capital expenditure to buildings 
and land. Shipbuilding and leather goods were not represented 
amongst the immigrant industries that came between 1945 and 1965, 
so the hypothesis can be redefined to exclude them.
There was evidence that between 1945 and 1951, when government 
policy was most actively dependent on providing (ie subsidising) 
factories and sites, these industries displayed a greater than 
average prefei'ence for the Assisted Areas, About 91% of plants in 
these industries located in the Development Areas compared with 
81% of all immigrant establishments. The difference, based on the 
actual number of plants, is significant at the .05 level for a Chi 
Square test. The 1952-59 period produced no support for the 
hypothesis, reflecting the relaxation of government regional policy 
as well as the smaller number of immigrant establishments.
In the 1960s the subsidy to capital not only increased but the 
emphasis changed to give greater weight to plant and machinery 
costs, which constitute the largest component of capital 
expenditure. Therefore industries where capital costs in general 
are high might be expected to be over-represented in the Assisted 
Areas of Scotland between I960 and 1965. There was however no 
evidence for this. In the 1966-70 period, when the increased 
government incentives might have been sufficient to do this, the 
extension of Assisted Area status to most of the country makes it 
impossible to identify such a trend.
If the 1945-65 period is considered as a whole, it is apparent 
that industries differed in the extent to which they were 
influenced by the availability of government subsidies. Clothing 
establishraents were particularly attracted by government 
inducements and were significantly (.05 level) over-represented in 
the Assisted Areas, whereas both the textile and food industries 
were significantly under-represented (at the .01 and .05 levels 
respectively).
The explanation for these patterns appears to be more in terms of 
the industries’ susceptibility to transport costs and accessibility
factors, as the previous chapter showed, rather than the importance 
of capital costs within their overall cost structure. Those 
industries, such as clothing, least constrained by transport costs 
were best placed to move to the Assisted Areas within Scotland to 
take advantage of the cost subsidies, whereas the financial 
assistance was often insufficient to divert the textil; and food 
industries from the locations minimising their transport costs.
In conclusion, therefore, the evidence shows that the attainment 
of Assisted Area status has significantly improved an area’s 
competitive position and this has enabled it to attract more than 
its expected share of incoming industry. In particular the 
designation of Special Development Areas (SDAs) had a marked 
diversionary effect on the flow of immigrant industry coming into 
Scotland. Consequently the government has had a significant effect 
on the choice of location by mobile industry, since it can 
influence an area’s attractiveness, either through financial 
inducements or physical planning controls over factory building.
The impact of this policy can be seen in the Scottish locations 
selected by incoming industry.
CHAPTER 6
THE AVAILABILITY OF LABOUR 
AND THE ATTRACTION OF INDUSTRY
6.1 THE THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF LABOUR COSTS
Although Weber (1909) recognised that a cheap source of labour 
could divert the least cost location away from that determined 
purely by transport costs, it was seen as a subsidiary factor 
(Pig 3.2). Classical location theory has persistently under­
emphasised the importance of labour supply factors. Access to 
labour, however, is implicitly incorporated within the concept of 
agglomeration economies (Hoover, 1948). Localisation economies, 
which are external to the firm but internal to the industry 
include labour skilled in the requirements of that industry. The 
overall supply of labour is part of the more general urbanisation 
economies, which are external to the industry and benefit all 
establishments in an area. Firms are likely, therefore, to be 
attracted either to areas with similar industry or to the largest 
labour markets.
The influence of labour costs can be readily incorporated within 
Smith's (1971) variable cost model, by utilising the concept of 
space cost curves. If labour constitutes a major part of a firm’s 
costs and displays relatively pronounced spatial cost vaxlations 
it can be hypothesised that it will be an important influence on 
the location decision. This occurs because the cost penalty of 
siting a new plant away from a cheap labour location will be high.
Labour as a proportion of total costs is shown in Table 4.1, where 
it is exceeded only by the value of purchases. It is particularly 
high in the case of engineering and electrical goods and, to a 
slightly lesser extent, in the clothing industry. Since these 
sectors dominated the structure of immigrant industry, the cost of 
labour is likely to be influential in location decisions. 
Unfortunately there is a lack of detailed information on 
geographical variations in labour costs within Scotland, apart from 
average earnings in the planning regions (Table 6.1). Even if it 
were available careful interpretation would be required since there 
is little evidence that wage rates exert a strong influence on 
mobile industry (Cameron and Clark, I 966). The real cost to a firm 
will depend on issues such as the skills required, the local 
competition for labour and its productivity.
It is assumed here that the cost of labour is influenced by the 
relationship between its supply and demand and is inversely related 
to any excess in supply. The larger the surplus labour in an area, 
the lower its effective cost. In practice there is only a weak 
correlation between a region’s earnings and its unemployment, but a 
stronger relationship between the rates of change in earnings and 
unemployment (Brov/n, 1972). Nationally negotiated rates tend to 
enforce inter-regional similarities (Cameron, 1974) and as a result 
the availability of labour needs to be seen as incorporating 
financial advantages additional to those relating to wage rates.
It is possible to pinpoint some of these advantages. If labour is 
obtainable locally fewer people have to be moved with the firm or 
attracted in from elsewhere. Both these are likely to require 
financial inducements. An adequate supply may also facilitate the 
more rapid build up of output and enable a firm to take advantage 
of a sudden market upturn.
Apart from supply factors, the other major influence on labour 
costs is likely to be government policy. Assistance with training 
has taken the form of Government Training Centres and financial 
incentives to firms. For plants in Development Areas, the rate of 
assistance towards training costs was doubled in 1967 (McCrone, 
1969). The only direct subsidy for employing labour has been the 
Regional Employment Premium, equivalent to 7i% of labour costs 
when introduced in 196? (Alison, 1967). It was specifically
TABLE 6.1 AVERAGE AEEKLY EARNINGS IN EACH PLANNING REGION IN 1970
----- ---
Region
Full-time men 
(21 and over)
Full-time women 
(18 and over)
Manual Total Manual Total
£ £ £ £
W, Central 26.5 28.7 13.0 14.9
Falkirk/
Stirling
26.1 27.7 13.7 14.7
Eo Central 24.6 27.7 12.3 15.3
Tayside 22.7 26.0 12.4 14.4
Borders 20.5 22.5 12.9 13.9
South West 24.6 26,4 N/A 13.6
North East 22.2 24.6 11.9 15.0
Highlands 23.3 26.3 10.8 14.2
Scotland 25.2 27.7 12.7 14.9
Great
Britain 26.2 29.4 12.9 15.8
SOURCE; Scottish Abstract of Statistics 1971
designed to cut production costs in the Development Areas and 
thereby allow prices to be reduced. Depending on demand 
elasticities, this would give producers in these areas a 
competitive advantage, raise demand for their products and enable 
them to increase their labour force (McCrone, 1969).
6.2 MEASURING THE LABOUR SUPPLY
Labour can be obtained locally either from established industry, 
the unemployed or those available for work but not registered as 
unemployed, or it can be attracted in from other areas. In a tight 
labour market wages will probably have to exceed those of local 
industry or of other areas from which labour is to be attracted. 
This raises the question as to the most' satisfactory means of 
identifying the potential local labour resources.
Although high unemployment rates are generally taken to be 
indicative of a slack labour market, there are grounds for 
thinking that this is an over-simplification of the real situation. 
Development District status, for example, was conferred upon or 
removed from Employment Exchanges if the unemployment rate rose 
above or fell below 4&%. However, in terms of attractiveness to 
incoming industry preoccupation with percentages may be misleading. 
This is because "when it comes to the question of readily available 
labour supply for an intending employer, it is not the percentage 
of unemployment that matters, but the numbers available within a 
reasonable travel to work radius of the plant" (Davies, 1967).
A smaJ.l local labour market with a high rate of unemployment is 
unlikely to be able to meet the requirements of the larger incoming 
establishments, even if their manpower needs are exceeded by the 
number unemployed. A restricted labour pool is less likely to be 
able to provide a sufficient variety of ages, skills, and 
experience from amongst its workforce, in contrast to a larger 
centre with a lower rate of unemployment, This is because, as 
Davies (1967) argues, by far the most important "training centre" 
for industry is existing industry itself and the unemployed of a 
district reflect to a greater or lesser extent the industrial
expertise of their environment. Consequently the number of people 
unemployed will probably be a better indicator of labour reserves 
than the rate of unemplo^mient, McKay and others (1971) have 
pointed out that the supply of labour to individual firms is bound 
to be more elastic in the conurbations given the ability of 
employees to change employers by adjusting their travel to work 
journeys.
Although unemployment levels indicate the potential ease of labour 
recruitment for a firm, this is not to assume that mobile industry 
will recruit exclusively, or even predominantly, from the unemployed. 
In fact evidence suggests that this is unlikely and Steuer (1973) 
argues that "as a broad generalisation, it is fair to say that 
incoming firms recruit from the employed, creaming off the better 
workers, rather than from the unemployed".
One difficulty in identifying the potential labour force, especially 
in the case of female labour, is that the registered unemployment 
figures provide only a partial indication of the real situation.
Many women do not take the trouble to register as unemployed. It 
is sometimes argued that activity rates provide an alternative 
means of assessing the state of the labour market, but the actual 
meaning of differences in activity rates is far from clear,
Davies (1967) has pointed out that a reserve of labour indicated 
by low activity rates in no sense constitutes an economically 
effective supply here and now for an employer desperately seeking 
labour. It is necessary to distinguish the economic from the 
social component in local differences in the attitudes of women 
to taking employment.
There is no statistical evidence that female activity rates have 
been relevant in explaining the locations selected by mobile 
industry in Scotland. There has not even been a consistent 
relationship. In some periods there was actually a positive 
correlation between activity rates and the amount of industry 
moving into an area. After the initial tests, female activity 
rates were excluded from further consideration.
6.3 DIFFERENT TYPES OF LABOUR
An overall view of labour availability may prove of limited value 
in explaining the location of incoming industry if there are major 
differences in the various labour markets between the supply of 
particular types of labour, Davies (1967) has pointed out that 
it is misleading to treat the unemployed as "undifferentiated 
labour units, each equally capable of performing any job". Such 
an approach ignores both the quality and the efficiency of the 
input. After all, a supply of unskilled female labour is of small 
consequence to a firm seeking highly skilled and specialised male 
labour. Conversely, total labour availability is of little 
relevance to a female employing establishment if the unemployment 
figures are dominated by male labour* This is quite a problem 
given that female unemployment is under-recorded.
This question of distinguishing between supplies of male and female 
labour is potentially an important one. Changes in the structure 
of immigrant industry may alter the demand for particular factor 
inputs, resulting in new locational factors becoming significant. 
During the course of the post-war period the demand for male 
labour by incoming industry has declined as a result of the 
decreasing importance of the mechanical engineering industry and 
the growing prominence of the mainly female employing electrical 
engineering and clothing industries. These latter two sectors 
provided over half the incoming jobs in the late 1960s compared 
with only about one-quarter just after the war. Prior to the 
1966-70 period immigrant establishments created more male than 
female jobs, although if the two motor vehicle plants are 
excluded this applies only to the period up until I960 (Table 6.2).
Spare supplies of male and female labour are identified, to a 
greater or lesser extent, by means of the unemployment figures, 
but skilled labour is not so readily distinguished. Fortunately, 
this is not a serious problem because empirical studies have 
shown that "far fewer firms cited the availability of skilled 
labour as a factor determining their choice of location than 
cited either male or female labour in general" (ILAG, 1973), It 
appears that companies do not expect to find aJ.l their requirements 
f01' skilled labour mot without undertaking training. Even where
TABLE 6.2 MALE : FEMALE EMPLOYï^/IEET RATIOS IN IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY
Period
Male : female ratio
At maximum 
employment
End of period 
employment
1945-51 1.3 : 1 1.1 : 1
1952-59 1.5 : 1 1.4 : 1
1960-65 1.2 : 1 1,5 : 1
1966-70 0.8 : 1 0.8 ; 1
labour is attracted from established plants in the same industry, 
the skills required may differ slightly, making retraining 
necessary (Cameron and Clark, 1966). The overall availability of 
labour appears therefore to be more important to immigrant 
industry than the availability of particular skills.
6.4 LABOUR AVAILABILITY AND THE CHOICE OF LOCATION
The critical importance of the availability of labour in location 
decision making has be%i a consistent finding in empirical studies 
of industrial movement. It helps to explain why a particular 
Assisted Area is chosen, as well as why a particular site is 
selected within the preferred region. As a result it is relevant 
to explanations of location choice at both the inter- and intra- 
regional scale,
Cameron and Clark (1966) concluded that the supply of trainable 
labour is of overwhelming importance in choosing a new location 
and their findings accord closely with those of the ILAG survey 
(1973). This found that very few firms approached their choice 
of location without regard to the labour supply aspect. The 
availability of labour, together with government inducements, was 
the outstanding consideration for about three-quarters of the firms 
moving to Scotland, Sant (1975) has produced statistical 
confirmation that these are the two most significant factors in 
attracting industry to an assisted region.
Given the importance of an adequate supply of labour and the 
presence of about 40^ of the unemployment in the Assisted Areas, 
Scotland’s attraction relative to other regions seems to have been 
the ready availability of trainable labour. This should not 
obscure the fact that, on occasions, the presence of locaLisation 
economies has been vital. Univac Limited, for example, specifically 
cited this as an advantage to be found in Scotland. They claimed 
to need ’’people with the right sort of background and education, 
and clearly the place to get them was from our competitors to 
build up the operation quickly enough” (TISC, 1973), A similar
reason appears to explain the preference of incoming textile 
establishments for the traditional areas of production such as the 
Borders and Ayrshire.
Scotland’s potential advantage in terms of labour supply has been, 
to some extent, offset by the distance from the major English 
exporting regions (Keeble, 1972). Consequently the volume of 
industry attracted is less than might be expected solely in terms 
of the labour available. As Cameron and Clark (1966) have pointed 
out, the general pattern of industrial movement is to establish 
units in the nearest area with suitable supplies of labour,
Scotland's comparative advantage seems to have been particularly 
strong for firms requiring female labour, especially in the 1966-70 
period. At this time Scotland attracted a higher proportion of 
female jobs than any other assisted region (Department of Industry, 
1973). The growing prominence of the clothing and electrical 
engineering industries worked to Scotland’s benefit. More than 
any other sectors they attached most weight to a ready supply of 
trainable labour, particularly of females (ILAG, 1973). Some 
electronics firms, such as Univac Limited, specifically sought 
"semi-semi-skilled” female labour which they found was 
particularly plentiful in Scotland (TISC, 1973). As a result the 
attraction grew for places with a supply of female labour.
6.5 THE SPATIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR SITS SELECTION WITHIN SCOTLAND
The changing labour requirements of incoming firms have implications 
for the relative attractiveness of different areas. Those with 
plentiful resources of female labour do not necessarily have 
surplus male labour, although this is generally the case. The 
correlation between male and female unemployment levels is high 
throughout the post-war period. Nonetheless it did fall from 
between -^*0,89 and +-0.93 in the 1945-65 period down to +0.82 after 
1965. There was a lower correlation betv/een the unemployment 
rates. It grew from-hO, 47 prior to 1952 to-HO.64 in the early 
1960s, but after this it again fell t o '*■0,56.
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The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that in the mid- 
1960s the distribution patterns of male and female unemployment 
began to diverge more than in the earlier periods. This occurred 
at a time when female labour was of increasing importance to 
mobile industry. As a result, immigrant firms might be expected 
to move to different locations than formerly. The growing 
preference for sites in the east of Scotland may reflect a new 
found cost advantage, arising from such trends.
In terms of the overall supply of labour, the west of Scotland in 
general and Glasgow in particular were most favourably placed.
But the developing need for female workers v/as to the advantage of 
Stirlingshire, West Lothian and Fife. Their share of Scotland's 
female unemployment not only exceeded that of male unemployment, 
but it also increased during the post-war period (Table 6.3).
In contrast, the West Central region's share of female 
unemployment was lower between 1966 and 1970 than in any of the 
previous periods. This arose largely from the situation in Glasgow, 
but it was also true of Renfrewshire. Both Lanarkshire and Ayrshire 
experienced an improvement in their competitive positions after 
1965. Although less attractive than formerly in terms of its 
labour inputs, the West of Scotland still remained the most 
favourable part of the country because it consistently contained 
over half the unemployed reserves of female labour.
An indication of the extent to which changes in the location of 
immigrant plants can be attributed to labour supply factors is 
given in Table 6.4. This compares each region’s actual share of 
employment in incoming industry with that expected on the basis of 
its share of unemployment. Although the West Central region 
failed to attract the expected volume of industry after I960, the 
difference was most pronounced after 1965. This coincided with 
the enhanced attraction of the East of Scotland, which obtained 
between two and three times the amount of industry expected on 
the basis of its labour resources.
The overall regional figures disguise conflicting trends within 
them. These arise from pronounced differences between the various 
parts of a region in the quality and availability of their factor 
inputs. In Table 6.5 those areas are shown with either the largest
95.
TABLE 6.4 ACTUAL AND EXPECTED SHARE OP IÎ(îhIGRANT INDUSTRY BY SCOTTISH
PLANNING REGION
1945- 51 1952- 59 1960- 65 1966- 70
Region
Expected
Share
Actual
Share
Exp ected 
Share
Actual
Share
Expected
Share
Actual
Share
Expected
Share
Actual
Share
W. Central 70.1 71.6 58.3 77.1 63.3 56.1 59.0 37.6
Falkirk/
Stirling 2.2 0.2 3.6 6.6 3.2 2.0 3.7 11.2
E. Central 10.4 2.2 14.6 6.0 14.4 36.9 14.1 35.5
Tayside 6.0 23.1 6.5 4.2 5.7 1.3 6.6 2.0
Borders 0.3 0.4 0,4 1.4 0.5 - 0.7 2.4
South iVest 1.4 0.1 1.6 0,6 2.3 3.4 3.4 2.6
North East 5.3 2.3 7.9 3.3 5.6 0.1 5.7 2.7
Highlands 4.3 0.1 7.1 0.8 5.0 0.2 6.8 5.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Actual Share ~  %  o f  incuuigrant industry employment, at maximum 
Expected Share ° based on the %  o f  Scottish unemployment in the region
TABLE 6.5 AREAS WITH THE LARGEST SURPLUS OR DEFICIT OF
INCOMING EMPLOYMENT RELATIVE TO THEIR LABOUR SUPPLY
Period Areas of surplus employment
Areas of deficit 
employment
1945-51
Lanarkshire (d-16.1 ) 
Dunbartonshire (-e 5.2) 
Dundee (+18.0)
Glasgow (-25.8) 
Edinburgh (- 5*4)
1952-59
Lanarkshire (+-17,1) 
Dunbartonshire (+- 9.0)
Glasgow (- 8.7) 
Edinburgh (- 7.3) 
Aberdeen city (- 4.3)
1960-65
Lanarkshire (-+- 9.9) 
Dunbartonshire (+- 4.8) 
Ayrshire (-h 3.5) 
West Lothian (-M5.1) 
Fife 0-12.0)
Glasgow (-28.0) 
Edinburgh (- 5.0) 
Dundee (- 3.2) 
Aberdeen city (- 3*3)
1966-70
Lanarkshire (+■ 4.9) 
Stirling/ (4-7 4 ) 
Clackmannan 
West Lothian (''-13.9) 
Fife (+■ 12 .1 ) 
Inverness/ . 
Ross-shire ^.O)
Glasgow (-21.3) 
Renfrev/shire (- 6.4) 
Edinburgh (- 4.8) 
Dundee (- 3.2)
NOTES
Surplus Employment
Deficit Employment
(-P 5.0)
the area’s share of actual employment (at 
maximum) exceeded its expected share, 
based on unemployment, by more than three 
percentage points.
the area's share of expected employment 
exceeded its actual share (at maximum) 
by more than three percentage points.
difference between the actual and expected 
percentage snare of employment (at 
■ maximum).
surplus or deficit of incoming employment relative to their labour 
supply. The cut-off point of a difference of three or more 
percentage points is arbitrary, but has been chosen to identify 
both the most and least successful areas.
A number of persistent trends can be identified. Lanarkshire has 
been the most attractive area, experiencing a relatively large 
"excess" of employment in each period. Dunbartonshire was only 
marginally less successful in that only in the 1966-70 period was 
the surplus less than the three per cent cut-off level. These 
results show that even after I960 much of the West of Scotland 
proved attractive to immigrant firms. In this sense the overall 
regional picture is misleading. It is, however, clear from the 
figures that the East of Scotland's growing share of incoming 
industry from I960 onwards can be attributed to only two areas: 
namely Fife and West Lothian. They both experienced the largest 
relative surplus of any parts of Scotland.
In terms of employment deficit, the most marked feature is the 
continual presence of some or all of the Scottish cities in this 
category. Both Glasgow and Edinburgh experienced a shortfall of 
incoming jobs in every period. In Glasgow's case the gap was the 
largest of any area, and always at least twenty percentage points, 
with the exception of 1952-59. Dundee moved from a position of a 
large relative surplus of jobs just after the war to one of deficit 
in the 1960s. After 1965 the only other area where the number of 
jobs failed to reach the volume expected was Renfrewshire.
The spatial pattern within the regions is, in general, one of the 
central city experiencing a shortfall of incoming jobs, v/ith the 
surrounding counties obtaining at least their expected share on 
the criteria adopted here. In the West Central region Glasgow's 
deficit v/as too large to be offset in the 1960s and was in fact 
reinforced by Renfrewshire after 1965, despite the continued 
success of Lanarkshire and to a lesser extent of Dunbartonshire as 
well as Ayrshire in the early 1360s, This was similar to the 
position on Tayside and in the North East, where the cities' 
inability to attract much incoming industry was not counteracted 
by any pronounced success on the part of their neighbouring
counties. The reverse situation occurred in the East of Scotland, 
where the counties of Fife and V/est Lothian were able to more than 
compensate for the failure of Edinburgh to attract any mobile 
industry during the 196bs.
6.6 SURPLUS LABOUR RESERVES - HOW REAL ARE THE BENEFITS?
It is possible to suggest two reasons for expecting the distribution 
pattern of incoming industry to alter in response to the 
availability of labour. Firstly, there was the growing size of 
the Assisted Areas within Scotland. Places previously ineligible 
for government incentives and at a consequent cost disadvantage, 
despite surplus labour reserves, became able to compete for 
immigrant firms on a more equal footing. Secondly, there was the 
shift in demand from male to female labour arising from the 
changing structure of incoming industry. This favoured those 
areas with a large supply of female workers. Both trends 
benefitted Stirlingshire and the East of Scotland in particular, 
because they were able to offer many resources comparable to those 
available in the West of Scotland.
Although a wider distribution of immigrant industry was to be 
expected, Clydeside, and especially Glasgow, should have continued 
to enjoy the largest comparative advantage. And yet despite this 
other areas with smaller labour reserves proved more attractive, 
particularly from the mid-1960s. This suggests that Clydeside’s 
theoretical attraction was either perceived to be illusory, or 
that it was outweighed by other adverse factors. There is evidence 
that both may be true.
When labour costs per unit output (efficiency wages) and net 
output per head (productivity) are considered, there is evidence 
not only of spatial differences within Scotland, but also that 
incoming industry v/as influenced by them. Doubts exist over the 
quality of Clydeside’s labour resources, especially in terms of 
its productivity and industrial relations. Burroughs Machines 
Limited have stated that they could have looked for a little bit 
more in tho way of quality of labour than they had. on certain
occasions in their two n'est of Scotland factories (TISC, 1973).
Also, the .'Vest Central Scotland Plan (1974) concluded that the 
region displayed a low level of labour productivity, but that 
average wage levels were similar to those in the UK as a whole.
As a result, efficiency wages were relatively high, placing the 
region at a cost disadvantage. Cameron and Clark (I966) found 
that mobile industry v/as aware of, and deterred by, such a 
situation. They concluded that "labour productivity was assumed 
to be much the same in all the major Assisted Areas; the one 
exception being the V/est of Scotland, where several companies 
felt that restrictive union v/orking practices would lower labour 
productivity".
In fact concern over industrial relations seems to have been a more 
frequent reason for rejecting sites than the suspect productivity 
of local labour (Cameron and Reid, I966). There is strong evidence 
to suggest that Clydeside's competitive position was particularly 
weak in this respect. This is reviewed in more detail in Chapter S. 
The effect of all this appears to cause incoming firms to discount, 
at least in part, the area's labour supply advantages on the grounds 
of its suspect quality.
There is also reason to believe that access to labour may be less 
relevant than foi-'merly (Forsyth, 1372). Changing technology and 
rising productivity have reduced the labour requirement per unit 
output and the average size of mobile plants has fallen (moore and 
Rhodes, 1976), Burroughs Machines Limited have pointed out that 
their product used to be fairly labour intensive, but it is 
becoming increasingly capital intensive. In the past low cost 
labour was a factor of some importance but this is now less true 
because of the changing nature of their products (TISC, 1973). A 
decrease in the significance attached to the supply of labour by 
mobile industry means that greater attention will be paid to other 
factor inputs, which then become the marginal determinants of 
location. The possibility that this may have occurred is examined 
in the other enactors of Part II,
CHAPTER 7
THE AVAIL ABHjITY OF
INDUSTRIAL SITES AND PREMISES
ZlL_ THEORETICAL CONTEXT
The availability of industrial sites and premises can readily be 
incorporated v/ithin the variable cost model, as developed by Smith 
(1971). Land and factory costs will be important in location 
decisions only if they vary markedly over space and if their share 
of spatially variable costs is relatively high. Under such 
circumstances areas with cheap sites and premises will enjoy a 
pronounced cost advantage which will increase their attraction for 
incoming industry.
Direct costs can be measured by the purchase price, suitably 
discounted, or rent, as well as rates. Although spatial variations 
exist there is no readily available data to map the distribution, 
but since there is no strong empirical evidence to suggest that 
such costs are a major factor in the location decision, this is 
not a serious difficulty. Cameron and Clark (1966), for example, 
found that factory rents were ranked very low as an influence on 
the choice of site. This is consistent v/ith the views of East 
Kilbride Development Corporation (1965), who have stated that 
"rents for both sites and factories in East Kilbride are now 
amongst the highest in Scotland ..... the fact that there is no 
difficulty in obtaining these rents in competition with heavily 
subsidised offers elsewhere is a reflection of the fact that 
industry regards them as a good bargain".
Such conclusions, however, do not necessarily mean that site and 
factory costs are unimportant to mobile industry. After all, land 
can he denied to industry by the refusal of planning permission 
or an Industrial Development Certificate^' and this effectively 
imposes an unbearable cost on industry in the locations concerned.
The concept of spatial margins to profitability, within which a 
firm is free to choose a satisfactory rather than the optimum 
location, illustrates the potential significance of a suitable 
available site or building. An industrialist may decide that a 
location with a site or factory immediately available is suitable, 
although not as ideal for production as the one where costs are 
minimised. A firm can derive important cost advantages from such 
a decision, as is well illustrated by a site on an industrial 
estate.
The provision of communal facilities in the form of gas, electricity, 
water and transport facilities, for example, spreads the cost over 
many establishments, enabling each to be serviced more cheaply 
than on individual sites. The cost savings from such external 
economies can then be passed on to industry. Furthermore, the 
often lengthy and costly process of obtaining planning permission 
is avoided, enabling production to be started with the minimum of 
difficulty. An additional advantage is that an industrialist is 
given flexibility in that he can meet his changing space 
requirements within the estate. If a move to a new site or 
factory is required, distance and disruption costs can be minimised 
so that the existing labour force and linkages can be maintained.
The ready availability of factory space can also confer important 
benefits on industry. It allows a firm to undertake pilot 
production during which employees are trained, production teething 
troubles are ironed out and the market tested before the commitment 
is made to a large scale investment programme. In this way, risks 
are reduced and a company can take advantage of a favourable 
market situation by starting production without undue delay. This
IDCs have, been required only in the non-assisted areas since 
mid-1972.
Is an important consideration in a situation where time is money. 
It is these indirect cost advantages rather than the direct ones 
such as low rent and rates which encourage incoming firms to seek 
readily available sites and factories. They explain why it is 
rational for an industrialist to select a satisfactory rather 
than the cheapest site.
7.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL SITES AND PREMISES
It is possible to distinguish several different types of both 
sites and factories and these are each discussed in turn, before 
their importance to immigrant industry is considered.
7.2.1 The Components of Site Availability
There are two major types of industrial site. The first consists 
of sites which are fully serviced, immediately available and 
preferably contain room for expansion. They are best illustrated 
by industrial estates. A useful definition of such an estate, 
quoted by Klaasen (1965), is that it is "a device which can take 
many forms, but which basically refers to a tract of land developed 
in accordance with an overall plan designed to provide 
accommodation for a sufficiently large number of factories to make 
it economical to provide common services and special facilities to 
the industrial occupants". Although fully serviced sites with 
industrial zoning are by no means restricted to industrial estates, 
the alternatives are frequently unsuited to the needs of mobile 
industry. Many of these sites are too small, inaccessible, 
physically unsuitable or contain decrepit buildings. It is for 
this reason, as well as that of easier data availability, that 
industrial estates have been used as surrogates for the supply of 
industrial land.
The second type of site is one with special physical or locational 
characteristics. These cater for those industries with specialised 
site needs in terms of size, access to facilities such as rail head
or water frontage, or the presence of effluent disposal facilities 
to cope with heavy pollution. Sites with such demanding 
requirements are less generally available and are sought by a 
restricted range of industries, as both Cameron and Clark (1966) 
and ILAG (1973) point out. They appeal most to the food and 
drink, chemical, metal production, bricks and cement, and paper 
industries. In addition, very large plants place great weight on 
site availability, especially where new units are being established 
by assembly producers, particularly in the motor vehicle industry 
where land is also required for stocking vehicles.
The cost of industrial land can be indicated in a very general way 
by the availability of sites on industrial estates, if it is 
assumed that such sites confer certain cost a.dvantages for the 
reasons already discussed. This gives those areas with industrial 
estates a comparative advantage in attracting mobile industry.
Two methods have been used to measure the amount of such land 
available to industry; namely, the total acreage of all industrial 
estates of more than five acres and the acreage of those estates 
at maximum effectiveness (Table 7.1). This latter concept has 
been introduced because as an estate is developed the amount of 
land available for new industry decreases, along with its appeal 
to incoming firms. This of course explicitly assumes that the age 
of an estate and its attraction to industry are inversely related.
The time taken to fill an industrial estate varies depending on 
its size, location, the letting policy of the developers and the 
success of local and central government industrial development 
policies, A large estate close to a city may fill up more quickly 
than a smaller one in a rural area, so that size alone is not an 
adequate criterion. Time has been used as the critical factor 
determining an estate’s pulling power, with a period of ten years 
being assumed to represent the era of maximum effect. This 
follows a similar assumption made by Sant (1971) in the case of 
the impact of new towns. It is of course possible to extend the 
period of maxim'um effectiveness by increasing the size of the 
estate at a later date. This happened, for example, at Millington, 
V/ardpark (Cumbernauld) and College Milton (East Kilbride). In such 
instances only the new extension is considered to operate at 
maximum effectiveness and not the whole estate.
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7.2.2 Types of Industrial Premises
Industrial premises can be divided into three basic categories; 
namely purpose built (bespoke) factories constructed to the 
requirements of the f i m  concerned, new advance factories and 
previously occupied premises (including older advance factories).
The last two types constitute the stock of readily available 
premises suitable for immediate occupation by incoming industry.
In contrast, bespoke buildings involve a time lag while construction 
proceeds,
The stock of available premises in an area can be increased by 
building factories in advance of any known demand in order to 
supplement the premises released by plant closure or movement.
The term advance factory is used here to refer only to single 
storey buildings, not multi-storey premises such as the Clydeway 
Centre in Glasgow. This ha.s been done because multi-storey units 
are higher cost and less flexible, offering no means of lateral 
expansion. As a result of such drawbacks the Board of Trade told 
the Springburn Study team (1966) that they would not build flatted 
factories since "they find such developments unattractive to 
industrialists". It therefore seems reasonable to exclude such 
buildings from the category of advance factory space.
Firms requiring a specialised building on account of their large 
space requirements or the demanding specifications imposed either 
by the production process or by the nature of the plant and 
machinery housed within it are likely to favour purpose built 
premises. On the other hand, establishments with relatively 
undemanding needs and able to accommodate their production 
facilities in fairly standard premises are likely to be satisfied 
with an available building provided that it can be readily and 
inexpensively adapted to their requirements. This in effect 
usually means a'single storey, relatively modern building in good 
repair. It is therefore important that factory space should not 
only be available but also that it should be of a suitable form.
This point was stressed by the Springburn Study (1966), which 
pointed out that "shipyards, foundries, rolling mills, railway 
locomotive shops etc, are not the sort of premises demanded by the
lUO
light or mobile industries which are expanding at present. It 
follows that attempts to offer Glasgow's old industrial plants a: 
inducements to new industry are foredoomed to failure".
7.3 HIGTORIGAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES
Industrial estates were first developed in Scotland in the 1930s 
as a result of government initiative in attempting to tackle the 
severe unemployment problems of Clydeside. Four estates were 
developed, the largest being Hillington on the outskirts of Glasgov/, 
This policy was extended iimnediately after the war with the 
development of a further twelve estates in the West of Scotland 
and two in Dundee, and it was supplemented by the building of 
advance factories. The Board of Trade through its agent the 
Industrial Estates Company of Scotland, now called SIEC (Scottish 
Industrial Estates Corporation*) was responsible for undertaking 
these developments, which were the main regional policy instruments 
at this time.
An ambitious programme of 2,750,000 sq ft of advance factory 
floorspace was planned, of which 98^ was scheduled for Clydeside.
In reality a slightly reduced building programme actually 
materialised owing partly to difficulties in obtaining land at 
Balmore and Shav/field in Glasgow and partly to a cut-back in 
government expenditure after 1948 as a result of national economic 
problems.
The 1950s saw development start on the first of the new town 
industrial estates, in addition to two new SIEC ones. Advance 
factory building v/as not resumed until the latter 1950s when East 
Kilbride and Glenrothes new towns were allowed to build nest units 
following their earlier complaints that "it was not within 
Government policy to provide for the building of factories in 
advance of demand" (Glenrothes Development Corporation, 1955). The
* This is now part of the Scottish Development Agency,
Board of Trade announced the restart of their own programme in 
1959 as part of the movement towards a more active regional policy 
and the building of advance factories was steadily increased 
throughout the 1960s,
The main feature of the decade after I96O was the growing number 
of agencies involved in industrial development. Many local 
authorities began to take the initiative to attract mobile industry 
by developing their own industrial estates and constructing ■ 
advance factories. In the latter 1960s private developers also 
began to build their own estates and factories, especially in 
Glasgow where the Ronald Lyon group redeveloped a number of old 
industrial sites, including redundant shipyards.
The role of each organisation can be complementary as well as 
competitive, to the extent that they may cater for different 
demands. SIEC, for instance, give priority to manufacturing 
industry which provides a net addition to employment, rather than 
to establisliments relocating production without any increase in 
employment (Springburn Study, 1966). On the other hand, local 
authorities, new towns and private developers all cater for industry 
rehousing locally. The private developers, in particular, have 
attracted such plants together with distribution and repair or 
service depots, rather than incoming raanufacturing establishments 
(Henderson, 1972). This, plus the lack of readily accessible 
data, led to the decision to exclude private industrial estates 
from the analysis. Since such estates only operated between 1966 
and 1970 and then attracted only 3>% of the incoming plants in 
this period, it seems reasonable to omit them.
The contribution of the various agencies to the development of new 
sites and factories in each period can be seen in Tables 7*1 and 
7 .2 . Prior to I960, SIEC was the dominant developer and the 
location of advance factories and industrial estates provides an 
indication of the priorities accorded to different areas by 
government regional policy. After I 96O the situation changed as 
a result of the growing efforts of the new towns and local 
authorities. SIEC’s share of new advance factory floorspace fell 
to 33ks whereas the new tovms built over half the new space and 
the local authorities constructed about l6/j. A similar picture
TABLE 7.2 ADVANCE FACTORY FLOORSPACE BUILT IN EACH PERIOD
Advance Factory Floorspace - Square Feet Built
Period
SIEC New Town Local
Authority Total
000 
sq ft %
000
sq ft %
000 
sq ft
000 
sq ft %
1945-51 2,280.8 100.0 - — •c 2,200.8 100.0
1952-59 « 36,0 100.0 - « 36.0 100.0
1960-65 540.8 31.4 1,100.0 63.8 82.9 4.8 1,723.7 100,0
1966-70 1,239.6 33.1 1,703.0 45.5 803.6 21.4 3,746.2 100.0
Total 4,061.2 52.2 2,839.0 36.4 886.5 11.4 7,786.7 100.0
occurs v/ith industrial estates. Just after the war all the 
industrial estates were provided by SIEC, but by 1970 only 26-/j of 
the total acreage and as little as 12^ of the area at maximum 
effectiveness was on SIEC estates. These figures illustrate the 
dramatic v/ay in which the government's monopoly role as the 
provider of advance factories and industrial estates has been 
overtaken.
7.4 A COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF AVAILABLE SITES 
AND FACTORY SPACE
It is difficult to disentangle the separate influences of factory 
space and site availability on the location decision. Most advance 
factories are built on industrial estates, which also contain a 
large stock of buildings that can be reallocated whenever they are 
vacated. A further complication is that the availability of land 
around a factory to allow for future expansion may be a powerful 
attraction in addition to the building itself. In this latter 
case it can be argued that the availability of premises is the 
prime reason for a firm's interest in a particular industrial 
estate and the presence of land for expansion only becomes relevant 
once a short list of possible factories has been drawn up.
Cameron and Clark (1966) have provided evidence to support the 
argument that factories are the decisive location factor more 
frequently than sites. They showed that about 38/t of firms were 
strongly influenced in their choice by the immediate availability 
of ready built premises and found that a factory was ranked more 
highly by mobile industry than an available fully serviced site. 
This led them to conclude that, unlike premises, serviced sites 
were "factors of less importance". Their findings were 
corroborated by the ILAG survey (1973), which found that premises 
followed government inducements and labour availability as the 
most frequently mentioned major determinant of a firm's location 
and concluded that where this factor operates it tends to be 
decisive more often than other factors do.
I I U
East Kilbride Development Corporation (1965) are in no doubt that 
■factories are a more valuable asset thaai sites when trying to 
attract new industry. In their experience "it remained much 
easier to let advance factories than sites for purpose built 
premises and occupation of the former frequently induced closer 
consideration of the latter. Until there is a marked slackening 
in demand for such premises, clearly the policy must remain to 
build more as quickly as possible". All the new towns have placed 
great emphasis on their factory building policies and feel that 
these have made a vital contribution to their ability to attract 
mobile industry. Their views have been summarised by Livingston 
Development Corporation (1971), who have stated that "the 
immediate or early availability of factories built in advance of 
known requirements has been of vital importance to industrial 
development",
A number of major companies are also on record as attaching a great 
deal of importance to the ready availability of advance factories. 
Honeywell (1973) have argued that "through the years the existence 
of factory space that could be moved into within a matter of two 
or three months has been of tremendous value in persuading our 
American company to keep putting their assets and their production 
requirements into this country". Another American electronics 
firm, Univac (1973), have stated that the critical factor in their 
decision to develop at Livingston was neither government 
inducements nor the availability of labour, but the presence of an 
advance factory. Incentives and labour attracted them to Scotland, 
but the actual location within the country was dependent on the 
immediate availability of a suitable factory.
The evidence from this study supports these views. It is assumed 
that where an immigrant firm constructs a purpose built factory 
the availability of a site is paramount, but where a firm moves 
into a nev/ advance factory or previously occupied premises, the 
availability of the factory itself is of critical importance.
Between 33A (1952-59) and 59',7 (1966-70) of all immigrant 
establishments started production on an industrial estate. The 
proportion rose steadily in the 1960s from the relatively lev/ level 
of the 1950s wnen regional policy v/as lax. In employment terms
I I .
TABLE 7 .3  I/..1GRAAT ILLUoTRY E.IFLOY^KUT 07 ir:D73TR lAL ESTATES
(a) Establisiments
1960-65 1966-701952-59 Total1945-51Type
of
Ind
Site No of 
Estabs
No of 
Estabs
No of
Estab
No of 
Estabs
No of 
Estabs
26.7 16.5
16.5 
22.9
20SIEC IE 45.1 17.8
20.0
26.124 28 137
NT IE 11.3
LA IE 20 14 11.3
P IE
All IE 26233.445.1 100 50.0
ISO IS
Non IE 77 53.5 40,7 37.7 239
TOTAL 100.0144 100.0 135 100.0 170 100.0 524 100,0
(b) Employment
Type
of
Ind
Site
1945 -51 1952 -59 i960-65 1966 -70 Total
it ax No 
Jobs 
(000)
X of 
Jobs
Max No 
J obs 
(000)
>1 of 
J obs
Max No 
J obs 
(000)
of
Jobs
Max No 
Jobs 
(000)
>; of 
Jobs
Max No 
Jobs 
(000)
% of 
Jobs
SIEC IE 39.0 63 .2 4.7 15.8 3.2
.. „. .
3.1 5.3 21.7 53.1 33,8
NT IE _ - 5.1 17.0 10.5 26.4 4.5 18.5 20.1 12.5
LA IE - - 3.8 9.7 5.0 20.5 8.8 5.6
P IE
, .
_ - -
-
1.7 1 7 1 1.7 1.1
All IS
......
39.8 63 .2 9.3 32.8 17.5 44.2 16.5 67.3
■.......
33.7 53.3
SIEC IS 2.6 4.4 J.3 11.1 5.6 0.9 3.6 12.6 3.0
Non IE 20.4 32.4 16,8 56.1 16.6 41.6 7.0 28.6 60.7 38.7
TOTAL 63.0 100.0 29.9 100.0 39.7 100.0 24.4 100.0 157.0 100.0
KEY : SIEC IS - SIEC industrial Estate
A'T IS - Nev.’ Town Industrial Estate
LA IE - Local AuLhority Industrial Estate
P IE -• Private Industrial Estate
SIEC IS - SIEC Individual Site
Non IE - Lot cn an Industrial Estate
as many as 68^ of incoming jobs were located on industrial estates 
in the 1966-70 period and the average for the whole of the 1949-70 
period was 53% (Table 7.3).
Amongst those immigrant plants which moved to an industrial estate 
about three out of four occupied existing premises (new advance 
or previously occupied). This suggests that the buildings rather 
than serviced sites are the main attractions of an industrial 
estate (Table 7.4). When a firm occupies an existing building 
only for a limited period prior to moving into purpose built 
premises, it might be argued that this is indicative of the site 
(for the new factory) being either equal to or more important 
than the immediate availability of premises. Even if this view 
is accepted in its entirety it still does not affect the 
conclusions. Between 1945 and 1970 about one in three of all 
immigrant establishments started in or moved to purpose built 
premises, indicating that site considerations may have 
predominated, whereas t'wo out of three gave greater weight to the 
availability of factory space.
There are some differences .between the various types of industrial 
estate. Relatively more immigrant firms built their own factories 
on local authority and new town estates than on SIEC estates 
(Table 7,4). This probably reflects the more recent development 
of the first two categories of estates, in that they had fewer 
previously occupied premises available for letting. About one 
in three establishments moving to SIEC estates started in such 
premises, which is a much higher ratio than on local authority 
or new town estates. On each type of estate the most popular 
choice was the new advance factory, which was initially occupied 
by over half the incoming plants moving to the industrial estates.
The demand for particular types of factory varied from one period 
to another. Purpose built premises were most in demand in the 
1950s at a time when there was no government advance factory 
building, and this resulted in a restricted choice of available 
premises. However in no period did more than one in three 
immigrants initially build their own premises (Table 7.5). There 
was a persistent and definite preference for readily available 
factory space. The main trend, in this respect, was the growing
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TABLE 7.5 t y p e  OF FACTORY INITIALLY OCCUPIED BY liYIIIGRANT INDUSTRY
1946-51 1952-59 1 960-65 1966-70
Factory Type
No % No % No % No %
Purpose Built 29 20.1 25 33.3 36 26.7 39 23.0
Previously
Occupied 81 56.3 44 58.7 56 41.5 65 38.2
Advance Factory 34 23.6 6 8.0 43 31.8 66 38.8
a) SIBC
^ Advance Factory 34 23.6
6 8.0 16 11.8 22 12.9
n \ New Town
Advance Factory - — 19 14.1 IS 10.6
\ Local Authority 
Advance Factory
- ** - 8 5.9 24 14.1
,\ Private
Advance Factory
- " - 2 1.2
All Factories 144 100.0 75 100.0 135 100.0 170 100,0
proportion of firms moving into new advance factories rather than 
into previously occupied premises. This is a clear indication of 
the attraction of such buildings to mobile industry. Areas unable 
to provide advance factories are likely to be at a severe 
competitive disadvantage, unless they can offer previously 
occupied but modern factories as a suitable alternative. Since, 
by the latter 1960s, only about two out of every ten immigrants 
preferred to wait for a purpose built factory, with its 
attendant higher risks and greater cash outflow in the difficult 
early years, it can be concluded that incoming industry generally 
preferred an available factory to an available site (Table 7.5).
7.5 THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE SITES AND FACTORIES
In the immediate post-war period when industrial buildings and 
sites were scarce, their provision by government effectively 
lov/ered development costs and provided a definite cost advantage 
to the areas containing such facilities. Government policy has 
given priority to areas of high unemployment and this explains 
why in 1970 West Central Scotland had 81% of a3.1 the industrial 
estate acreage and 79% of the advance factory space developed by 
SIEC.
The construction of non-government estates, which were not 
developed on any scale until the 1960s, reflects the policies of 
local authorities and new towns rather than those of central 
government; but since most authorities enjoyed Assisted Area 
status when they laid out their own estates the policies seem to 
have been consistent with one another.
The activities of the various agencies undertaking site and 
factory development can be seen in their different geographical 
distributions. Central government commitment remained largely 
with the iVest of Scotland, although from the mid-1960s when the 
Assisted Area was extended industrial estates and advance 
factories were constructed in a growing range of locations 
throughout Scotland. West Central’s share of new SIEC industrial 
estate acreage at maximum effectiveness fell from 90% just after
the war to 40% by 1970 and its share of new advance factory 
floorspace declined from 97% to 53% (Tables 7.6 and 7.7),
The new town advance factory programmes also benefitted the West 
ox Scotland more than the East, but although the total industrial 
estate acreage developed by the new towns was similar in both 
regions, the East of Scotland had more of the new acreage (at 
maximum effect) after 1565. The local authorities were most 
active in the East Central region as can be seen from the 
distribution of local authority estates and advance factories in 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Their self-help policies counterbalanced the 
priority the West of Scotland enjoyed from central government 
policy.
The spatial impact of the combined efforts of all these agencies 
is important because it caused a change in the geographical 
distribution of cost advantages during the post-war period. Until 
I960 the West of Scotland enjoyed a very definite comparative 
advantage, with 81% of the industrial estate acreage and virtually 
all the immediate post-war advance factories. In the 1960s this 
position began to alter radically as new sites and factories were 
developed throughout Scotland and the new towns and local 
authorities supplemented the industrial development activities of 
central government. The East of Scotland benefitted most from 
this trend, and by 1965 it contained 57% of the new industrial 
estate acreage at maximum effectiveness, compared with 35% in the 
West Central region. By 1970 the respective shares were 50% and 
29%. The growing trend towards more capital intensive production 
methods lowered site employment densities and increased the demand 
for industrial land. The Grangemouth/Falkirk Regional. Survey and 
Plan (1968) felt that as a result there was a tendency for good 
industrial sites to be in short supply in central Scotland. 
Consequently the East of Scotland was favourably placed to benefit 
from any general, scarcity. As far as new advance factory space is 
concerned, the shift eastwards in comparative advantage has been 
less dramatic. Even by 1970 the West Central region had more than 
half of the new floorspace, compared with less than one-third in 
the East of Scotland (Table 7.7). Nonetheless East Central 's 
share steadily increased after I960. As a result of these
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TABLE 7.7 ADVANCE FACTORY BUILDING - DEVELOPERS, REGIONS AND TIME PERIODS
Advance Factory Space - Square Feet Built
Period Region SIEC
New Town LocalAuthority Total
000 
eq ft %
000 
sq ft %
000 
sq ft
000 
sq ft %
WC3 2,214.0 97.1 2,214.0 97.1
E/3 - - - - - - - -
ECS - - “ - - - -
1945“
T
B
66.8 2.9 - - - - 66.8 2.9
51 SiY
NE
HI
Scot
- - - “ - “ -
2,280.8 100.0 - “ - - 2,280.8 100.0
wcs 24.0 66.7 24.0 66.7
F/S - - “ - — - -
ECS » - 12.0 33.3 - - 12.0 33.3
1952- TB
SW
NE
- - - - - - - -
59 - - - - - - - -
HI
Scot - - 36.0 100.0 “ 36,0 100.0
WCS 353.8 65.4 840.0 76.4 53.5 64.5 1,247.3 72.4
P/S - - - - 10.6 12.8 10.6 0.6
ECS 141.0 26.1 260.0 24.6 18.8 22,7 419.8 24.3
1960-
65
T
B
— - - - — — -
s w 27.2 5.0 - - - 27.2 1 .6
NE 18.8 3.5 - “ - - 18.8 1.1
HI - ** - - - - -
Scot 540.8 100.0 1,100.0 100.0 82.9 100.0 1,723.7 100.0
V/CS 653.3 52.7 1,129.0 66.3 222.6 27.7 2,004.9 53.5
F/S 41.7 3.4 - - 155.0 19.3 196.7 5.3
ECS 209.7 16.9 574.0 33.7 352.0 43.8 1,135.7 30.3
1966“
70
T
B
74.2
10.0
6.0 
0.3
10.0
14.0
1.2
1.8
84.2
24.0
2.2
0.6
SïV 131.6 10.6 -■ 30.0 3.7 161.6 4.3
NE 105.6 8.5 - 20.0 2.5 125.6 3.4
HI 13.5 1.1 - - - 13.5 0.4
Scot 1,259.6 100.0 1,703.0 100.0 803.6 100.0 3,746.2 100.0
developments incoming industry had a wider choice of potential 
locations and sites were no longer restricted to the areas of high 
unemployment on Clydeside and in Dundee.
At the city or county scale the best placed areas in terms of the 
availability of sites and advance factories were Lanarkshire, Fife, 
West Lothian and Dunbartonshire. In all these counties the new 
towns made a major contribution, with a share of advance factory 
floorspace ranging from 90^ in Dunbartonshire to 65^ in 
Lanarkshire, in West Lothian and 54^ in Fife. These counties
proved the most successful in attracting incoming industry in the 
1960s and each obtained more immigrant employment than expected 
on the basis of their labour supply measured by the level of 
unemployment.
7 .5.1 The Distribution of Areas with Adequate and Inadequate 
Supplies of Land and Factories
In order to place these events into some sort of perspective it is 
necessary to try and suggest a notional expected level of industrial 
estate and advance factory building in an area. Using the same 
method as previously, based on a region's share of Scottish 
unemployment, it is possible to show that West Central's level of 
advance factory space only fell short after 1965, when another 
200,000 sq ft would have been required to equate its share of new 
advance floorspace and unemployment (Table 7.8). This contrasts 
with the East of Scotland, which obtained nearly double the 
expected floorspace after I960, culminating in a notional excess 
of around 600,000 sq ft in the latter 1960s. Other regions with 
a notional surplus after 1965 were Falkirk/Stirling and the 
South West, while Tayside, the North East and the Highlands aJ.1 
experienced a notional deficit.
Following a similar procedure with industrial estates, it is 
possible to select two scenarios depending on whether total 
acreage or only the nev/ acreage at maximum effect is used. The 
former will include previously occupied premises coming vacant 
for letting, whereas the latter is more strictly a measure of
TABLE 7.8 ACTUAL AND NOTIONAL EXPECTED ADVANCE FACTORY 
FLOORSPACE BUILT IN EACH PERIOD
1 21
Advance Factory Floorspace
Period Region % Share
Converted to 
sq ft (000) Difference 
in sq ft 
(000)
Actual Expected Actual Expected
VV Central 
Falkirk/
97.1 70.1 2,214 1,601 -t-613
Stirling
2.2 50 — 50
E Central 10.4 — 237 -237
1945-
Tayside 2.9 6.0 67 136 — 69
51 Borders 0.3 - 6 - 6
S West ** 1.4 - 32 - 32
W East 5.3 - 121 -121
Highlands
Scotland. 100.0
4.3
100.0 2,281
93
2,281
- 98
W Central 
Falkirk/
72.4 63.3 1,247 1,091 H-l 56
Stirling 0,6 3.2 11 55 “ 44
E Central 24.3 14.4 420 248 'HI 7 2
I960- Tayside — 5.7 - 98 - 98
65 Borders — 0.5 - 9. - 9
S West 1.6 2.3 27 40
1
“ 13 1
N East 1.1 5.6 19 97 - 78
Highlands
Scotland 100.0
5.0
100.0 1,724
86
1,724
— 86
W Central 
Falkirk/
53.5 59.0 2,005 2,210 -205
Stirling 5.3 3.7 197 139 -f 58
E Central 30.3 14.1 1,136 528 + 608
1966- Tayside 2.2 6.6 84 247 -163
70 Borders 0.6 0.7 24 26 — 2
S West 4.3 3.4 161 127 + 34
N East , 3.4 5.7 126 214 - 88
Highlands 0.4 6.8 13 255 -242
Scotland 100.0 100.0 3,746 3,746
NOTE; a.) The 1952-59 period is excluded as virtually no advance 
factories were built. 
b)The ( %'/joted no./ Pi core pace is based on eacli region ' s 
snare of u n eaiployme;j t .
I .
site availability. Both indices lead to similar conclusions and 
differ only in their magnitudes. After I960 West Central 
experienced a notional deficit of industrial land, the size of 
which increased in the latter 1960s, however it is measured.
This contrasts with the East of Scotland, where there was a large 
notional surplus throughout the 1960s reaching nearly 2,000 acres 
of land by the end of the decade (Table 7.9). This figure is 
obtained by comparing the expected share (14.1%) of new industrial 
estate acreage with the actual share (50%). The other surplus 
regions, which were relatively well provided with industrial sites 
after 1965, were the Borders ( 73 acres) and South West ( 29 acres) 
and the deficit regions were West Central (-1,539 acres), Falkirk/ 
Stirling (-119 acres), Tayside (-108 acres) and the Highlands 
(-188 acres).
The conclusion to be drawn from Tables 7.6 to 7.9 is that there 
was a relative shift eastwards during the 1960s in comparative 
advantage, as far as the availability of serviced sites and new
advance factory space was concerned. But despite the erosion of
West Central Scotland's competitive position it still retained 
an absolute advantage in terras of advance factory space and was
on a par with the East of Scotland as far as total, but not new,
industrial estate acreage was concerned (Table 7.6). The actual 
number and extent of the sites and factory floorspace is important 
because the larger the choice in an area, the higher the
probability that mobile industry can find its requirements catered
for. A small place with a favourable ratio of space to 
unemployment may only have a single factory available, whereas a 
larger centre with a poorer ratio may have more factories to offer. 
It therefore stands a greater chance of meeting a firm's needs in 
terms of size, height or quality of the building.
Although the West Central region failed to develop its notional 
expected share of new sites and factories, especially after 1965, 
this seems unlikely to account fully for the size of the eastward 
shift in the distribution of incoming industry. The region 
attracted less industry than its share of new advance factory
space or total industrial estate acreage would indicate to be
appropriate. It contained the largest stock of both existing 
premises and new advance factories and should have been In the
12J
TABLE 7.9 ACTUAL AND NOTIONAL EXPECTED INDUSTRIAL ESTATE 
ACREAGE AT LAXI-.U..! EFFECTIVENESS
Ind Est Acreage at Maximum Effectiveness
Period Region % share
Converted 
to acres Difference 
in acres
Actual Expected Actual Expected
\V, Central 89.6 70.1 1,082 847 + 235
Falkirk/
Stirling -
2.2 - 26 - 26
E. Central — 10.4 — 125 -125
1945“ Tayside 10.4 6.0 125 72 +  53
51 Boi'ders “• 0.3 — 4 “ 4
South West - 1.4 - 17 - 17
North East - 5.3 “ 64 - 64
Highlands
Scotland
■
100.0
4.3
100.0 1,207
52 
1,207
“ 52
VY. Central 
Falkirk/
89.0 58.3 1,088 713 +375
Stirling 3.6 44 — 44
E, Central " 14.6 « 178 -178
1952- Tayside 10.2 6.5 125 79 + 46
59 Borders - 0.4 5 - 5
South West “ 1.6 20 „ 20
North East “ 7.9 97 - 97
Highlands
Scotland
0.8
100.0
7.1
100.0
10
1,223
87
1,223
“ 77
W. Central 
Falkirk/
34.7 63.3 1,067 1,946 -879
Stirling 1.6 3.2 48 98 50
E, Central 57.2 14.4 1,759 443 1,316
1960- Tayside - 5.7 •• 175 -175 i
65 ' Borders - 0.5 15 “ 15 1
South West 5.2 2.3 160 71 +-89
North East 1.0 5.6 30 172 -142
Highlands 0.3 5.0 10 154 -144
Scotland 100.0 100.0 3,074 3,074
W. Central 
Falkirk/
_ . _ 
29.3 59.0 1,517 3,056
!
-1,539
Stirling 1.4 3.7 73 192 -119
E. Central 49.8 14.1 2,580 730 1,850
1966“ Tayside 4.5 6.6 234 342 -103
70 Borders 2.1 0.7 109 36 73
South West 4.0 3.4 205 176 + 29
North East 5.7 5.7 297 295 + 2
Hignlsnds 3.2 6.8 164 352 -188
Sco bland 100.0 100.0 5,179 5,179
“—- -— .
strongest position to provide factories to meet the demands of 
incoming industry, even though, in relative terms, the East of 
Scotland had a better record of advance factory building. On the 
other hand, the East of Scotland attracted more employment in the 
latter 1960s than might reasonably be expected on the basis of its 
available sites and factories. This situation cannot be explained 
by an over-concentration of new building in only a few locations 
in West Central which might be deficient in other respects and 
therefore unattractive to immigrant firms. The advance factories 
were, in fact, distributed over more employment exchanges* (19) 
than in the East of Scotland (10), Consequently, factors 
additional to those of site and factory availability seem to have 
been operating to deter industry from moving to the West and 
encouraging it to move to the East of Scotland.
7.6 THE INDUSTRIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL SITE AND 
E A C T 0 RY AY AIL AS IL IT Y
It is of relevance to policy whether or not certain firms are likely 
to view the availability of a serviced site or a factory as an 
inducement. If the majority of incoming industries are attracted 
by such factors, it should be possible to improve an area's appeal 
to immigrant firms by a policy of industrial estate and advance 
factory development.
This question is examined by identifying the industries which are 
either significantly over or under-represented on particular types 
of site and in certain sorts of premises. In the case of industrial 
estates, Table 7.10 shows that the only industry in y/hich incoming 
establishments were found in significantly larger numbers than 
expected, on the basis of the distribution for all immigrants, 
was instrument/electrical engineering. Conversely, those 
industries least attracted either by sites or factories on
* The Glasgow and Edinburgh employment.exchanges were counted 
as one each.
TABLE 7.10 IimiGRANT INDUSTRIES AED THEIR PREFEREE CE FOR 
PARTICULAR TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL SITE
(a) Immigrant Industry which displayed a si,f^nifleant preference 
for sites on industrial estates
Industry
Chi Square Test
Number of 
Establishments
% of 
EstablishmentsLevel of 
Significance
Instrument/
Electrical
Engineering
.001 66 67.3
All
Industry 262 50.0
(b) Immigrant Industry which displayed a significant preference 
for sites off industrial estates
Industry
Chi Square Test
Number of 
Establishments
% of 
EstablishmentsLevel of 
Significance
Pood, drink 
& tobacco .001 29 78.4
Textiles j .001 32 76.2
I
Bricks, i 
Glass etc ' 23 76.7
All 1 
Industry j 262 50,0
industrial estates, where they were significantly under-represented, 
were food, drink and tobacco, textiles, and bricks, glass etc 
(Table 7.10),
In order to determine whether it seems to have been site or 
factory considerations that caused firms in these industries 
either to move to or reject industrial estate locations, it is 
necessary to identify the type of premises they initially 
occupied. The instrument/electrical engineering plants seem to 
have been attracted by the availability of new advance factories. 
Table 7.11 shows that as many as of immigrants in this
industry initially started production in a new advance factory, 
compared with only 2S^ of all immigrant establishments. If the 
same proportion had held true for instrument/electrical engineering 
units, then only 28 would have moved into advance factories. The 
difference is highly significant at the .001 level.
Although the availability of new factory space rather than a 
serviced site was of critical importance to this industry, it 
also appears to have been influenced by the presence of nearby 
sites on which purpose built factories could subsequently be 
built to facilitate expansion. A significantly (.01 level) 
higher proportion of instrument/electrical engineering than of 
all immigrant establishments expanded into purpose built premises.
New advance factory space also pi'oved a strong attraction to 
clothing firms because the number starting in such premises was 
also significantly greater than expected (Table 7.11). The fact 
that in the 1960s, when advance factory building was particularly 
pronounced, the clothing and instrument/electrical industries 
were the commonest incoming industries meant that those areas 
constructing advance factories enjoyed a major advantage in their 
ability to attract immigrant firms.
As far as the food, drink and tobacco and the bricks, glass etc 
industries are concerned, the ILAG survey (1973) shows that they 
had speciaJ. site requirements arising mainly from their effluent 
requirements. These made them unwelcome tenants on industrial 
estates, where both industries are signif icantly under-represented 
(Table 7.10), In addition, ILAG showed that tney az'e strongly
TABL^ 7.11 lïvlMIGRANT INDUSTRIES AND THEIR PREFERENCE FOR 
PARTICULAR TYPES OF FACTORY SPACE 1945-70
(a) Immigrant Industry which showed a significant preference for 
soace
Industry
Chi Square Test Number of 
Establish­
ments
% of 
EstablishH- 
mentsLevel of 
Significance
Instrument/
Electrical .001 42 42.9
Engineering
Clothing .02 33 39.8
All Industry 149 28.4
(b ) Immigrant industry which showed a significant preference for 
previously occupied premises
Industry
Chi Square Test
Number of 
Establish­
ments
% of 
Establish- 
ments
Level of 
Significance
Textiles 
All Industry
.02 27
246
64.3 
46.9
(c) Immigrant Industry which showed a significant preference for
purpose built premises
Industry
Chi Square Test
Number of 
Establish- 
ments
% of 
Establish- 
ments
Level of 
Significance
Chemical s .001 15 53.6
Food, drink,
tobacco/
JBricks, glass etc .05 24 35.8
AIT Industry “ 129 24.6
influenced by the need for access to raw materials. Since this 
restricts their location choice they are less likely to find a 
suitable industrial estate (even assuming they are Interested) on 
which to start production. However, their preference for purpose 
built premises (Table 7.11) relative to immigrant industry as a 
whole indicates that a site on which to construct such a building 
is of particular importance.
It is somewhat surprising, at first glance, that the chemical 
industry, which also tends to require specialised sites and access 
to raw materials, (ILAG, 1973) is not also under-represented on 
industrial estates. In fact half of the immigrant chemical plants 
were on estates, which is the same proportion as for all incoming 
establishments. The explanation, in this instance, seems to be 
that many of the plants were at the "lighter", non-polluting end 
of the chemical industry spectrum, especially in pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics and photographic products, and they frequently located 
on industrial estates. Examples are Organon Laboratories, Flow 
Laboratories and Polaroid. This does not rule out the importance 
of site factors to this industry because it displayed a significant 
preference for purpose built rather than available premises.
Table 7.11 shows that over half of the chemical plants built their 
own premises compared with only one-quarter of all immigrants.
Another interesting finding is the aversion of textile establish­
ments to a site on an industrial estate, despite both their lack 
of specialised site requirements and a significant preference for 
previously occupied premises (Tables 7.10 and 7.11). As many as 
64'/^  of immigrant textile concerns started production in such 
buildings compared with 47/ of all immigrants. The stock of 
factories on industrial estates might have been expected to 
attract textile firms. The reason they did not do so seems to be 
the importance attached by the industry to localisation economies. 
Textile firms showed a strong preference for the traditional 
textile nianufacturing areas where they utilised cheap premises 
which were frequently former mills.
7.7 THE ORIGIN COMPONENT IN THE DEFiAKD FOR SITES AND FACTORIES
There is evidence that an origin as well as industry component 
influences the demand for sites and premises. Immigrant plants 
coming from North America have displayed a particularly strong 
desire to locate on industrial estates and in advance factories, 
as can be seen in Tables 7.12 and 7.13. For example, 61/ of 
North American immigrants, but only 47/ of those from elsewhere, 
started on industrial estates. The respective figures for new 
advance factories were 40/ and 25/. In both cases the North 
American concerns displayed a significantly different preference 
pattern from that of immigrant industry as a whole.
It was however shown above that the instrument/electrical 
engineering industry was particularly influenced by the availability 
of industrial estate sites and factory space and this industry is 
over-represented amongst North American immigrants. For example,
34/ of them were engaged in instrument/electrical engineering, 
compared with only 14/ of establishments from other origins. 
Nonetheless, even when standardised for industrial structure it 
is evident, in Tables 7.12 and 7.13, that the North iunerican 
demand has been strongly biased towards new premises and industrial 
estates.
The number of establishments within any industry moving into an 
advance factory is too small to derive statistically meaningful 
conclusions. However, in all the industries shown, relatively 
more North American immigrants than others started in new advance 
factories. Ahen all new premises, in the form of both advance and 
purpose built factories, are considered together it becomes 
apparent, in Table 7.13, that North American establishments in 
both the mechanical and the instrument/electrical engineering 
industries showed a stronger preference for a new building than 
did immigrant industry as a whole.
The, engineering industries as a group are also of interest for two 
other distinctive aspects of their demand for sites and factories. 
They are the only industry in Table 7.12 which is over-represented 
on industrial estates and, as Table 7.13 shows, they have displayed 
a pronounced demand for sites on which to construct tneir own 
factories.
TABLE 7.12 NORTH A-EKICAJM IBIVII GRANT ESTABLISH!,1 ENTS ON
INDUSTRIAL ESTATES
Establishments 
on Industrial Estates
Industry North
American
Other
Origins
No % No %
Mechanical Engineering 15 62.5 17 38.6
Instrument/Electrical
Engineering 31 75.6 36 63.2
Mechanical, 
Xnstrument/Ele ctrical 
Engineering
46^ 70,7 52 51.5
Metal Goods n e s 5 45.5 21 56.3
Clothing a 6l. 5 40 55.6
All Industry 73* 61,3 190 46.9
^ significsjitly higher than expected: ,02 level for Chi Square Test 
 ^ significantly higher than expected: .01 level for Chi Square Test
NOTE: Only those industries with more than 5 North /merican
establishments are shown.
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TABLE 7.13 NORTH AMERICAM IMMIGRANT ESTABLISKjlEBTS IN ADVANCE FACTORIES AND 
NEW PREMISES, 1945-70
Establis 
in Advance
hments
Factories
Establishments in 
purpose built 
premises
Establishments in 
all new premises 
(advance and 
purpose built)
Industry
North Other North Other North Other
American Origins American Origins American Origins
No . % No % No % No % No No %
Mech Eng 8 33.3 11 25.0 7 29.2 5 11.4 15* 62.5 16 36.4
Instr/Elec
Eng 21 51.2 21 36.8 12 29.3 8 14.0 33** 80.5 29 40.8
Mech
Instr/Elec 29 44.6 32 31.7 19** 29.2 13 12.9 48*** 73.8 45 44.6
Eng
Metal 
goods nes 4 36.-4 32.4 4 36.4 4 10.8 8 72.8 16 43.0
Clothing 7 53.8 26 36.1 1 7.7 11 15.7 8 61.5 37 51.8
All Ind 48** * 40.0 101 25.0 37** 30.8 92 22.8 85 70.8 193 47.8
KEY: Significantly larger than expected at
.05 level for Chi Square Test 
,01 level for Chi Square Test 
,001 level for Chi Square Test
*
* *
NOTE: Only those industries with more than 5 North American establishments
are shown,
The reason for the greater desire on the part of North American 
immigrants to occupy new premises is unclear. It could reflect 
aspirations for the new and modern, as well as a willingness and 
ability to invest in the best possible facilities, rather than 
selecting cheaper but possibly less efficient alternative, older 
premises,
7.8 ESTABLISHMENT SIZE AND DEMAND FOR SITES AND PREMISES
There are reasons for thinking that the size of an establishment 
may affect its demand for a particular type of site or building. 
Those requiring extensive sites are rarely able to find sufficient 
land on an industrial estate and as a result it might be expected 
that average employment size would be lower on industrial estates. 
The evidence is conflicting because between 1952 and 1965 this 
hypothesis held, but it did not apply in either the preceding or 
the following period (Table 7.14). One reason for this is that 
some of the larger capital intensive plants required extensive 
sites, but relatively small labour forces, whereas some large 
employers, especially in the engineering industry, provided 
relatively high density employment on industrial estates.
Insofar as the relationship between establishment size and factory 
type is concerned, Klaasen (1965) has argued that "the benefits 
afforded by the availability of sites, factories and services on 
industrial estates are particularly important for small firms or 
new enterprises, especially those which can be accommodated in 
standard factory buildings offered for rent". This is supported 
by Cameron and Clark's (1966) findings that the smaller companies 
were particularly influenced by factory availability. Table 7.14 
shows that this is also true of Scottish immigrant establishments. 
Those building their own premises employed between 50^ and 100% 
more people in each period than those moving into new advance 
factories, and these in turn tended to be larger employers than 
firms starting in older, previously occupied, premises which 
offered less room for expansion.
TABLE 7 .14 THE AVERAGE EMPLOTvIELT (AT rv'AXTMUM) OP BIMIGRANT
ESTABLISHiVlEHTS - INDUSTRIAL SITES AND PRiLIISES
Number of Employees
1945-
51
1952-
59
1960-
65
1 966- 
70
Type of Site
Industrial Estates 613 392 247 165
Not on
Industrial Estates 293 409 347 112
Type of Factory 
initially occupied
Purpose built 842 633 483 188
[
' Previously 
1 occupied
281 275 160 133
New
Advance Factory 465 321 313 127
All Industry 438 398 295 143
I ^  ‘f- <
The size distribution of completed advance factories can be seen 
in Tables 7.15 and 7 .1 6 .  These illustrate why the largest 
employers require purpose built premises, because the median 
size of 31EC advance factories was only 20,000 sq ft and this is 
considerably larger than those built by either the nev/ towns or 
the local authorities. Nest factory construction (defined here 
as units of under 10,000 sq ft) has been left largely to the 
local authorities and new towns. Only 5% of the SIEC factories 
were smaller than 10,000 sq ft, compared with two-thirds of the 
local authority and as many as. three-quarters of the new town 
advance factories (Table 7 . 1 6 ) .  The government (SIEC) factories 
were orientated more towards the needs of larger firms, aJ,though 
in absolute terms the new towns built more large (over 20,000 
sq ft) advance factories than SIEC.
SIEC advance factory occupants are conspicuous for the prominence 
of immigrant firms and for their reluctance to undertake a 
subsequent move to purpose built premises. Both features suggest 
a high degree of satisfaction with such buildings. As much as 
68>o of the SIEC advance factory floorspace built and occupied 
between I960 and 1970 was taken by incoming establishments and 
of these 95:^ remained in their initial factory, expanding either 
by constructing extensions or taking nearby advance units. 
Immigrants starting in local authority advance factories displayed 
only slightly less stable characteristics in that 88^ remained in 
their original building. A different picture is found in the nev/ 
towns, where only 65^ retained their original factory and one-third 
subsequently moved to purpose built premises. Differences in 
factory size seem to provide the explanation for this pattern in 
that the new towns built relatively more of the smaller units than 
either SIEC or local authorities. It appears that many immigrants 
in the new towns started pilot production in premises too small to 
satisfy their long term needs. Advance factories seem to have 
fulfilled a valuable function in facilitating initial small scale 
production while teething troubles are overcome.
Overall there is a strong preference amongst inmiigrant companies 
to remain in the same type of premises in which they started, 
since 89/5 did not change, although a fèw of these moved to a
TABLE 7.15 AVERAGE SIZE OP COÎ.iPLïïTED ADVANCE FACTORIES - 000 SQ FT
Authority
All Factories 10,000 sq ft and over
Median
Size
Lower
Quar-
tile
Upper
Quar-
tile
Median
Size
Lower
Quar-
tile
Upper
Quar»
tile
SIEC 20.0 13.0 27.5 20.0 13.2 27.8
New Towns 5.0 2.0 6.3 20.0 12,5 25.0
Local
Authority 5.0 3.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0
IJb,
TABLE 7.16 THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF ADVANCE FACTORIES BUILT BY DIFFERENT 
AUTHORITIES
Space Completed. 1950-70 - Number of Factories
000 
sq ft
All Factories 10,000 sq ft and over
SIEC New Towns LocalAuthority SIEC New Towns
Local
Authority
No % No % No % No % No % No
1 - 9.9 4 5.3 261 76.1 76 64.9 - — - - — -
10 - 19.9 35 46.7 34 9.9 29 24.9 35 49.3 34 41.4 29 70.7
20 - 29.9 22 29.3 35 10.2 10 8.5 22 31.0 35 42.7 10 24.4
30 - 49.9 6 8.0 8 2.3 2 1.7 6 8.4 a 9.8 2 4.9
50 - 79.9 8 10.7 4 1.2 - - 8 11.3 4 4.9 - -
80 - 99.9 - - 1 0.3 - - - - 1 1.2 - -
Total 75 100.0 343 100.0 117 100.0 71 100.0 82 100,0 41 100.0
similar type of factory. As might be expected, the smallest 
movement was out of purpose built premises, and the largest from 
the new town advance factories.
7.9 CONCLUSION
It appears that the distribution of readily available premises has 
had an important influence on the location of incoming industry. 
Since I960 about three out of every four iimnigrant establishments 
have started production in available, rather than purpose built 
factories. Previously occupied buildings have made a greater 
contribution than new advance factories, but by the latter 1960s 
the increased scale of advance factory construction resulted in 
as many immigrants moving into such premises as into previously 
occupied ones.
The -changing distribution of advance factory building, with a 
decreasing proportion being built in the West of Scotland, seems 
to offer only a partial explanation for the region’s declining 
share of incoming industry. After all, even in the 1960s the 
majority of immigrants did not start in an advance factory. The 
availability of previously occupied space has also been important 
and the West Central region should have enjoyed an advantage in 
this respect. Not only does it contain over half of Scotland’s 
manufacturing industry, but it also benefitted most from 
government industrial development activity, containing as it did 
about 80^ of all the SIEC industrial estate acreage in 1970,
The region’s share of new industrial estates fell dramatically 
during the post-war period and it became less competitive than the 
East of Scotland. However, the fact that factories rather than 
sites seem to have been critical to most incoming firms and that 
West Central snould have enjoyed a comparative advantage in terms 
of this resource suggests that this cannot provide a complete 
explanation for the changing distribution of incoming industry.
It appears, as a result of the industrial development activities 
of the various agencies in the 1960s, that an increasing number 
of locations outwith the West of Scotland had factories and sites
available. This represented a very marked change from the earlier 
periods. Consequently mobile industry was no longer restricted 
in its choice of potential locations to the West Central region, 
although the variety of factories available was still likely to 
be greatest there. In cost terms the region’s previous advantages 
were reduced, but not eliminated (assuming that factory 
availability and cost are inversely related). The reduction of 
geographical cost differentials in this v/ay may have either 
helped to extend the spatial margins to profitability away from 
the West of Scotland, or else it decreased cost differences 
inside the margins, particularly within the central belt. A large 
enough reduction could a].low other factors, such as psychic costs, 
to offset the competitive advantage enjoyed by those places 
with the largest choice of sites and factories. In this way 
industry’s attention might be drawn to a wider variety of 
locations where its requirements could be satisfactorily met, 
especially if there was an urgency to start production.
CHAPTER a
PSYCHIC COSTS AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF .AN AREA’S IMAGE
8 .1 INCORPORATING PSYCHIC COSTS Y/ITHIN THE VARIABLE L EAST COST
MODEL
Behavioural theories were shown to incorporate sub-optimal decision 
making since they recognise tnat industrialists are essentially 
"satisficers” who seek to attain certain aspiration levels rather 
than "maximisers" seeking the optimum solution to their location 
problem (Simon, 1959). This concept that personal considerations 
can outweigh economic ones in location decisions is important 
because it recognises that an industrialist's perception of an 
area can influence his choice of site, since the decision is rarely 
confined to purely commercial considerations. Greenhut (1956) has 
argued that non-financial factors represent a "psychic income" 
which contributes to the businessman's goal of maximising total 
satisfaction, and Smith (1966) has shown how concepts such as the 
image of an area and the search for a satisfactory' rather than 
optimum site can be incorporated within a variable cost model.
In deference to this latter approach the term psychic costs is used 
here to denote the perceived non-financial costs arising from a 
reduction in an industrialist's total satisfaction as a result of 
choosing a particular location. They constitute the cost of 
enterprise in that management is likely to be attracted more readily 
and cheaply to areas with low psychic costs because higher financial 
induccinents will probably be required to entice managers to those 
places perceived as being unattraxtive, ■
The theoretical discussion showed that the spatial margins to 
profitability are likely to be determined by economic factors such 
as costs or revenues, but anywhere within them a manufacturer will 
be able to find a satisfactory location. As a result the actual 
choice may be determined by personal preferences based on an 
impressionistic view of different areas. Townroe (1971) has found 
that a detailed economic evaluation of alternative sites is 
unusual, thereby allowing personal feelings to affect the location 
decision. The opportunity cost of such a decision is the profit 
forgone by locating away from the least cost location. Therefore 
the steeper the spatial cost gradient and the further away the 
chosen location is from the hypothetical optimum, the higher the 
opportunity cost and the greater the implied psychic cost 
advantage of the preferred site.
The smaller the variations in cost over space, the greater the 
probability that psychic cost advantages will be able to offset 
the financial cost penalties of a non-optimum site. Consequently 
any trend towards an equalisation of production and transport 
costs within Scotland is likely to increase the weight exerted on 
the location decision by personal considerations or psychic costs. 
In such circumstances it can be hypothesised that psychic cost 
advantages will increasingly become the marginal determinant in 
the choice of location.
The influence of psychic costs is illustrated in Pig 8.1 based on 
Smith’s (1966) work. The least cost maximum profit point is at X, 
although anywhere within the shaded area will enable profits to be 
made. The margin is determined by the points of zero profits at 
M-] and M g , beyond which losses are sustained.
AC35 - 
30 -
AR
20 -
Y X il!
AC - Average cost 
AR - Average revenue
Fig 6.1 The hi’foct of an Area's Image or; the loc"; ti on decision
A manufacturer may be deterred, from locating at X because of its 
unfavourable perceived image whereas he is attracted to Y for 
personal reasons (Pig 8.1). Greenhut tries to rationalise this 
further via "psychic income" and it can be argued that although Y 
is a higher cost location than X by £5 per unit output, if the 
psychic income obtainable at Y exceeds this difference then Y will 
offer a higher total satisfaction and personal factors will divert 
the factory from the maximum profit location. An alternative way 
of expressing this situation is to argue that location X imposes 
high "psychic costs", and if they are assumed to be more than £5 
per unit output this renders'X a higher cost location than Y, 
which becomes the least cost point.
V/hether or not the perceived image is realistic is unimportant, 
and it does not matter if a decision maker is unlikely to use the 
facilities of an area because as Eversley (1965) points out, it 
is enough that he should feel that he will be deprived of something 
by not selecting that particular location. ILAG (1973) found 
support for this general argument, concluding that amenities and 
environment appear to play an important supplementary role in 
decision taking and pointed out that 70% of all firms said they 
were influenced to some extent by this consideration. Cameron 
and Clark (1966) also concluded that "an attractive local 
environment influenced a sizeable minority of companies".
8.2 THE COMPONENTS OP Ah AREA’S BIAGE ALP THEIR I.YPLICAlIOhS 
PGR PSYCHIC COSTS
The intangible and subjective nature of the concept makes for 
difficulty in identifying, let along assessing, the relevant 
components that go to make up the image. In addition, the type of 
move being considered may be relevant, for if management and key 
workers are to move with tne plant then the new location must be 
attractive to them, whereas if few personnel are to transfer the 
image of the environment for residential purposes is less important 
On the other hand, the perception of the work environment as it 
affects the efficient economic operation of the firm is likely to 
be r'elovant regardless of the type of move.
8.2.1 Ima.ve of the Physical Environment
It is possible to recognise at least three components that contri­
bute towards the concept of image. Firstly, the physical 
environmenr is likely to be the factor influencing a manufacturer's 
initial impression on visiting an area. A drab town set in 
scenically unattractive surroundings is unlikely to prove 
attractive unless the economic arguments in its favour are 
overwhelming and these may be influenced by the type of industry, 
because as Klaasen (1965) has pointed out, "the more footloose an 
industry ..... the more the nature of the general facilities
offered by the area will be important". As most of the incoming
industry falls into this category, by virtue of the fact that it
has moved from elsewnere in the UK or abroad, it means that v/e
should expect immigrant establishments to be under-represented in 
environmentally depressed areas. The most obvious feature of such 
places is the low quality of housing and a run-down urban fabric.
If it is assumed that industrialists view Scotland in the context 
of city regions, it is possible to compare the regional centres 
using Census data relating to the quality of the urban physical 
environment (Table 8.1). Glasgow is shown to be the most 
underprivileged centre and therefore likely to present the most 
unappealing image, a fact which has been recognised by the sub­
committee of the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee (1967), who 
concluded that "Glasgow has a reputation for bad housing conditions 
and, despite great efforts by the Corporation this reputation is 
unfortunately justified". It must be admitted that this is only 
a partial picture as it cannot illustrate, for example, the value 
of the numerous attractive Victorian buildings in Glasgow, nor the 
influence of the Georgian New Tov/n on Edinburgh's image.
8 .2.2 Image of the Social/Cultural Environment
A second component is the social/cultural one, which embraces 
features such as the quality of theatre, musical and otner 
entertaininent, the range of eating places, the choice of activities 
either to v/atcn or participate in, as well as indicators of the
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TABLE 8.1 CO:.:PARATIVïï s t a t i s t i c s  o f  u r b a n  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  SCOTLAND
Glasgow Edinburgh
r~  '
Aberdeen Dundee Scotland Great
Britain
Physical Environment
% of population at over 
1.5 persons per room
11,8 4.9 4.0 5.2 5.4 1.6
i' of households lacking 
hot water tap 23. B 10.5 15.1 22.5 12.4 12.5
> lacking bath 32.7 20.2 31.3 32.4 20.0 15.4
7I lacking exclusive use 
of v;c 17. S 6.2 30.8 17.9 11.2 8.1 1
r’ of owner occupied 
dwellings 20.1 47.3 29.4 18.4 28.2 46.7
i
Social Environment !
A' of population under 
15 years 27.5 23.8 23.4 26.6 26.2 /N/A at 1
5^ 15 - 64 years 59.4 62.1 63.0 61.0 61.7
, time of !
over 64 years 13.1 14.1 13.5 12.5 12.1 ( 1
Dependency rates* 683 610 586 641 621
,report
Deaths per 1,000
population 13.3 12.9 12.5 12.3 12,3 11,9
(all causes)
Infant mortality per 
1,000 live births 27 22 17 20 21 18
males professionals, 
mana,j,ers & employers 8.7 17.3 14.0 11.1 13.2 15.1
A males intermediate &
juni or non-m c nual and 
semi- and unskilled 48.0 45.0 46.7 46.8 45.7 43.3
manual workers
* Dependency rates: the number of persons under 15 and those over 64 per 1,000 
persons aged 1 5 - 6 4
Source: Areas of Need - 01esgo.v Corporation and Scottish Development 
Department, 1
social environment such as the demand for welfare services, social 
structure, homelessness, crime rates and alcoholism. Without 
detailed analysis it is impossible to suggest any comprehensive 
view on the social/cultural image of different areas other than 
to speculate that the two extremes are likely to be represented by 
Edinburgh at the favourable end of the spectrum and Glasgow at the 
other end. The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan (1966) clearly 
held this view, arguing that the Edinburgh area is one of high 
amenity value and likely to be favoured by an industrialist 
wishing a location for his factory which will be attractive both 
to himself and his workforce. The survey team felt that 
Livingston New Town could benefit from this association by 
emphasising its accessibility to the business, social and 
cultural life of Edinburgh. Edinburgh enjoys international acclaim 
for its annual Festival, whereas Glasgow's publicity frequently 
has a negative, not to say sensational, bias, with an emphasis on 
the "No î.lean City" image (McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1956). 
Examples are articles in "Time" magazine (1973) which concentrated 
on violence and squalor, and the Sunday Times and Observer Colour 
Magazines (1968), which both focussed exclusively upon extremes 
of violent behaviour by teenage gangs. "Time" magazine even went 
so far as to claim that "for most of this century, Glasgow has 
been a Mecca foi' criminologists and sociologists. It is violence, 
and not the ships built and launched into the slate-grey waters 
of the Clyde, that gives Glasgow its fame". Glasgow football fans 
are another popular topic with the media, who frequently appear 
more interested in off the field activities, especially when 
Celtic and Rangers play each otner.
It is however interesting to note that Cameron and Clark's (1966) 
study provided support for the contention that "some areas are 
rejected on social criteria and particularly because of the poor 
physical and social environment which they are said to possess".
A poor perception of Clydeside would appear to be rooted in fact 
in that Holtermann (1975) concluded that "there is no escaping 
the conclusion that v/hen deprivation is measured at small area 
level, Scotland and Clydeside have more of it than anywhere else, 
it is more severe tnere and there is more of it in the same 
places. No English, conurbation is in the same league as 
Clydeside".
8 . 2 . 3  Image of the Economic Environment
The economic environment représentes the third component of 
"image", and is equally elusive and difficult to measure. It is 
assumed to exclude wages and labour availability, for which there 
is quantifiable evidence and which represent a distinct factor 
and cost of production in their own right. But it includes 
features such as militancy of the workforce, for which no small 
area data is provided.
The evidence that is available suggests that not only is this an 
important consideration to a number of firms but also that once 
again Clydeside is likely to present a more unfavourable image 
than other parts of Scotland. Cameron and Clark (1966) found that 
the desire to locate in an area of good management-labour relations 
was often mentioned, with strong preferences being expressed for 
areas which were free from strikes or where union organisation 
v/as felt to be relatively weak. They also discovered that a 
number of companies refused even to contemplate the West of 
Scotland because of its reputation for militant labour, while 
some large companies, alter considering the region, rejected it 
on the grounds of the suspect quality and tractibility of labour. 
Unfortunately for Clydeside, those companies in the important 
engineering and electrical goods sectors which considered setting 
up large branch plants showed "a marked desire to establish units 
in the newer areas, where it was felt the unions would not be so 
militant as in areas close to the centres of traditional industry" 
(Cameron and Clark, 1966).
Clear evidence for a difference between the West and East of 
Scotland has come from Burroughs Machines Limited in their evidence 
to the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee (1973). They claimed that 
"in Scotland we have had more than an acceptable amount of labour 
disruption relative to other places throughout the world - I 
would say particularly at Strathleven and to some extent at 
Cumbernauld also". This contrasts with the situation in their 
Fife plant, wnere "in tne case of the Glenrothes factory, I 
believe the relationships with the workers and with the unions 
have been very good". This supports the view expressed by the
Lothians Regional Survey and Plan (1966) that the Edinburgh 
region does not have a bad reputation for industrial relations.
The West Central Scotland Plan team (1974) found that the region 
had a poor strike record and concluded that "for all stoppages, 
the number of days lost per 1,000 employees per annum over the 
period 1960-68 in West Central Scotland was significantly higher 
than in the UK as a whole, or in the rest of Scotland", In fact, 
amongst all regions of Britain only Merseyside had a worse strike 
record than West Central Scotland between 1968 and 1973 (Table 8,2), 
after standardising for differences in industrial structure to 
remove the distorting effect of an over-representation of strike 
prone industries (Department of Employment, 1976),
The cost of poor industrial relations is likely to arise from 
disruptions to production which upset the factory's workflow, 
higher labour costs owing to overmanning and demarcation rules, 
the diversion of management attention from other problems, penalty 
clauses for late delivery and the consequent loss of future orders. 
Any or all of these tnings will raise the costs of a location in 
the West of Scotland. Consequently it is possible to incorporate 
industrial relations within a least cost theoretical framework.
The evidence therefore seems to support the hypothesis that the 
West of Scotland has a distinctly more unfavourable "economic 
image" than the East, and this is likely to influence the location 
decisions of mobile industry.
8.2.4 Further Evidence of Spatially Differentiated Images of 
Scotland and Changes over Time
Further interesting supporting evidence has been provided by the 
Manpower Research Unit of Heriot-7/att University (1974). They 
interviewed a sample of managers In England to try and identify 
their perceived image both of Scotland as a whole and of different 
areas within the country. Two of their findings are particularly 
relevant here. In terms of residential preferences, Glasgow had 
the worst image of any of the Scottish towns considered, whereas 
Edinburgh was viewed most favourably. In addition, the researches
TABLE 8.2 INDUSTRIAL STOPPAGES 1968-73
Region/Area
Unadjusted 
Ratio of 
Region/GB 
Annual Average
Adjusted for 
Industrial 
Structure : 
Ratio of 
Region/GB 
Annual Average
Scotland
West Central 1.95 1.74
Palkirk/Stirling 1.01 0.96
East Central 1.27 1.01
Tayside 0.86 0.99
Borders 0.59 0.33
South West 0.34 0.54
North East 0.67 0.70
Highlands 0.19 0.29 i
1
Rest of Great Britain^
■.... .......... 1
South East England 1.61 0.68
East Anglia 1.37 0.70
South West England 0.79 0.82
West Midlands 1.39 1.28
East Midlands 0.92 0.66
Yorkshire & Humberside 1.76 1.01
North West England 5.43 2.43
North England 1.92 0.99
Wal e s 2.99 1.27
* The figures show the ratios in the worst sub-regions of each
s t and az’d r eg ion.
SOURCE: Department of ihiployment Gazette, November 1976.
found that it was possible to identify three regional images of 
Scotland as held by managers in England:- (i) the West Coast 
(ie basically West Central Scotland) perceived as being wet, but 
scenically attractive and with a poor workforce unwilling to work; 
(ii) the East Coast - viewed as being dry and cold. The cities 
were dull (presumably with the exception of Edinburgh?) but the 
people were seen to be industrious and the area was considered to 
offer a good business environment; (iii) the Highlands - viewed 
as scenically superb but suited principally to primary industry 
and tourism.
The boundaries between these perceived regions are far from 
distinct and there will of course be many exceptions within them. 
It is possible to suggest that the most likely favourable excep­
tions will be in those places where there is evidence of dynamism, 
growth and a favourable "business climate" since confidence is 
important to decision making and there is much truth in the axiom 
that "nothing succeeds like success". Local authorities are able 
to play a valuable role in creating and fostering such an image, 
and the New Towns may be particularly advantaged in this respect.
Gould and A'hite (1963) have produced a perceived residential 
amenity map of Britain on the basis of the preferences of groups 
of school leavers throughout the country. The pupils ranked all 
the counties according to their residential desirability, on the 
assumption that they could live wherever they v/ished. After 
removing the bias towards a preference for local areas a national 
perception surface is identified and its Scottish component is 
shoi.vn in Map 8 .1. Within Scotland the least desirable residential
areas are seen to be the Clydeside conurbation. West Lothian,
Aberdeen and the northern Highlands, whereas the most attractive 
places are Edinburgh and the Dumfries and Borders areas.
Although tnere is strong evidence to suggest that West Central 
Scotland in general, and Glasgow in particular, have higher 
psychic costs than elsewhere in Scotland, this does not explain 
the sudden deterioration in the region’s performance in the I 96O3 . 
Glasgow's poor reputation is of long standing and unfavourable 
reports of violence, squalor, poor housing and social problems
were not uncommon in the inter-war period. Even tne militancy of
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the area's industrial relations is an established phenomenon 
which was a subject of concern in a study by Glasgow University 
back in 1932 - "there is the impression that conditions between 
employers and workers are bad and that the district is one 
seething with unrest which is of a subversive character” . The 
same report found little interest in the area from foreign 
businessmen since "in their view, the reputation of the area for 
strife and disorder was so bad, they would not consider risking 
their capital in it".
Two possible explanations can be advanced to account for an 
increased detrimental influence emanating from the area's image 
in the 1960s. Either Glasgow's reputation suffered a further 
relative fall or else its effect on location decisions increased 
as a result of the weakening in importance of other factors. There 
is evidence that both considerations may have been operating, A 
series of reports drew attention to the poor state of much of the 
city's housing stock (Cullingworth, 1968, Scottish Housing 
Advisory Committee, 1967) and no doubt resulted in the impression 
that there were few attractive residential areas available in 
Glasgow. During the same period the city's reputation for teenage 
violence became a popular topic with the media, Patrick (1973) 
has pointed out that "news stories on juvenile violence began to 
appear in the late 50s and early 60s, but it wasn't until 1965 
that the trickle of news items on gangs began to swell into a
f l o o d ..... by Alay 1966, the national television and radio
networks had taken up the story The city's image as a
desirable place in which to live and work must have been tarnished 
by such publicity.
There are also grounds for thinking that cez’tain locational 
factors exerted a smaller influence on the decisions of incoming 
industry in the 1960s. The spreading of Assisted Area status to 
most of Scotland effectively widened the search areas for mobile 
industry because Aest Central Scotland no longer offered a cost 
advantage on this particular count. Additionally, the slackening 
of the Scottish labour market as reflected by the worsening 
unemployment levels during the course of the 1960s enabled 
industry to obtain its labour needs in a wider choice of locations 
,than previously. The.refox'e the spa.tial margins to profitability
I J  !
were extended with government incentives and labour tending to 
approximate to basic rather than locational costs as their 
geographicEil variations declined. This meant that their effect 
on locational decisions weakened. Image factors via psychic 
costs remained strongly differentiated spatially and whereas they 
were previously of secondary importance to other factors this 
became less true during the 1960s as spatial cost differences were 
eroded.
8.3 THE EFFECT OP PSYCHIC COSTS UPON THE LOCATION DECISIONS 
OP IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY
If the hypothesis is correct that Clydeside in general, and Glasgow 
in particular, tend to present a poor image which imposes psychic 
costs and renders these areas less attractive to mobile industry,
then this should be reflected in the locations selected by
immigrant establishments. The previous discussion suggests that 
psychic cost considerations are likely to be selective in their 
effect as regards size of firm, type of industry and the nature 
of the move. The larger the immigrant establishment the greater 
the number of managerial staff and key production workers who will 
be required either to move with the firm or be attracted from 
elsewhere. In order to obtain such workers the chosen area must 
present a favourable image in terras of its living and working 
environment. The critical size threshold where such considérâtions 
become important is difficult to identify, but it is possible to
suggest a figure of about 300 or more employees. This is the size
of establishment identified by Luttrell (1962) as being relatively 
self contained in its operation and relatively free to operate in 
al.l the major industrial centres in the UK,
Those industries most likely to be influenced by "image" factors 
are the ones where there is a high technological input with a 
heavy requirement for skilled labour or those which are relatively 
"footloose" (bearing in mind the previous qualificatj.ons concerning 
this terra) and consequently enjoying wide spatial profit margins, 
Chisholm (1964) has argued that in those industries wnere rapid 
technological progress is occurring firms are starting to find it
necessary to consider plant locations which will attract and hold, 
managerial staff and skilled labour. Amongst the industries which 
best fulfil both these considerations are mechanical, instrument 
and electrical engineering, which were identified by Cameron and 
Clark (1966) as being the most reluctant to locate in the West of 
Scotland. If the argument is correct that considerations of 
psychic costs became particularly relevant during the 1960s this 
would suggest that the instrument/electrical engineering industry 
is the most likely to be responsive to such factors because 
mechanical engineering became decreasingly important in the 
structure of immigrant industry during this period.
Finally, the type of move is also a relevant consideration.
Transfers, which involved the closure of a plant in one location 
and its move to a new one, require the movement of the existing 
labour force or at least the "key" workers if production is not 
to be disrupted and costs increa.sed by the need to train new 
labour. Firms moving to areas with an attractive image will be 
the most likely to reta.in their existing workforce or to obtain 
replacement labour. However, the lack of information to 
distinguish such immigrants which transfer from those set up as 
new branch plants prevents this hypothesis from being tested.
It is therefore possible to suggest that large plants in the 
engineering industry in general and instrument/electrical 
engineering in particular are the ones most likely to be 
susceptible to locational considerations of a non-pecuniary nature. 
This is likely to be reflected in their aversion to moving to 
areas perceived to have an unfavourable image or conversely their 
preference for those places offering "attractive" environments.
It can therefore be hypothesised that such establisrnnents are 
likely to be under-represented on Clydeside and particularly in 
Glasgow, For the purpose of this hypothesis Clydeside is taken 
to be Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Dunbartonshire and Renfrewshire, with 
the exception of the new towns of East Kilbride and Cumbernauld, 
which are assumed to present a favourable "image".
Table 8.3 suggests that there is some evidence that large engineering 
plants were more- reluctant to move to Clydeside than other large 
establishments and that this was a more markea feature of the
TAEL E_8_. 3 THE INFLUEN CE OF AN AREA'S lA.AGE ON ITC ATTRACTION
TO IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY
(1 ) Clydeside
(a) Share of Lar^e Immigrant Plants - Enp:lneerin^ aiid 
All Industries
Period
Engineering 
PIants
Non“Engineering 
Plants
All Plants
No fo No % No %
1945-59 23 58.9 23 65.7 46 62,2
1960-70 7 25.0 12 ■ 46.2 19 35.2
1945-70 30 44.8 35 57.4 65 50.8
(b) Share of Larye Instrarnent/Electrical Engineering; Plants
Period
Ins t ruaient/El ectrical 
Engineering Plants
Non-Instruizient/Electrical 
Engineering Plants
No No %
1945-59 16 61.5 30 62.5
1960-70 5 22.7 14 43.7
1945-70
- — ...  ^ --4 ^
21 43.7 44 55.0
(For notes on plant size and area definitions, see next page.)
TABLE 8 .3 (continued)
(2) Glasgow
(a ) Share of Lar^e Instrument/Electrical Engineerin/^ and 
Clothing Plants
Period
Instrument/
Electrical
Engineering
Plants
Non-
Instrument/ 
Electrical 
Engineering 
Plants
All
Plants
Clothing
Plants
Non-
Clothing
Plants
No % No % No % No % No %
1945-59 3 11.5 12 25.0 15 20.3 3 33.3 12 25.0
1960-70 - 3 9.4 3 5 V 6 1 6.3 2 4.3
1945-70 "3 6.3 15 18.8 18 14.1 4 16.0 14 13.6
* Significantly smaller than expected on the basis of its share 
of large non-instrament/electrical engineering plants 
(.05 level Chi Square Test).
NOTES
1. Large - 300 or more employees at maximum employment,
2. Small - under 300 employees at maximum employment.
3. Engineering - mechanical, instrument and electrical engineering,
4. Clydeside - Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Dunbartonshire, Renfrewshire,
excluding East Kilbride and Cumbernauld.
5. Glasgow - the nine city employment exchanges, plus Clydebank,
Rutherglen, Carabuslang and Barrhead.
immigrants that arrived in the 1960s. The same is true if only 
instrument/electrical engineering immigrants are considered, but 
in neither case is the difference sufficiently pronounced to rule 
out chance factors from being responsible, Although the argument 
that Clydeside presents a tarnished image to industrialists which 
deters them from establishing new plants in the area, is unproven 
it is pertinent to consider whetner or not this may still in fact 
be true of Glasgov/, It is shown in Chapter 10 that West Central 
Scotland's poor record of industrial attraction in the 1960s is 
essentially a Glasgov/ phenomenon and that the rest of the region 
performed reasonably satisfactorily. Consequently, it could be 
that the city rather than the region as a whole suffers from an 
adverse image.
There is in fact evidence to support such a hypothesis because 
Glasgow's share of the large instrument/electrical engineering 
immigrants is significantly (,05 level) smaller than its share of 
other large establishments (Table 8.3). It might be argued that 
other factors, such as a tighter female labour supply, could be 
responsible for this industry avoiding Glasgow, but as there is 
no evidence v/hatsoever that large clothing establishments were 
more averse than other large plants to a Glasgow location it seems 
reasonable to dismiss this as the explanation. Similarly, a 
shortage of attractive industrial sites and modern factories in 
the city could be held responsible since it v/as shown previously 
that the instrument/electrical engineering industry was 
particularly attracted by such factors.
However, this does not seem to provide a full explanation as the 
city v/as ranked seventh and ninth respectively in terms of advance 
factory space built and nev/ industrial estate acreage in the 
post-1960 period, whereas it ranked only eleventh when the number 
of jobs in these particular immigrant industries are considered.
In addition, the city failed to attract a share of the large 
instrument/electrical engineering immigrants commensurate with its 
share of other large plants even in the period 1945-59, when it 
was relatively competitive as far as the availability of sites and 
factories was concerned (Table 8.3), This supports the argument 
that the city's unfavourable reputation is responsible for an 
aversion amongst large establishments, particularly in the
instrument/electrical engineering industry, to locate in the city. 
The fact that there is no evidence tnat small units in the same 
industry avoided the city shows that there is both a size and an 
industry component operating, as the hypothesis predicts. Either 
feature on its own would be insufficient to accept the hypothesis.
In marked contrast, the new towns appear to offer an environment 
which is favourably perceived by incoming industrialists and they 
avoid most of those unfortunate features which were identified as 
afflicting Glasgow, For the hypothesis to be correct, engineering 
establishments should be significantly over-represented in the 
new towns. Table 8,4 provides clear evidence that this is the 
case, as the new towns attracted one in three of all large 
engineering plants but only about one in seven of other large 
immigrants. This finding, however, does not rule out cost rather 
than non-pecuniary considerations from being responsible. The 
new towns were particularly well provided with industrial sites 
and advance factories, and as these were important inducements to 
engineering firms, particularly instrument/electrical engineering 
ones, it might be expected that such industries would he prominent 
ajnongst the new town immigrants.
In order to standardise for this variable the immigrant establish­
ments locating in the new towns were compared with those locating 
on SIEC and local authority industrial estates. This confirmed 
the previous finding, with the new towns attracting a higher share 
of the large immigrant engineering plants than other industrial 
estates (Table 8.4). The fact that a size, as well as an industry, 
component is-operating can also be seen in the table, with the new 
towns, unlike the other industrial estates, attracting a 
significantly higher proportion of large engineering plants than 
small ones. This corroborates the hypothesis that large 
engineering plants, particularly in the instrument/electrical 
sector, display the greatest propensity to move to areas with a 
favourable environment and to avoid places with poor reputations.
TABLE 8.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEW TQVIIS' IMAGE ON THEIR 
ATTRACTION TO lAAIGRANT INDUSTRY
(a) Share of Larxe Immigrant Plants - Bngineerjj 
Industries (1952-70)
Type of Plant No %
Large Engineering Plants 14 32.6
Large Non-engineering Plants 7 13.5
All Plants 21 22.1
(b) Share of L arge Immigrant Plants that Located on Industrial 
Estates - Engineering and All Industries (1952-70)
Type of Plant
New Tovms
Other
Estates
No % No %
Large Engineering Plants 14* 53.8* 12 46.2
Largo Non-engineering Plants 7 35.0 13 65.0
All Large Plants 21 45,7 25 54.3
(c) Share of Large and Small Engineering Plants on Industrial 
Estates (1952-70)
Type of Plant
New Towns
Other
Estates
No % No %
Large Engineering Plants 14^ ■ 53.8^ 12 46,2
Small Engineering Plants 13 27.7 34 72.3
All Engineering Plants 27 42.9 36 57.1
* Significantly larger than expected on the basis of their share 
of large non-engineering plants (.05 level Chi Square test).
Significantly larger than expected on the basis of their share 
of small engineering plants (,05 level Chi Square test).
CHAPTER 9
THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY
ACTIVITY OH THE LOCATION DECISION
9.1 THE EFFECT OF LOCAL AUTHORITY ACTIVITY ON INDUSTRY'S COSTS
The activities of local authorities can be readily incorporated 
within a cost minimising location model since there are various 
ways in which local authorities can lower costs for incoming 
industry. It is possible for them to adopt a number of policy 
measures which can contribute to a reduction in the cost of any, 
or even all, of the factors of production.
The availability of "key worker" housing may reduce the financial 
incentives which a firm has to provide in order either to entice 
its existing skilled workers to move or to attract such labour from 
elsewhere. The provision of serviced industrial sites and advance 
factories lowers the cost of land and fixed capital. A flexible 
option on future development land held by a local authority at no 
cost to the company concerned, but for its longer term expansion, 
effectively provides a continuous subsidy for a firm's land costs. 
The local authority not only lose revenue from the site, but they 
also run tne risk that if the time fixed option is not taken up, 
then the land will have been sterilised to no avail. However, 
Cameron and Clark (1966) found that "the provision of free but 
time-dated option was one of the most significant inducements to
a company which was expanding output ..... Indeed this was regarded
as something of an assurance that tne local authority would i-emain 
genuinely interested in the company's progress on the site".
Since personal considerations can determine the choice of location 
within the spatial profit margins, it is apparent that local 
authorities can influence the decision. They can lower the 
effective cost of enterprise within their boundaries by helping 
to reduce psychic costs and therefore the marginal financial 
compensation a firm has to pay to attract high quality management 
to the area concerned. This might be achieved by undertaking 
environmental improvement or conservation schemes, encouraging 
local social and cultural activities, or by displaying an ability 
and willingness to assist a firm in its new location. This might 
be done by the speedy and flexible handling of its planning 
application in order to reduce delays and therefore costs. The 
ILAG survey (1973) found, for instance, that "regions and towns 
endeavouring to attract industry can, and very often do, help 
firms in a way which they will not forget".
9.2 EVIDENCE FOR THE II/IPACT OF LOCAL AUTHORITY ACTION ON 
LOCATION DECISIONS
There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that local authorities 
frequently exert an important influence on location decisions. In 
the ILAG survey, 39/ of immigrant firms to Scotland considered 
that the efforts of local authorities were a major factor and a 
further 36/ thought it a minor factor in their location decision­
making, although it was rarely the outstanding single reason.
Cameron and Clark (1966) had similar findings: "almost six out 
of every ten companies mentioned that tne co-operation of the 
local authority had influenced them in their selection of a 
particular site". In fact, they identified local authority 
assistance as one of the three factors of particular importance 
on the location decision. They concluded that "the lack of 
co-operation at the decision stage, or the impression given of 
being one industrialist amongst hundreds who visited the site, 
acted as a distinct reason for not establishing a unit".
Local initiative is most effective if it fulfils two criteria. 
Firstly, it brings the local area to the attention of outside 
industry by means of industrial promotion campaigns. Secondly,
and more importantly, it is able to offer positive inducements to 
incoming industry in the form of the cost reducing measures 
discussed above. The former without the latter seems to result 
in much wasted time and money. The efforts of government to steer 
new industry to an area will be undermined in the absence of local 
initiative since, as Klaasen (19Ô7) has pointed out, "all the help 
in the world will not redevelop an area which does not take the 
initiative itself. Local leadership, local government, local 
resources, local business, local labour - these are the only 
bases on which a sound redevelopment can be based".
9.3 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PQ/VERS AVAILABLE TO LOCAL AUTHQRITlES
The ability of local authorities to partake in the industrial 
development process sterns from a series of legislative Acts,
Local planning authorities' powers to provide serviced sites and 
industrial buildings originated under Section 19 of the Town and 
Country Planning (Scotland) Act of 1947. These powers were 
extended to burghs which were not planning authorities if they 
drew up a Town Development Scheme, approved by the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, under Section 10 of the Housing and 
Development (Scotland) Act of 1957. The Schemes were available 
to authorities which made overspill agreements with Glasgow. The 
powers available allowed town councils to develop land for 
industrial purposes and to build factories. All local authorities, 
irrespective of overspill agreements, were subsequently granted 
these powers under the Local Government (Development and Finance) 
(Scotland) Act of 1964. Additional discretionary powers were 
granted to enable local authorities to give 75/ loans towards the 
cost of constructing factories, provided they obtain borrowing 
consent from the Secretary of State for Scotland. The loans have 
to be recovered within a thirty year period, which means that 
economic rents are charged.
9 .4 THE SPATIAL IMPACT OF LOCAL AUTHORITY ACTIVITY
In order to determine whether local authority initiative and 
assistance to mobile industry has been greater in one part of 
Scotland than another, it is necessary to find some criteria 
against which their performance can be measured. If it can be 
shown that local authorities in the East of Scotland in general 
adopted a more positive approach to the needs of industry than 
those in tne West, it seems likely, based on other empirical 
findings, that this could make an important contribution to 
explaining the relative failure of West Central Scotland to 
attract immigrant industry once Assisted Area status v/as extended 
to most of Scotland.
9,4.1 Advance Factory Building by Local Authorities
One suggested measure of the dynamism of a local authority's 
industrial development effort is the amount of advance factory 
space built, since this signifies a willingness on the part of 
the local authority to risk its money trying to offer a positive 
inducement to industry. The pattern of advance factory building 
supports the idea of a relatively dynamic East and relatively 
cautious West of Scotland. Between I960 and 1970 about 886,500 
sq ft of advance space was built by local authorities (excluding 
the new towns) and of this total about 42/ v/as in the East Central 
region and 19/ in the Falkirk/Stirling region.
Table 9.1 compares the share of local authority advance factory 
building in each region with its share of Scotland's insured emp­
loyees and the efforts of the East Central and Falkirk/Stirling 
regions can clearly be seen. They contrast with the West Central 
region, which had about half the insured employees, but whose local 
authorities built under one-third of the new advance floorspace 
constructed by Scottish local authorities during tne 1960s. In 
fact, West Central's advance factory building owed little to its 
local authorities, wno built only about 11/ of the new floorspace 
between 1966 and 1970. The dearth was particularly marked in the 
Clydeside conurbation, where no single-storey advance factories
TABLE 9.1 LOCAL AUTHORITY ADVANCE FACTORY BUILDING 1960-70
Advance Factory
Space
Period Region
% of Scottish
Insured Employees
000
sq ft
W. Central 
Scotland 53.5 64.5 50.8
Falkirk/
Stirling 10.6 12.8 5.0
Ec Central 
8 Gotland 18.8 22.7 19.4
1960-65 Tayside "" — 8.7
Borders - 2.0
South West - — 2.5
North East - - 7.5
Highlands - 4.1
Scotland 82.9 100.0 100,0
W, Central 
Scotland 222.6 27.7 50.6
Falkirk/
Stirling 155.0 19.3 5.1
E. Central 
Scotland 352.0 43.8 19.7
- 1966-70 Tayside 10.0 1.2 8.7
Borders 14.0 1.8 2.0
South West 30.0 3.7 2.3
North East 20.0 2.5 7.5
' Highlands - - 4.1
Scotland 803.6 100.0 100.0
at all were built by the local authorities. Most of the space was 
built by only three authorities in the outer part of the region, 
namely Irvine and Greenock burghs and Dunbarton county. All the 
counties in East Central, and particularly Fife and West Lothian, 
were active in building advance factories, and they were 
enthusiastically supported by burghs such as Kirkcaldy and Whitburn 
The impressive performance from the Falkirk/Stirling region was 
largely attributable to the two small burghs of Grangemouth and 
Denny, Amongst noteworthy perfoi-mances from small authorities in 
the rest of Scotland, the efforts of Girvan burgh are particularly 
outstanding.
The local authorities, like the new towns and unlike SIEC, concen­
trated on building nest factory units. Nearly two-thirds of their 
factories were smaller than 10,000 sq ft, and in fact only two 
factories larger than 30,000 sq ft were built. Their letting 
policies appear to have been more akin to SIEC's than to those of 
the new towns, with a preference being shown for manufacturing 
establishments, although they sought firms nev/ to their area rather 
than to Scotland in general. A number of authorities, such as 
West Lothian, Midlothian and Irvine, benefitted from industrial 
decentralisation out of Edinburgh and Glasgow. Their policies 
were intermediate between those of SIEC and the new towns and this 
is reflected in tne fact that the proportion (53A) of local 
authority advance factory floorspace initially occupied by 
immigrant firms lay between that experienced by SIEC (68/) and by 
the new towns (29%).
9.4.2 Industrial Estate Develooment by Local Authorities
An alternative and less stringent measure of local authority 
attitudes towards industrial growth relates to the development of 
industrial sites. It seems a reasonable assumption tnat an 
authority prepared to devote resources to servicing an industrial 
estate has an interest in industrial development. Once again 
local authorities in the East of Scotland, particularly the 
counties and burghs of Fife and 7/est Lothian, have been especially 
o.ctive, v/nether assessed in terms of the number of estâtes
developed, their acreage, or the number of authorities involved 
(Table 7.6). By 1970 they had developed four times as much 
industrial estate acreage as the larger authorities in the West of 
Scotland.
It must be admitted, however, that this is an imperfect measure 
in that some larger authorities, especially in West Central,
despite developing small estates of their own, were not noticeable
for their active industrial development policies. On the other 
hand, an authority lacking its own estates may prove active in 
trying to attract industry to SIEC sites within its boundaries.
An excellent example is Cumnock burgh, which abandoned its own 
plans to develop an industrial estate on discovering that SIEC 
was interested in the saine site, but it has vigorously pursued an 
industrial development policy. As in so many cases (eg Cumnock, 
Denny, Girvan, Whitburn), the driving force behind a small 
burgh’s efforts in self-help has been a prominent personality on
the permanent staff, usually the town clerk.
9.4*3 Identifying the Active Local Authorities
The local authorities in each region can be classified as "active" 
or "inactive", depending upon whether or not they undertook 
industrial estate or advance factory building. The maximum number 
of potentially active authorities in any area consists of all the 
counties, plus large burghs, plus small burghs. The active 
authorities are snown in Table 9.2 as a percentage of the total, 
although this takes no account of the importance of each individual 
authority. If it is assumed that importance equates with population 
size then the figures can be weighted by population.
The unfavourable competitive position of the Aest compared with 
the East end of the central belt is clear, especially in the case 
of higher risk activities such as advance factory building. For 
example, wnen weighted by size, one,in three of the authorities in 
the East were active, despite the fact that the largest one, 
Edinburgh, with 47/ of the region’s population, built no advance 
factories. By contrast, only one in eleven of the local authorities 
in the ‘rVest were active (Table 9.2).
TABLE 9.2 LOCAL AUTHORITY CO-OPERATION 1960-70
Method 1 - Industrial Estate Develooment
1 o p
Region
Weighted by 
Population Unweighted
Mean
Overall
Mean
Rank
fo
Active
Rank %
Active Rank
Rank /
W. Central 
Scotland
54.8 4 28.0 3 3.5 3.5 41.4 3
Falkirk/ 
Stirling
18.0 7 27.0 4 5.5 5 22.5 6
E. Central 
Scotland 89.5 1 48.0 1 1 1 68.7 1
Tayside 52.0 5 8.0 B 6,5 7 29.0 5
Borders 61.3 3 47.0 2 2.5 2 54.1 2
South '(Vest 10.2 8 11.0 5 6.5 7 10.6 8
North East 66.0 2 11,0 5 3.5 3.5 38.5 4
Highlands 27.7 6 17.0 7 6.5 7 22.3 7
Method 2 - Advance Factory Building
Region
Weighted by 
Population Unweighted
Mean
Overall Mean Rank
Active Rank Active
Rank
Rank %
W . Central 
Scotland 9.1 5 13.0 4 4.5 5 11.0 5
Falkirk/
Stirling 18.0 4 27.0 2 3 , 2.5 22.5 3
E. Central 
Scotland 33.1 3 26.0 3 3 2.5 29.5 2
Tayside 8.8 6 3.0 6 6 6.5 5.9
Borders 37.5 2 29.0 1 1.5 1 33.2 1
South West 4.0 7 5.0 5 6 6.5 4.5 7
North East 40.9 1 3.0 6 3.5 4 22.0 4
Highlands 0.0 8 0.0 8 8 8 0.0 8
U B F o r d c f i n ;i t i o n s i: o g t ext.
Various v/ays are shown of comparing the regions but it is suggested 
that the most satisfactory/ method is to take the mean of the 
weighted and unvveignted percentages (column 6) and then rank the 
results (column 7). If this is done for both the industrial 
estate and advance factory indices tne strong competitive position 
of the East Central and Border regions is apparent.
It could be argued that the wa.y local authority activity is 
measured results in a bias against West Central, where, as a 
result of priority from SIEC, there was less need for local 
authorities to develop their own sites and factories. The local 
authorities could have been active in support of SIEC developments 
by offering key worker housing, undertaking promotional campaigns 
and assisting industrialists wno came to look at sites or factories 
in the town, as was done by Cumnock, for example. Although there 
is truth in this, it can equally be argued that there was scope 
for many local authorities to undertake their ov/n developments to 
supplement those by SIEC, as is illustrated by towns such as 
Dundee, Greenock, Kirkcaldy, Irvine, Leven and Girvan and by 
counties such as Fife and Dunbartonshire, who all developed their 
own estates in the vicinity of SIEC ones.
There is, after all, a need for sites to supplement those of SIEC 
in order to meet a wider demand. Local authorities can cater for 
the needs of relocating industry and distribution depots, repair 
centres and other non-manufacturing uses as well as incoming 
industry. The potential for additional activity to tnat of SIEC 
has been illustrated by private developers, who in fact have 
concentrated on Glasgow and North Lanarkshire, where local 
authorities, in the study period, were slow to take an initiative. 
Therefore the fact that many authorities in the Aest of Scotland 
have been less active in the field of industrial development than 
their counterparts in East Scotland cannot be satisfactorily 
explained by the argument that SIEC activity rendered additional 
efforts unnecessary. In fact by 1970 tne local authorities in tne 
East of Scotland possessed a larger acreage of industrial estates 
than SIEC had in the iVest.
9.5 SUMMARY
Increasing priority was devoted to industrial promotion and 
development by local authorities in the course of the 1960s, In 
a situation wnere there are a large number of places competing for 
a limited amount of mobile industry, those authorities giving 
little priority to the needs of industry are likely to draw 
attention to the fact by failing to attract a volume of new 
industry commensurate with the potential or the resources of their 
area. Differences in the attitudes of local authorities in the 
West and East of Scotland, at least until 1970, were very pro­
nounced and it seems unlikely to be a coincidence that the 
locations selected by incoming industry reflected the competitive 
advantage enjoyed by the eastern part of the central belt.
CHAPTER 10
SCOTTISH CITIES AND THEIR
ATTRACTION TO liSv'IIGRANT INDUSTRY
The Scottish cities of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen 
have been referred to on a number of occasions in previous chapters, 
but it is now proposed to bring the information together in a more 
coherent and comprehensive fashion.
10.1 THE AMOUNT 01 INDUoTRY ATTRACTED BY THE CITIES
The number of immigrant establishments moving to the cities and 
the employment they provided is set out in Table 10,1, Glasgow 
has consistently attracted more establishments that the three other 
cities combined, and only in the 1945-51 period did these plants 
provide fewer jobs than in all the other cities. This single 
exception arose from the success of Dundee in attracting tv/o very 
large iümerican companies, NCR and Timex,
By 1970 immigrant firms were employing 9,700 people in Glasgow, 
although at their maximum they employed about 13,300 people. 
Therefore in 1970 only about 7/ of the city's manufacturing 
employment was provided by incoming establishments; this compares 
adversely with tne figure of 34% (12,960 jobs) in Dundee. In 
contrast, neither Edinburgh nor Aberdeen, with about 490 and 200 
jobs respectively, v/as successful in attracting incoming firms.
TABLE 10,1 SCOTTISH CITIES A TIP THEIR REGIONS - imilGRAKT 
INDUSTRY ATTiUGTED IN EACH PERIOD
Period Area. Estabs
Employment Average
Size
(max)Max 1970
1945-51
Glasgow
Rest of 'A. Central
Edinburgh
Rest of E. Central
Dundee
Rest of Tayside 
Aberdeen
Rest of North East
30 
79 
. 5 
4 
11 
4 
1 
2
8,330
36,740
570
830
14,110
420
20
1,440
3,480
25,360
130
270
12,230
80
10
1,360
278
465
114
207
1,283
105
18
721
1952-59
Glasgow
Rest of V/. Central
Edinburgh
Rest of E. Central
Dundee
Rest of Tayside 
Aberdeen
Rest of North East
12
34
4-
4
4
3
2
7,040
15,990
420
1,370
680
570
990
4,490
12,470 
360 
1,190 
480 
410
990
586
470
105
342
169
190
445
1960-65
Glasgow
Rest of iV. Central
Edinburgh
Rest of E. Central
Dundee
Rest of Tayside 
Aberdeen
Rest of North East
9
68
35
1
3
2
1,100
21,200
14,680
210
290
50
420
15,170
13,000
170
280
30
122
312 1
i
420 1 
207 1
97 I
24
1966-70
Glasgow
Rest of .7. Central 
Edinburgh
Rest of E. Central 
Dundee
Rest of Tayside 
Aberdeen
Rest of North East
13
50
49
1
5 
2
6 •
1,880 
7,310
8,650
80
600
280
380
1,310
5,100
7,300
60
450
200
330
144
146
176 
81 1 
119
139
63 1
1945-70
Glasgow
Rest of Vi . Cent ral 
Edinburgh
Rest of E . Central 
Dund e e
Rest of Tayside 
A.berdeen
Rest of North East
64
231
9
18,340 
81,230 
990 
25,530 
15,080 
1 ,880 
300 
2,860
9,770
58,110
490
21,770
12,960
1,220
210
2,710
. .. ....1
287
352 I 
110 j
277
887
125
99
238
I f V
The flow of mobile industry varied over time. Glasgow's share of 
incoming employment declined sharply after I960 (Table 10.2) and 
Edinburgh attracted no new firms at all at this time. Dundee 
never came neai* to repeating its immediate post-war success in 
obtaining new industry and Aberdeen attracted only three plants 
throughout the whole period (Table 10.1).
These basic figures provide little indication as to whether or not 
the cities proved particularly successful in obtaining new industry 
and they need to be set into some sort of context. This is done 
in Table 10.2 by comparing each city's actual amount of immigrant 
industry in each period with a notional expected volume based on 
its share of Scottish unemployment, A number of interesting 
features are revealed in these tables. With the exception of 
Dundee between 1945 and 1951, each city attracted fewer jobs in 
every period than might reasonably have been expected on the basis 
of its labour supply or need, as measured by its unemployment.
Glasgow stands out for the sheer size of its notional employment 
■deficit. On the criteria adopted the city attracted 28,500 fewer 
immigrant jobs than might have been expected by 1970 (Table 10.2). 
Its most successful period was 1952-59, when nearly one in four of 
all incoming jobs v/as in the city. Although still below the 
expected level, the shortfall of 2,200/2,500 jobs was significantly 
less than in any other period. Dundee was the only city which by 
1970 had successfully attracted a notional excess number of jobs 
(Table 10.2).
The cities also displayed different trends from those shown by 
their surrounding regions in the inflov; of immigrant industry.
Table 10,3 shows that both Dundee and Edinburgh experienced a 
steady fall in their share of the region's incoming employment.
This contrasts with the sudden increase in Aberdeen after 1965 and 
the fluctuations in Glasgow's snare, which ranged from a maximum 
of about 30/ in the 1950s down to only about 5/ in the early 1960s.
When the cities are removed from the regional totals it becomes 
evident that a city rather tnan regional, factor frequently appears 
to be operating. Table 10,4 shows that West Central, unlike 
Glasgow, experienced a notional surplus of jobs up until 1965,
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TABLE 10.B a c t u a l ;:,:j lotionai- e/p e c t e o : ;:.;igr a k t
INDUSTRY EYPLOY-.iERT
y of
Employment Maximum Employment 1970 Employment
City Scottish
Unemp a of 
;Aax
■a' of 
1970
Ex­
pected
Actual
Dif­
ference
Ex­
pected Actual
Dif­
ference
1945-51
Glasgow 38.4 13.2 3.1 24,300 8,330 -15,970 16,570 3,480 -13,090
Edinburgh. 6.2 0.9 0.3 3,900 570 - 3,330 2,680 130 - 2,550
Dundee 4.3 22.4 23.3 2,710 14,110 +11,400 1,860 12,230 +10,370
Aberdeen 3.1 1,950 20 - 1,930 1,340 10 - 1,330
1952-59 ,
Glasgow 31.0 23.5 20.1 9,260 7)040 - 2,220 6,940 4,490 - 2,450
Edinburgh 0.3 1.4 1.6 2,480 420 - 2,060 1,060 360 - 1,500
Dundee 4.7 2.3 2.1 1,400 600 720 1,050 480 570
Aberdeen 4.1 - - 1,220 - - 1,220 920 - 920
1960-65
Glasgow 30.2 2.8 1.4 12,010 1,100 -10,910 9,330 420 - 8,910
Edinburgh 4.9 - - 1,950 - - 1,950 1 ,51c - - 1 ,510
Dundee 3.7 0.5 0,5 1,470 210 - 1,260 1,140 170 970
Aberdeen 3.3 - - 1,310 - - 1,310 1 ,020 - - 1,020
1966-70
Glasgow 28.3 7.7 6.9 6,900 1,880 - 5,020 5,390 1,310 - 4,020
Edinburgh 4.7 - - 1,140 - - 1,140 890 - 890
Dundee 3.5 0.3 0.3 850 50 770 67c 60 510
Aberdeen 2.4 1.1 1.0 580 280 300 460 200 260
1970 Employment
Period City
Expected Actual Dif f erence
Glasgov/ 35,240 9,700 -28,540
1945-70
Edinburgh 6,940 490 - 6,450
Dundee 4,720 12,940 + 3,220
Aberdeen 3,730 200 - 3,530
* less than 0.1,
TABLE 10.3 SCOTTISH CITIES' SHARE OF THEIR REGIONS' INCOMING
EMPLOYMENT
Period City
% of 
Unemp
% of 
Employment
Max 1970
1945-51
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Dundee
Aberdeen
54.6
59.6 
72.4 
58.2
18.5
40.8
97.1
1.2
12.1
3.3
99.4
0.7
1952-59
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Dundee
Aberdeen
53.2
57.1
72.9
52.5
30.1
23.5
54.3
26.5
23.0
54.2
1960-65
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Dundee
Aberdeen
47.7
34.0
63.1
57.8
4.9
41,5
2.7
37.8
1966-70
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Dundee
Aberdeen
48.0 
33.3
52.0 
42.0
20.4
11.9
42.3
20.4
11.5
37.5
TABLE 10.4 EACH REGION'S ACTUAL AND EXPECTED INCOMING SZ'PLOmSNT 
.7HLN THEIR CITIES ARE EXCLUDED
Period
Region 
( excl 
city)
Share (%) 
of jobs
No of jobs 
(max)
Dif­
Ex­
pected
Actual Ex­
pected Actual
ference
W . Central 31.8 58.3 20,040 36,740 +16,700
E. Central 4.2 1.3 2,650 830 - 1,820
1945-51 Tayside 1.7 0.7 1,070 420 - 650
North East 2.2 2.3 1,390 1,440 + 50
u. Central 27.3 53.6 8,150 15,990 + 7,840
E. Central 6.3 4.6 1,880 1,370 510
1952-59 Tayside 1.8 1.9 540 570 + 30
North East 3.8
. .
3.3 1,130 990 140
W. Central 33.1 53.3 13,160 21,200 + 8,040
E. Central 9.5 36.9 3,780 14,680 +10,900
1 96O-G5 Tayside 2.0 0.7 790 290 500
North East 2.3 0.1 920 50 870
'lY. Central 30.7 30.0 7,480 7,310 170
1966-70
E. Central 9.7 35.5 2,360 8,650 + 6,290
Tayside 2.2 2.5 540 600 + 60
North East 3.2 1.6 780 330 400
1 7 4
after which it attracted the expected number of jobs. It is 
therefore more accurate to refer to an urban or metropolitan, 
rather than regional, problem in the West of Scotland as far as 
the attraction of immigrant industry is concerned.
In the East of Scotland the region's appeal to incoming firms 
after I960 can be entirely attributed to the area outside 
Edinburgh, whereas in North East Scotland both the city and region 
experienced persistent deficits in the 1960s.
10.2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OE THE CITIES' IMMIGRANT PLANTS
The cities, despite their large and concentrated labour markets, 
failed to attract the really large establishments and, with the 
exception of Dundee, the average size of each unit was smaller 
than in the surrounding region (Table 10.1), In Glasgow's case 
only in the 1950s did this situation fail to hold and this lends 
support to the argument that this was the city's most successful 
period. The probable explanation is that the cities lacked the 
extensive sites required by the largest employers and this is 
considered further in section 10.3.4.
The fact that Edinburgh and Aberdeen attracted very few incoming 
concerns and that this was also true of Dundee, except for the 
immediate post-war period, means that the analysis concentrates 
on Glasgow. One of its distinctive, albeit unfortunate, features 
is that immigrant firms in the city displayed a poorer growth 
record than anywhere else, when employment is compared at the end 
of each period and in 1970. In Table 10.5 every other area with 
a relatively large number of jobs (defined as more than 500 at 
either date) experienced a strong increase in employment amongst 
its immigrants. In contrast, in Glasgow employment actually 
declined, with tne exception of the 1952-59 immigrants, and even 
their employment only remained static. Therefore Glasgow not only 
failed to attract its notional expected number of jobs, but tnose 
firms which came seem to have been amongst the most unsuccessful. 
Several of the city's largest immigrants subsequently closed, 
notably Remington Rand, Remington Electric Shavers, Voith Engineering, 
AEl and Goujon Paper Togs.
TABLE 10.5  EMPLOYMENT GROV/TH. IN GLASGOW AND OTHER AREAS VvHICH
ATTRACTED MORE THAN 500 INCOMING JOBS
Area
Employment growth between 
end of period and 1970 (% change)
1951/70 1959/70 1965/70
Glasgow - 38.0 'Î* 0.4 - 57.0
Lanarkshire + 82.3 + 83.1 + 48,0
Dunbartonshire + 103.3 + 172.5 + 154.9
Renfrewshire + 433.6 + 39.6 + 41.1
■Ayrshire 4- 55.5 + 717.2 + 110.5
Stirling/ 
Clackmannanshire + 623.7 + 19.1 + 56.6
West Lothian + 9.4
East Lothian 4 318.3
Fife + 295.1 + 153.5
Wigtown/
Kirkcudbrightshire + 210.8
Dundee + 198.7
Aberdeenshire +1,216.5 + 216.1
NOTE: Only areas attracting more than 500 immigrant jobs in
any period are shown.
10.3 EXPLAINING THE TRENDS
10.3.1 Accessibility Factors
There is no reason for thinking that accessibility disadvantages, 
at least for Edinburgh and Glasgow, have contributed to their 
failure to attract the expected volume of industry. Both cities 
are in the central belt close to ports and certain specialised 
business services. Glasgow is particularly favourably placed 
because it is at the core of a major industrial region with many 
suppliers and sub-contractors and it is the focus for both intra 
and inter-regional transport routes. In the case of Dundee and 
more especially Aberdeen, their distance from markets, suppliers 
and the country's main industrial centres is likely to be a 
deterrent to incoming industry. Certainly this was the main 
drawback to a location in both Dundee and Aberdeen identified by 
the Tayside Study (1970) and by Divesey (1961). It does not 
however explain why Aberdeen never managed to obtain as much 
industry as its surrounding region, nor why Dundee, only twenty 
miles from the successful town of Glenrothes, failed to attract 
an equivalent amount of new industry.
10.3*2 Government Policy
Both Glasgow and Dundee benefitted from government regional policy 
throughout the post-war period, enjoying continuous Assisted Area 
status. On the other hand, Edinburgh received no such advantage 
and from 1966 v/as the only part of Scotland excluded from the 
Development Area. This prevented it from obtaining any government 
factories or industrial estates and firms moving to the city were 
never eligible for financial assistance. Consequently the city 
has been at a cost disadvantage compared with elsewhere in central 
Scotland and it is hardly surprising that no firms came to 
Edinburgh in the 19oOs.
Aberdeen was designated a Development District in I960 but this 
brought little apparent advantage as far as mobile industry v/as 
concerned. None came between I960 and 1965 and taen only 230 jobs
arrived in the latter part of the decade. The small volume of 
industry moving into both Glasgow and Dundee at this time is 
further proof that Assisted Area status on its own is insufficient 
to attract new industry in the absence of other necessary factor 
inputs.
The Springburn Study (1966) took the view that neither Glasgow nor 
Edinburgh has benefitted from government policy as much as might 
have been expected. The study felt that "existing policies some­
times give an unfortunate impression of ignoring the very existence 
of Scotland’s two largest cities and of writing off the traditional 
contributions which such areas make to economic growth". Evidence 
for this view was held to be the omission by the Scottish Office 
of both cities from the 1963 Growth Areas (Cmnd 2188) and the lack 
of planning studies concerned with the economic growth of the 
cities. The Board of Trade, who were responsible for distribution 
of industry policy, saw their spatial priorities in terms of the 
different categories of Assisted Area and, apart from differences 
in advance factory and industrial estate development programmes, 
no attempt was made to discriminate in faVour of any particular 
locations within the designated areas. The Springburn Study also 
suggested that in some respects Glasgow might not even have been 
accorded equal treatment since "steering organisations must often 
feel compelled to snow only the best of their wares in order to 
stake the best possible bid for the country as a whole". This 
meant Glasgow was likely to be excluded.
There was also a conflict in the local authority’s planning policy 
between the city's physical and economic planning needs (Springburn 
Study, 1966). The policy of population and industrial overspill 
had its roots in the Clyde Valley Regional Plan (1946) and this 
had suggested that new industry should be allowed into the 
"congested area" only if it was proved essential for it to be 
closely dependent on the city's facilities. The combination of 
central government Growth Area policy and the local authority 
overspill policy led the Economist (1965) to conclude that Glasgow 
had to take second place to the new towns and other growth areas 
in competing for incoming industry.
10.3.3 The Availability of Labour
In terms of labour availability the cities in general and Glasgow 
in particular should have enjoyed advantages over other competing 
areas as a result of their large labour markets. It has already 
been pointed out that, apart from Dundee prior to 1951, all the 
cities failed to attract the amount of industry commensurate with 
their share of Scotland’s labour supply, as measured by their 
unemployment. There are two explanations for this. Either the 
labour supply advantages are more apparent than real or else they 
are offset by the poor quality of some of the cities' other 
resources. The latter possibility is examined elsewhere in this 
chapter, but the former consideration does appear to be of some 
relevance.
The shift in demand from male to female' labour worked to the 
cities' disadvantage since their share of Scottish unemployment 
was higher for male than for female labour. In addition the labour 
market was relatively slacker for male labour, which experienced 
higher rates of unemployment. In fact Cameron (1971) has suggested 
that one reason for Clydeside's declining share of mobile industry 
has been the relative tightness of the female labour market, which 
may have encouraged firms in predominantly femail.e employing 
industries to seek locations in the East of Scotland. Edinburgh, 
however, would prove an exception because as the Lothians Regional 
Survey and Plan (1966) pointed out there were signs that at least 
some expansion may have been discouraged by a shortage of semi­
skilled female labour.
There is also evidence that the cities' labour supply advantages 
declined relative to those of their regions, reflecting in part the 
changing population distribution as overspill and new town 
programmes proceeded. Until about I960 Glasgow and Edinburgh had 
more unemployed than their regions, but this was no longer true 
in the 1960s when their share of incoming industry declined 
noticeably. In Aberdeen this reversal occurred in tne mid-1960s 
and although Dundee continued to have more unemployed than Tayside 
it moved from a position of two and a half times as many after the 
war to only 17/ more by 1966.
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10.3.4 The Availability of Sites and Premises
A major reason for the cities' comparative failure to attract new 
industry has been a shortage of suitable sites and factories.
This is best illustrated by Glasgow, which was the largest and 
potentially the most attractive of the cities.
The shortage is a long standing and persistent one. As long ago 
as 1546 the Clyde Valley Regional Plan stressed the "lack of space 
available in the central urban area, both for new industry and for 
the normal, expansion of existing factories and works". The post­
war government industrial estates and advance factories helped to 
ease the situation and by 1951 the city had 490 acres of industrial 
estates and 857,000 sq ft of new advance floorspace. Such 
developments made an important contribution to the city's ability 
to attract 5,600 new jobs at this time. Nevertheless the city 
remained deficient in supplies of land and modern premises. By 
1959 this was causing concern to Glasgov/ Corporation, who pointed 
out the limited and decreasing reserves of suitably vacant 
industrially zoned sites within the city.
The position was so serious that the Springburn Study (1966) was 
convinced that the shortage was the cause of Glasgow's failure to 
attract new industry. According to the Study, "although Glasgow 
has probably more to offer the industrialist as regards labour 
availability, communications, sub-contracting capacity and 
educational and training facilities than any other location in 
Scotland, it has least to offer from the point of view of industrial 
sites and premises". If this problem could be remedied the Study 
saw no reason why the city's potential should not be realised.
The same difficulty seems to have occurred in the other cities, 
especially in the 1960s when their existing industrial estates were 
nearly fully occupied. The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan (1966), 
for instance, pointed out that the snortage of sites in Edinburgh 
severely reduced its appeal to mobile industry. Table 10.6 shows 
the new industrial estates and new advance factories developed in 
the cities during each period. Its main feature is the dramatic 
deterioration, after I960 in the cities' comparative position. Their 
shore of new industrial estate acreage slumped from about half the 
Scottish total to about 6/ by 1970,
TABL5 10.6 INDUSTRIAL ESTATE Aim ADVANCE FACTORY BUILDING IN
THE SCOTTIoH CITIES 1945-70
Period City
Ind Est 
acreage 
(max 
effect)
% of 
Scottish 
total 
acreage
Advance 
factory 
space 
bull t 
(000 
sq ft)
% of 
Scot tish 
advance 
factory 
space
% of 
Scottish 
unemp
Glasgow 490 40.6 856.8 37.6 38.4
Edinburgh rmm — «W — 6.2
1945-51
Dundee 125 10.4 66.8 2.9 4.3
Aberdeen - — — - 3.1
Glasgow 490 27.8 - - 31.0
Edinburgh 120 6.8 ». « 8.3
1952-59
Dundee 125 7.1 - - 4.7
Aberdeen 30 1.7 - 4.1
Glasgow 64 2.1 51.6 3.0 30.2
1960-65
Edinburgh 120 3.9 - — 4.9
Dundee - — — - 3.7
Aberdeen 30 1.0 18.8 1.1 3.3
• Glasgow 146 2.8 161.7 4.3 26.3
Edinburgh 4.7
1966-70
Dundee 127 2.5 74.2 2.0 3.5
Aberdeen 39 0.8 63.0 1.7 2.4
Glasgow, and to a lesser extent Dundee, are largely responsible 
for this situation. Until I960 both cities had a level of site 
and advance factory provision commensurate with or greater than 
that expected on the basis of their share of unemployment. After 
this time, however, few advance factories were built and little 
new land was developed on industrial estates. The decline in 
Glasgow's share of the total provision in Scotland can be seen in 
Table 10.6; the new advance factory floorpace, for example, built 
in the 1960s was only about one-quarter of that developed in the 
city immediately after the war. Given this transformation in its 
competitive position it is hardly surprising that Glasgow's share 
of incoming industry should fall so steeply in the 1960s, although 
it is noticeable that the slight improvement after 1965 coincided 
with an increase in advance factory and industrial estate 
development.
No advance factories were ever constructed in Edinburgh and the 
ariount of industrial land was consistently less than expected on 
the basis of its unemployment. Similarly, Aberdeen's need for 
sites and buildings was never adequately catered for (Table 10.6). 
These shortages were reflected in the persistent notional deficit 
of incoming industry throughout the post-war period.
Any advantages the cities enjoyed from their large labour markets 
were of no consequence if immigrant firms were unable to find a 
serviced site or modern premises available. It is clear that when 
compared with the new towns, the cities were labouring under 
considerable difficulties because they lacked comparable site and 
factory facilities.
10.3*5 The Image of the Cities
It was argued earlier in Chapter 8 tnat the images projected by 
the cities were far from uniform, with Glasgow and Edinburgh 
representing the opposite ends of the spectrum. Evidence was 
produced to show that Glasgow was viewed unfavourably both as a 
residential.and industrial location, wnereas Edinburgh was generally 
viewed favourably; a fact waich Livingston new town, for example,
was expected to capitalise upon, Dundee and Aberdeen seem to have 
been soinewnere between these extremes. Aberdeen's position is 
somewnat complex in that, as Livesey (1961) points out, it enjoyed 
good industrial relations, which indicate a favourable economic 
image, but Gould and White (1968) have shown that it had a 
relatively poor residential image.
If other things were equal, Edinburgh should have been relatively 
more successful than Glasgow in attracting new industry. Since 
this has not occurred and Edinburgh obtained no incoming firms in 
the 1960s, it is clear that other things have been far from equal. 
This suggests that on their own an attractive environment and low 
psychic costs are insufficient to stimulate industrial development. 
It supports survey findings that image is a subsidiary rather than 
primary influence on the choice of site. However, as geographical 
cost differences decline so these lesser location factors increase 
in importance, provided they retain pronounced cost variations 
over space. Under such circumstances they are more likely to 
become the critical marginal determinants of location.
The fact that Edinburgh failed to attract any new firms in the 
1960s is, in fact, consistent with this hypothesis. The city 
remained outwith the Assisted Area and therefore an incoming firm 
would operate at a cost disadvantage compared with an alternative 
location elsewnere in the region. The shortage of sites and 
premises was a further cost deterrent to an Edinburgh location. 
Before the city's favourable image is likely to operate to its 
advantage, it has to be competing on a similar cost footing with 
alternative locations. Clearly this did not occur, and the psychic 
cost advantages were insufficient to outweigh the other cost 
penalties. This finding supports the view that cost considerations 
remain the primary determinant of the general area in which a firm 
will seek a new location.
In contrast, Glasgov/, especially before I960, enjoyed certain cost 
advantages in terms of government inducements, sites, factories 
and labour supply and these were sufficient to attract new industry 
in spite of the city's poor image. This suggests that cost 
subsidies can help to outweigh the perceived disadvantages of 
environmentally deprived areas and render them attractive to a
wider range of mobile industry. However this does not mean that 
non-economic considerations are irrelevant because despite its 
cost advtmtages the city still failed to attract the notional 
expected aiT.ount of industry, v/hen the cost advantages became 
seriously eroded, as in the 19oOs, psychic costs became of 
increasing significance and the city’s share of incoming industry 
declined sharply. This was particularly pronounced in the case 
of large engineering plants, which appear to have been strongly 
influenced by environmental factors (Chapter 8).
The Springburn Study (1966), by ignoring the barrier presented by 
an unfavourable image, seems to have been too optimistic in 
assuming tnat simply by overcoming the shortage of sites and 
factories Glasgow's full potential to attract new industry could 
be realised.
10.3.6 Local Authority Assistance
The activities of local authorities can enhance the attraction of 
their areas for incoming industry, especially by ensuring there 
is an adequate choice of attractive sites and premises. The 
efforts of the city authorities can be examined within this 
particular context, especially in the 1960s when local authorities, 
facilitated by legislation, generally became more active in the 
industrial development process.
If government agencies are active then there may be less incentive 
for city authorities to undertake their own developments; although 
it was argued in Chapter 9 that local authorities could complement 
rather than compete with other agencies by catering for a different 
demand. The method used to assess the efforts of the city 
authorities is, once again, to identify the notional expected 
level of industrial estate and advance factory development 
programmes, on the basis of their unemployment, and in the light 
of total site and factory development in Scotland.
It has already been pointed out in Table 10.6 that all the cities 
experienced a shortfall of sucn facilities and this indicates that
there v/as scope for the local authorities to adopt more active 
policies. In fact, on the evidence available, it seems that none 
of the cities was particularly active in the study period.
The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan (1966), when considering 
Edinburgh's a,ttitude to incoming industry, concluded that "it may 
be doubted whether the city authorities ..... have adopted a 
specially favourable attitude towards industrial development. 
Edinburgh does not think of itself as an industrial city and so 
perhaps set itself out to attract industry much less than most 
other communities".
Much the same might be said of Glasgow, even though it v/as 
Scotland's premier industrial city. In the 1960s the local 
authority was pursuing a policy of population and industrial over­
spill so that the needs of industry were not of major concern 
(Henderson, 1974). No single storey local authority advance 
factories were built and the only industrial estates were small.
The size of the city’s needs was beyond the limited resources of 
SIEC, v/hich had a nationwide remit, and their efforts required 
supplementing by the local authority. As the Springburn Study (1966) 
was forced to conclude, "at the moment Glasgow has little to offer 
newcomers, apart from those relatively small factory units which 
come up for re-allocation from time to time on the estates of SIEC. 
Large (and even medium sized) concerns cannot be offered any 
location in the Glasgov/ area."
The largest acreage of new industrial estate developed by a city 
authority in the 1960s was in Dundee, although Aberdeen also 
built an advance factory on their new estate. Nevertheless such 
efforts were relatively small compared both with developments 
elsewhere and with each city's level of unemployment.
10.4 SUMMARY
With the exception of Dundee, none of the Scottish cities had 
attracted the number of jobs which might have been expected from 
immigrant firms by 1970. The snortfall was most acute in the
largest city, Glasgow; its share of incoming establishments fell 
sharply after I960 and a number of possible explanations for this 
have been considered. The cost advantages previously enjoyed by 
Glasgow declined at this time as a result of the extension of the 
Assisted Area throughout most of Scotland, This widened the area 
in which mobile industry searched for potential locations and 
increased the competition faced by the city for new industry. 
Nonetheless Glasgow in particular provided labour supply advantages 
to incoming firms, which meant that it should still have proved 
attractive to new industry. The fact that this was not the case 
in the 1960s suggests that certain cost penalties operated to 
offset these advantages. The shortage of sites and factories 
seems to be a major element in the explanation, but Glasgow's 
unattractive image has al.so deterred a number of large engineering 
plants, in particular, from moving to the city.
CHAPTER 11
THE ATTRACTION OP THE NEW TOWNS
TO INCOMING INDUSTRY
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The most publicised individual locations selected by incoming 
industry have probably been the five Scottish new towns set up 
originally under the 1946 New Towns Act. This Act allows the 
Secretary of State for Scotland to designate an area of land for 
development as a new town and appoint a Corporation to undertake 
the planning and development of the town. The Corporation has 
special powers for the compulsory purchase of land, infrastructure 
provision, obtaining planning consents direct from the Secretary 
of State and the provision of finance from central funds (Scottish 
Economic Planning Department, 1974). All these powers are 
relevant to the task of attracting mobile industry.
Following the 1946 Act the new towns of East Kilbride (1947) and 
Glenrothes (1943) were designated, but with different objectives. 
East Kilbride was to assist in the decentralisation of population 
and industry from Glasgow and from the congested areas of north 
west Lanarkshire. Glenrothes' main function was to act as a focaJ. 
point for regrouping the mining industry in Fife and it was planned 
around a modern, new NCB pit.
In the 1950s only one additional new town was designated wnen 
Cumbernauld (1953) was given the task of facilitating the Glasgow
overspill programme, but a further tv/o new towns were started in 
the 1960s. Livingston (1962) was to be the centre of a growth 
area designed to create a new focus of economic activity in central 
Scotland, in addition to assisting Glasgow overspill. Irvine 
(1966) was intended to promote economic development in an area 
which had shown itself attractive to industry. The objectives 
underlying the new town programme have evolved from a prime con­
cern with physical planning problems, such as population overspill 
and redevelopment, to those of stimulating regional economic 
development.
11.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW TQANS IN ATTRACTING 
Iiei I GRANT IN DUG TRY
The growth of the new towns has been heavily dependent upon their 
ability to attract mobile industry in order to employ the 
population to be rehoused. There is little doubt that they have 
been relatively successful in attracting industry new to Scotland, 
because between 1952 and 1970 they obtained 20,300 jobs. This 
represents 22>6 of all those moving into Scotland (Table 11,1). 
Figures showing the employment in firms moving to individual new 
towns will be biased towards the longer established ones and so 
it is not unexpected to find that East Kilbride and Glenrothes were 
the most successful, attracting 5,630 and 4,650 jobs respectively 
between I960 and 1970. These totals were exceeded only by the 
Bathgate Employment Exchange area as a result of the arrival of 
the British Motor Corporation.
The new towns' immigrant industry was dominated by the mechanical 
and electrical engineering and clotning sectors (Table 11.2). But 
as these were also dominant elsewhere in Scotland this might have 
been expected. Ahen account is taken of the structure of incoming 
industry as a whole, the only industry that is significantly 
over-represented (.05 level) in the new towns is electrical 
engineering. This is particularly true in employment terms, since 
this industry provided about half of all immigrant jobs in the new 
towns compared with just over one-quarter in Scotland as a
■TABLE 11.1 Iir.IIGRANT INDUSTRY ATTRACTED TO THE NS'.V TQ7/NS ,
1952-1970
Period Area
No of 
Estabs
% of 
Estabs
Einpl oy 
(max)
■>:. of 
Employ 
(max)
Average
Mean
Size
New Towns 6 7.9 5,280 17.7 398
1952-59
Rest of 
Scotland 69 92.1 24,580 82.3 356
All
S Gotland 75 100.0 29,860 100.0 393
Nev.' Towns 27 20.0 10,510 26.4
1
390
1960-65
Rest of 
Scotland 108 80.0 29,260 73.6 271 !
I
All
Scotland 135 100.0 39,770 100.0 295
New To.vns 28 16.5 4,510 18.5 161
1966-70
Rest of 
S Gotland 142 83.5 19,860 81.5 140
All
Scotland 170 100.0 24,370 100.0
■ ' " i
1
143
New Towns 61 16.1 20,300 21.6 333
1952-70
Rest of 
S Gotland 319 83.9 73,690 78.4 231
All
Scotland 380 100.0 93,990 100.0 247
i
TABLE 11.2 INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY IN THE
AE/, TO/,No, 1960-1970
New Towns All Immigrants
(SIC) Industry
Ho of 
Estabs
/ of 
Estabs
Employ
(max)
of
Employ
(max)
-7, of 
Estabs
fc of 
Employ 
(max)
Food, drink 
& tobacco
•“ - - 5.6 4.4
4/5 Chemicals 2 3.6 30 0.2 4.9 2.4
g Metal
manufacture
2 3.6 1,200 8.0 2.3 2.1
7 Lie oh Eng 9 16.4 950 6.3 13.4 8.1
8 Instr Eng 1 1.8 1,250 8.4 3.0 5.4
9 El0 0 Eng 13 23.7 7,600 50.6 14.7
1
26.8
11 Vehicles 4 7.2 480 3.2 3.9 14.0
Metal goods 
n e s 3 5.5 370 2.4 8.5 4.4
13 Textiles - - 4.6 3.5
c Leather & 
14/15 clothing 8 14.5 1,680 11.2 20,6 18.6
16 Bricks etc 4 7.3 300 2.0 5.9 2.7
Timber & 
furniture - — ” •3.0 1.1
2Q Paper,
printing etc 5 9.1 • 670 4.5 3.0 2.7
Other
manufacture 4 7.3 490 3.2 6.6 3.8
Signi;icantly over-represented relative to immigrant industry as 
a whole (.05 level for Cni Square test).
1 9 0 .
v/hole. In fact the new towns obtained only 11.5/ of the clothing 
plants, compared v/ith 20/ of those in other industries, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. The number of 
establishments in other industries was too small to identify with 
any confidence those that were particularly over or under­
represented in the new towns.
11.3 EXPLAINING THE NEW TOWNS' ATTRACTION TO IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY
The previous chapters have examined a number of hypotheses that seek 
to explain the changing spatial distribution of new incoming 
industry and the new towns have been referred to in a number of 
contexts. The purpose of this section is to consider the new 
towns in the light of these findings.
11.3.1 Transport Costs and Accessibility Factors
Transport costs, or more particularly communication cost advantages, 
appear to be relevant to the location decisions of a number of 
industries. Nonetheless there are few grounds for concluding tnat 
the new towns enjoyed any particular competitive advantage over 
the rest of central Scotland, although East Kilbride, Cumbernauld 
and Livingston are all very well located in relation to transport 
arteries and urbanisation economies.
East Kilbride is close to the labour, services, inputs and markets 
of Clydeside. Cumbernauld is slightly further from Glasgow, but 
located on the Stirling road and is centrally located for the 
Scottish ports and market. Livingston’s prime asset, stressed by 
the Lothian Regional Survey and Plan (1966) is its convenience for 
communications, located as it is astride the Glasgovz-Edinburgh 
trunk road and accessible to both east and west coast ports and 
airports. All tnese locations are more central than those of 
Glenrothes and Irvine. Glenrothes is furthest from major ports, 
airports and road links to the south, but the fact that it
attracted more incoming industry than most other towns suggests 
that transport cost considerations were not a major constraint on 
location choice in the 1960s within central Scotland.
11.3.2 Government Policy
It has been argued that government policy influences the wider 
area within which immigrant industry examines potential locations. 
The new towns have, in genera]-, been favourably placed in this 
respect; with the exception of Glenrothes up until 1962, all have 
been in the Assisted Area since their designation. Glenrothes 
Development Corporation (1961) were convinced that they were 
handicapped in their efforts to attract nev/ industry by their 
exclusion from the Assisted Area. They argued that if “Glenrothes 
was placed in a position of being able to offer the same terms as 
are available in the other new towns and local authorities in 
Development Districts, the Corporation are confident that their 
progress in attracting industry would be much better than it has 
been to date*'.
The changing policy emphasis towards stimulating regional- growth 
benefitted the new towns, which were all centres of the Growth 
Areas identified in the 1953 vVhite Paper (Cmnd 2188), These were 
areas within central Scotland whicn were judged to be capable of 
substantial and rapid growth. They were intended to provide 
focal points of especially vigorous economic development. The 
Growth Areas had two main advantages. They were to receive 
priority for infrastructure development and also, unlike other 
Development Districts, they were not to be descheduled if 
unemployment fell below the critical 4.5/ rate. This priority 
ended in 1966 wnen Development Area status was extended to the 
whole country except for Edinburgh, and from 1967 the small Special 
Development Areas were able to offer higher financial incentives 
than the new towns. Although tney benefitted from regional planning 
policies this seems to be an insufficient explanation for tneir 
attraction to incoming firms. After all, other less successful
areas were also eligible for government financial assistance 
throughout this period and the Growth Area policy existed 
officially for only about three years.
11.3.3 The Availability of Labour
Empirical studies have identified the ready availability of labour 
as a major influence on the location decision and, in this respect, 
the new towns enjoy a number of advantages. The commitment to 
population growth means that an employer is guaranteed a steadily 
increasing labour supply, while in the shorter term the availability 
of overspill and key worker housing allows a firm either to bring 
or to attract skilled labour to the town.
The individual nev/ towns vary in their labour reserves according 
to their size and that of neighbouring centres within the same 
labour market. In this respect East Kilbride is probably the most 
favourably placed since it can draw labour from the surrounding 
towns in Lanarkshire as well as from the south side of Glasgow.
Only Glasgow itself, and some of its neighbouring towns, either 
equalled or exceeded East Kilbride's labour market potential.
Such labour supply advantages were recognised in the 1966 White 
Paper on the Scottish Economy which concluded that "much of the
success of the Scottish new towns ..... derives from their lying
v/ithin the complex labour market and within range of the elaborate 
service facilities of a metropolitan or heavily urbanised area"
(Cmnd, 2864).
11.3.4 The Availability of Serviced Sites and Factories
The immediate availability of serviced sites and factories are 
powerful inducements to Larnigrant industry and the new towns were 
extremely competitive in both respects. They made a major 
contribution to advance factory building, constructing 2.8 million 
sq ft of new floorspace, and were responsible for 60/ of the new
factory space in the West Central and 54/ of advance space in the 
East Central regions between I960 and 1970, All the new towns 
attach considerable importance to their ability to provide 
factories. Livingston Development Corporation (1971) have stated, 
for example, that in their experience the immediate or early 
availa.bility of factories built in advance of known requirements 
has been of vital importance to industrial development.
Their advance factory program!es usually allowed them to offer a 
range of buildings to any incoming firm that needed one and, 
unlike SIEC, the new towns were prepared to allocate factories 
for rehousing and non-manufacturing projects. The new towns built 
the highest proportion of small factories, with over three-quarters 
being smaller than 10,000 sq ft compared with only 5/ of the SIEC 
factories. Such units were too small for most incoming firms, which 
explains why only 29/ of new town advance factory space was 
initially occupied by immigrant plants, wnereas in the case of the 
SIEC floorspace the figure was 68/. It also accounts for the 
relatively high proportion of new town immigrants which 
subsequently moved out of the advance factories, although this was 
also facilitated by the availability of serviced sites on which 
firms could build their own factories.
Although it is difficult to separate the individual influence of 
sites and factories on tne decision to move to a particular 
location, it does appear that the availability of factory space 
was particularly important in the new towns. This conclusion 
arises from tne finding that 62/ of immigrant firms started 
production in an advance factory, compared with 49/ on other 
industrial estates.
The quality, cost and availability of sites and factory space 
probably explain the particular attraction of the new towns for 
the engineering industry in general and the instrument/electrical 
engineering sector in particular. It was snown previously that 
this industry is strongly influenced in its choice of location by 
the availability of a new advance factory.
11,3.5 Development Corporation Assistance
The new town Development Corporations have all pursued active 
industrial development policies and specialist attention is given 
to the needs of immigrant industry since this provides the basis 
for much of their growth (Lothians Regional Survey and Plan, 1966)< 
In support of this objective they have undertaken co-ordinated 
programmes of infrastructure development and industrial promotion. 
The provision of serviced sites and advance factories is probably 
the most effective way in which they are able to influence 
economic activity. Their attraction is further enhanced by the 
ability of the Development Corporations to offer mortgage 
facilities' and concessional rents. In addition the avail ability 
of key v/orker housing, flexible planning and rapid decision making 
are all policies conducive to attracting incoming industry.
The ILAG survey (1973) referred to the energetic efforts of the 
Scottish new towns wnen it mentioned that fifteen of the thirty- 
two firms influenced by new town Corporations were Scottish cases, 
Univac Limited have specifically mentioned that they received 
considerable assistance from Livingston Development Corporation, 
who were prepared and able to provide direct and immediate ansv/ers 
to enquiries and where decision making is delegated to a few key 
individuals whom the firm came to know (TISC, 1973)• The 
organisational framework of industrial promotion agencies there­
fore seems to be relevant to their effectiveness because Univac 
Limited found that in some authorities they had to contact various 
groups of people and this sometimes resulted in contradictory 
advice. The decisiveness of the Development Corporation and the 
availability of an advance factory were the main reasons for 
Univac Limited deciding to move to Livingston,
11.3*6 The Image of the New Towns
The new towns enjoy a general level of amenities and environment 
that compare favourably with most other urban areas in Scotland, 
They have benefitted from the concentration of public investment
and a co-ordinated development plan, which has been unhampered by 
existing land uses. The physical, infrastructure is modern and 
there are no areas of urban decay which afflict many older towns. 
East Kilbride Development Corporation (1965) clearly felt that 
this gave them a useful advantage in attracting incoming industry. 
In their experience, "it is clear that staff coming from England 
prefer to live in surroundings which most nearly approximate to 
those to which they are accustomed. Conversely, if the management 
staff are not satisfied with their houses there is uncertainty in 
their factory life; hence even more effort is being put into the 
provision of a higher standard of managerial and semi-managerial 
housing".
The new towns also benefit from the favourable image of their 
economic as well as their physical environment. They have been 
largely free of the industrial relations problems of some of the 
older areas and give an impression of dynamism and growth ; "the 
attractions for industry continue to grow with the growth of the 
town. Success breeds success" (East Kilbride Development 
Corporation, I964).
Such considerations influence mobile industry and Cameron and Clark 
(1966) have shown that "the expected beneficial effects of an 
attractive environment upon labour productivity caused most firms 
to site in the newly developed centres or on the periphery of 
major urban areas". The new towns attracted the larger plants, 
for in every period the average size of their immigrant 
establishments exceeded the Scottish average (Table II.I). This 
can probably be partly attributed to labour supply advantages such 
as growing population and key worker housing, but they also exerted 
a special appeal to the larger engineering units. Evidence was 
presented in the chapter on psychic costs to show that, even when 
allowance is made for industrial structure and for site and factory 
availability on industrial estates, such plants were over­
represented in the new towns. It v/as argued that the new towns 
projected a favourable image to management and that this proved 
decisive in attracting such plants.
11.4 PLACING THE UE'.V TC7NS IN PERSPECTIVE
Despite their success in attracting about 23% of all immigrant 
employment between I960 and 1970, there is a need to keep the 
contrioution of the new towns in perspective. It is worth 
emphasising that the vast majority of incoming establishments 
(over 80%) selected a location outwith the new towns.
The new towns also seem to have suffered some erosion in their 
competitive edge during the course of the 1960s in that their share 
of both incoming establishments and employment declined after 1965* 
(Table 11.1). This is the reverse of what might have been expected 
The early 1960s saw the arrival of two very large motor vehicle 
plants, neither of which moved to a new town, and this could have 
been thought likely to deflate the new towns' share of emplo^mient 
relative to the succeeding period. In addition, the latter 1960s 
saw a larger number of new towns in operation since Livingston's 
development effectively started only in the mid-1960s and Irvine 
was designated a new town in 1967.
It is also worth noting that each new town attracted fewer jobs 
after I960 than its surrounding county (Table 11.3). East 
Kilbride's 5,680 jobs, for example, compared with 7,940 in the rest 
of Lanarkshire, while Fife obtained over half as many jobs again 
as Glenrothes. The lowest ratio of new town : county jobs occurred 
in Livingston, but this can be attributed to the movement of the 
British Motor Corporation into V/est Lothian. It is therefore 
misleading to place excessive emphasis on the new towns v/hile 
ignoring the success of other areas.
A measure of the new towns’ declining fortunes can be seen in East
Kilbride and Cumbernauld, which after 1965 together attracted
fewer new immigrant jobs than Glasgow (902 compared with 1,880).
The new towns’ share of the West of Scotland’s incoming employment 
slumped from 31% in the early 1960s down to 10% after 1965. This 
contrasts noticeably with the East of Scotland, where the new 
to’wns' snare of employment rose from 25% to 41% as a result of an 
inflow in both periods of about 3,500 jobs, wnereas the rest of the 
region experienced a decline (Table 11,4).
TABLE 1]  IMMIGRANT INDUSTRY IN THE NBA/ TOANS AND THEIR
SURROUNDING COUNTIES 1960-1970
Area*
Employment (Maximum) 1960-70
New
Town
Rest of 
County
Ratio of 
New Town : 
Rest
East Kilbride 5,680 7,940 1 ; 1.40
Cumbernauld 2,130 3,030 1 : 1.42
Glenrothes 4,650 7,310 1 : 1.57
Livingston 2,530 8,590 1 : 3.40
* Irvine has been excluded because it was not designated until 
1967 and only attracted one immigrant subsequent to this.
TABLE 11.4 HiulGRANT INDUSTRY IN THE NEV/ TOD'NS AND THEIR
REGIO.,3 1960-1970
Employment (Maximum)
Period Region
New
Towns Region
New Towns 
as % of 
Region
1960-65
West Central 
East Central
6,910
3,590
22,300
14,680
31.0
24.5
1966-70
West Central 
East Central
900
3,580
9,180
8,650
9.8
41.4
The probable explanation for the new towns' decreasing share of 
immigrant industry employment is that their competitive position 
weakened as a result of the extensive development of new industrial 
estates and advance factories in other areas, Their share of both 
fell after 1965; from 45% to 35% in the case of the new industrial 
estate acreage and from 64% to 45% of the new advance factory 
space. This further strengthens the view that the availability 
of sites and factories represent the new towns' largest assets.
PART III
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
CHAPTER 12
THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
12.1 REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The previous chapters discussed the individual variables hypothesised 
as exerting an influence on the choice of location in Scotland made 
by incoming industry. Each one was considered separately and 
assessed for its changing impact over time. On the basis of this 
type of approach it is rarely possible to determine tne importance 
of one factor relative to another. Instead, what is required is 
a joint assessment of all the relevant considerations because if 
two factors are operating in opposite directions, either to 
attract or to repel incoming industry, each will disguise the 
other's impact. It is possible to standardise for such an effect 
by statistical means using multiple regression analysis.
This technique identifies the linear relationship, expressed in 
the multiple correlation coefficient (R), between a set of 
independent or explanatory variables, in this case a number of 
potential location factors, and a dependent variable, such as tne 
volume of immigrant industry moving into an area. This is achieved 
by taking into account the inter-relationships among the 
independent variables (Nie et al, 1975; Koutsoyiannis, 1973). The 
difference between tne actual value of the dependent variable and 
that "predicted" by the linear combination of the independent 
variables is the residual. The regression equations seek to 
"explain" by means of the R^ (Coefficient of Determination) value
the proportion of variance in the dependent variable accounted for 
by the explanatory variables. The higher the r 2 value the better 
the explanatory power of the model.
The individual effect of eacn location factor on the volume of 
incoming industry can be identified by means of the sign and size 
of the regression coefficient. This shov/s the direction and 
strength of any relationship. A positive coefficient such as 
occurs in tne case of unemployment indicates that the larger the 
supply of labour in an area, the larger the volume of mobile 
industry that v/ill be attracted. The major location factors are 
identified on the basis of their significance levels.
The use of multiple regression analysis is well established in 
economic and geographical research and has been extensively used 
to identify the causal factors underlying a wide range of spatial 
distributions. These include retail prices (Chisholm and Campbell, 
1970), land values (Yeates, 1965) and rural farm population 
densities (Robinson et al, 1961). In addition the technique has 
formed the basis of a number of studies of industrial location.
These have dealt with urban decentralisation (Cameron, Firn et al,
1974), manufacturing employment growth (Smith, 1969; Keeble and 
Hauser, 1972) and inter-regional movement (Keeble, 1972 and Sant,
1975). By using multiple regression analysis the main factors 
attracting industry to particular areas or regions have been 
identified, although none of these studies has examined the locations 
chosen within the destination region by long distance industrial 
migrants.
Multiple regression analysis is used here to try and identify those 
factors which have either attracted industry to or repelled it from 
different parts of Scotland, Movement into each area is measured 
by the number of jobs provided by immigrant industry arriving in 
a specific time period. This is correlated with a range of 
explanatory variables hypothesised as being important influences 
on the location decision. More specifically, the relationship is 
expressed in the form:-
Y a -V biX-j t bgXg ......  b^X^ ®
where Y == the number of jobs in an area
X-] , . , Xj^  “ the explanatory variables 
e « error term or residual
a = a constant
b = the regression coefficients
The regression equations shown in Equations 13.1 to 13*38 include 
only those variables v/hich display the predicted sign, since these 
are the only ones considered to be meaningful. Those regression 
coefficients which are not significant at the 95% confidence 
level are then excluded and the equations re-run using only the 
significant variables. The relative importance of each factor is 
identified by means of its standardised regression coefficient or 
beta weight value. This converts the different scales of each
variable into comparable units on the basis of their standard
deviations.
A major cause of variables displaying a sign which is the reverse 
of that predicted is multi-collinearity. Multiple regression 
analysis assumes that the independent variables are independent of 
each other. If this is not the case and they are inter-correlated 
then the sampling error of the regression coefficient will be large, 
resulting in its incorrect specification (Hauser, 1974). In 
extreme cases it may result in tne occurrence of an incorrect 
sign, suggesting a false and misleading relationship,
Hauser (1974) suggests that if the correlation between independent 
variables exceeds -• 0.8 then collinearity is a serious problem.
In such circumstances it probably is best to apply "zero 
restriction" and drop one of the variables from the equation 
(Keeble and Hauser, 1972), using the remaining variable as a 
surrogate for both. In the succeeding analysis this is in fact 
done if it makes theoretical sense. For example, the very high 
correlation between the advance factory and industrial estate 
variables in the 1945-51 period results in the former snowing an 
incorrect sign and being omitted. The industrial estate variable 
is then assumed to represent new as well as existing factory space 
and site availability.
J 2*2 MEASURING THE VARIABLES
This section discusses the methods used to measure the variables 
used in the statistical analysis. The zones are those shown in 
Table 2.1 and represent the cities and counties or groups of 
counties. The analysis has been conducted on the basis of the four 
time periods discussed in Chapter 2.
Two ways of measuring the volume of immigrant industry have been 
used. Firstly, the maximum employment (regardless of year) 
provided by the establishments coming in each period; secondly, 
the employment they provided at the end of the period. This is 
undertaken both for immigrant industry as a whole and for the 
engineering sector on its own.
Maximum employment has been used both to ensure that all 
establishments were included, even those closing before the end 
of the period, and to allow for the build up in employment by 
firms coming only at the end of the period. On the other hand 
this build up to peak employment can occur many years later when 
it may be unrelated to conditions pertaining in the period during 
which the firm started production. The use of a measure of 
employment at the end of the period avoids this difficulty but 
excludes those plants closing before the terminal year.
The results using both measures are compared to see whether or not 
they produce similar findings. If not, an attempt is made to try 
and resolve the differences and to indicate which regression 
equation is likely to be tne most meaningful.
12,2.1 The Dependent Variables
Y 1 Maximum employment in all immigrant industry
Y 2 " Emplo;yinent at the end of the period in all immigrant industry
Y9 « Maximum employment in engineering immigrant plants
Y^ S3 Employment at the end of the period in engineering immigrant
plants -
203.
12.2.2 The Independent Variables
(a) Labour Supply
=: the number of females unemployed - this is used to measure the 
female labour supply which became more important than male 
labour during the 1960s.
Xp « the total number of people unemployed - this is used to 
measure the total labour supply.
X3 ï: the female unemployment rate,
X/j. =5 the total unemployment rate.
The vai’iables were measured in 194B, 1954, 1963 and 1966,
(b ) Accessibility
X^ the distance from the Scottish market plus the UK market - the 
mean centre of tne Scottish market is approximately at 
Stirling, while London was taken to represent the UK market.
(c) The Image of an Area
Xg s the percentage of households living in overcrowded conditions 
(defined as more than two persons per room in 1951 and more 
than one and a half persons per room in 1961 and 1966) - this 
is used as a surrogate for an area's physical image.
Xy S3 the percentage of economically active males in socio-economic 
groups 1 - 4  (basically managerial and professional groups ) - 
this is used as a surrogate for an area’s social image.
(d ) Site and Factory Availability
Xq » the acreage of new (less than 10 years developed) industrial 
estate land per 1,000 unemployed - this variable is a 
surrogate for tne availability of industrial sites.
Xg % the square footage of advance factory space built in the period 
pel' 1,000 unemployed - this variable is a surrogate for new 
factory availability.
Both variables are expressed as a ratio with the numbers unemployed 
to try and reduce collinearity because new sites and factories 
tended to be concentrated in areas of high unemployment. In 
addition, both act as a proxy either for central government policy 
(eg between 1945 and 1951) or for both central and local 
government policy (eg the 1960s).
(e ) Local Authority Assistance
X^Q " the proportion of local authorities in each area v/ho 
developed industrial estates or advance factories.
The only variables v/here the regression coefficients are expected 
to have a negative sign are Xg and X g . In all other cases a 
positive relationship is hypothesised.
CHAPTER 13
THE RESULTS OP THE
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
This Chapter discusses the results of the multiple regression 
analysis for each of the periods analysed.
13.1 THE 1945-51 PERIOD
The circumstances of this period were exceptional in that wartime 
building controls still existed, along with the nev/1 y introduced 
Industrial Development Certificates. There v/as a pronounced 
shortage of premises as a result of both v/ar damage and the release 
of pent-up consumer demand as the economy moved away from its war 
footing. This situation allov/ed the Government to exercise a 
strong influence on the location decisions by means of its control 
over industrial building activity.
The results from the regression equations are consistent with 
these circumstances. Equations 13.1 to 13.4 show that only four 
factors appear to be relevant to the choice of location. The 
availability of labour, measured either as the actual number or 
percentage of people unemployed, and the ability to offer sites and 
factories proved positive inducements, whereas distance from market; 
or inputs was negatively related to the amount of industry moving 
to an area,. The hign correlation ( 40.92) between the advance
factory and industrial estate variables means that the latter is 
used to act as a surrogate for new as well as second hand premises 
and serviced sites (Table 13.1).
In the case of both immigrant industry as a whole and the engineering
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sector on its own these variables provide a higher R value when 
employment is measured at the end of the period rather than at its 
maximum. This is not unexpected given that the build up to peak 
employment sometimes did not occur until the 1960s when very 
different conditions prevailed. Consequently the results are 
discussed in terms of employment at the end of the period.
Factory space and labour availability (measured in terms of total 
unempl oyrnen t ) stand out as the important considerations both for 
incoming industry as a whole and for the engineering sector on its 
own. The beta weight values indicate that of these factors the 
availability of factory space was about 50,1 more important to all 
immigrants than labour availability, whereas it was more than 
twice as important for the engineering sector (Equations 13.6 and 
13*8; Table 13.2).
The results are therefore consistent with the view that factory 
space was at a premium in this period. Since all the advance 
factories were government built, aJ.l new purpose built premises 
were subject to strict government control and many of the re-lets 
were government munition factories, it is clear that government 
policy had a pronounced effect on the choice of location within 
Scotland. It is also consistent with the argument that the 
availability of factory space is particularly attractive to 
engineering firms.
The strong preference of immigrant industry for a location either 
on Clydeside or in Dundee can therefore be attributed largely to 
the concentration of government factory building in these areas, 
although their large labour supplies were also a significant 
additional attraction.
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TABLE 13.1 CO u RELATIONd 3ET.VEEN THE VARIABLES: 1945-1951
Y1 Yg Yg Y4 X2 X4 X5 X-6 X7 X q  Xg
Y^ 1.00
'±2 0.96 1.00
Y3 0.97 0,90 1.00
Y 4 0.94 0.96 0.94 1.00
Xg 0.58 0,74 0.47 0.70 1.00
X4 0.62 0.63 0.55 0.55 0.48 1.00
Xg -0.23 -0.28 -0,20 -0.26 -0.26 0.24 1.00
X^ 0.68 0.73 0.60 0.76 0.30 0.45 -O.4I 1.00
Xy -0.07 "0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0.04 “0.13 -0.03 “0.18 1,00
Xq 0.86 0.36 0.87 0.90 0.52 0.48 0.26 0.62 0.02 1.00
Xg 0.76 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.46 O .46 -O.30 0.61 0,05 0.92 1.00
Notes
(a) Ail values are positive unless otherwise shov/n.
(b) For the key to the variables see text (12.1 and 12.2)
k f U Ü  .
REGRESSION EQUATIONS - ALL VARIABLES WITH THE PREDICTED SIGN
■JÏ- * -}'r
(13.1) y-| = 1105.34 V O.O8X2 f 1124.26X4 - 5.05X5 4 2716.24Xq
(0 ,1 6 ) (526.66) (5 .23) (567.29)
R 0,90 r2 40.81
i("X' "X" *
(13.2) Y2 - 460.72 4 0.15Xg 4 359.83X 4 - 1 .99X 5 + 908.45Xq
.(0 .05) (160.33) (1.59) (1 7 2.70)
R ° 0.94 R^ = 40.89
(13.3 ) Yg = 6.63 + 502,08X 4 - I.3 .X5 4 2297.04X3
(359.76) (3.71) (414.26)
R 40.88 r 2 " 40,78
(13.4) Y4 = -8,48 4 0 .07X2 4 59.17X 4 - 0 .17X 5 4 620.94X3'
(0 .03) (82.63) (0 .82) (8 9 .00)
R = 40.94 r 2 “ 0.89
NOTES : (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors
of the regression coefficients.
(b) * - significant at the 95% level
significant at tne 99% level
REGRS33IC!] EQUATIONS - ALL SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
(13.5) = -1289.35 f 986,12X 4 ' 4 3070,40X3
(429.86 ) (491.9 .)
R = 4-0.89 r 2 = 4-0.79
(13.6) Yg « -41.66 + 0.19X2 ' 4. 1074.71X3
(0 .05) (166.30)
R = 40.92 r 2 “ 4-0.86
(13.7 ) Yg " 166.95 4- 2609.53Xg
(325.93)
R - +0.87 R2 « +0.75
(13.8 ) Y4 » -6.80 + o.oaxp*"'' + 645.64x3''*
(0.02) (76.36)
R = +0.94 r 2 = +0.89
-+41-
NOTES : (a) rigures in brackets are the standard errors
of the regression coefficients.
(b) * - significant at the 95% level
** - significant at the 99% level
TABLE 13.2 BETA AEIGHT V/iLUE3 - AJjL SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
Dependent
Variable X2 24
VA-S
Ï1 - -to. 27 +0.73
Ï 2 t O . 41 “ +0.64
^3 - “ +0.87
Ï4 -hO.31 - +0.74
13.2 THE 1932-59 PERIOD
This period v/as one of relatively lax regional policy (Hioore and 
Rhodes, 1973), with little atteiiipt by government to influence the 
location decisions of immigrant industry. Only two new government 
industrial estates wei'e started in this period and no advance 
factories were built. Nevertheless sites were available on the 
existing estates and premises became vacant for re-letting from 
time to time, so that government influence on location decisions 
was not entirely absent.
During the 1950s three of the new tov/ns began to develop their own 
industrial estates and to attra.ct nev; industry, although the only 
advance factories were a few nest units which tended to hold 
little appeal to immigrant firms. The removal of wartime building 
controls, the larger supply of factory space as a result of the 
post-war building boom, and the cessation of the demand pressures 
which were experienced just after the v/ar meant that the demand 
for new factories had eased, while the supply of premises had 
improved. Consequently the influence of factory space (and 
government policy for which it acted as a proxy) on the choice of 
site is likely to be less in evidence during this period.
Once again four factors stand out as being relevant to the choice 
of location within Scotland (Equations 13.9 to 13.12). Distance 
from markets continued to deter industry from moving to the 
remoter areas whereas a good supply of labour and of sites/factory 
space proved a positive inducement.
The values remain highest when employment is measured at the 
end of the period, although the difference is much less pronounced 
than in the previous period. The results are therefore discussed 
in terms of this measure of immigrant industry. The variables 
"explain" about 88,1 of the variation in employment in all 
immigrant plants and 864 in the engineering sector.
Labour availability and the supply of sites/factories again stand 
out as being of prime concern to incoming establishments, although 
this time tneir ranks are reversed in tne case of all iiumigrants. 
The beta weighi values suggest tnat labour supply exerts nearly
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twice as much influence as the availability of sites/premises.
This is consistent with the view that since supply and demand for 
factory space was more in balance during this period its effect 
on the choice of site would bo correspondingly less. It also 
reflects the reduced government control over factory building.
The decline in "explanatory" power when only these two variables 
are used in the equation is minimal since falls from 0.88 to 
0.86 and suggests that these factors were of overwhelming 
importance.
Engineering imiuigrants differ in that the R^ value is the same 
whether employment is taken at its maximum or at the end of the 
period. Kov/evez' the sigziificant factors are influenced by the 
employment measure used, V/hen the dependent variable is employment 
at its maximum the critical location factors are the availability 
of both sites and factories and of labour (as reflected in the 
rate of unemployment) and distance to markets. Of these, sites 
and factory space exert about four times the weight of the other 
factors. The reason why neither distance nor the rate of 
unemployment shows up as significant in the full equation is that 
their impact is reduced by the presence of the variable measuring 
total unemployment.
When engineering employment is assessed at the end of the period 
the availability of sites and factories continues to be the 
outstanding factor but its relative importance is reduced to about 
504 above that of the total supply of labour. Neither the rate of 
unemployment nor distance to market is significant in this equation.
Therefore both measuz’es of engineering employment agree that site 
and factory availability continues to be of outstanding importance 
to engineering immigrants, with labour supply of lesser significance 
This contrasts with immigrant industry in general and reflects the 
greater importance of site/factory space to engineez’ing plants.
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TABLE 13.3 CORRELATIONS BEÏ.7EEN THE VARIABLES: 1952-59
Yl Ï2 Y3 Y4 X2 X4 X5 Xg Xy Xg Xg
Y-j 1.00
Y 2 0.98 1.00
Y3 0.89 0.80 1.00
Y4 0.97 0.94 0.94 1.00
X2 0.78 0.87 0.4a 0.72 1.00
X4 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.32 0,28 1.00
Xg -0.34 -0.32 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 0.44 1.00
Xg 0.7& 0.79 0.56 0.69 0.81 0.25 -O.4I 1.00
Xy -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.18 1,00
Xg 0.77 0.87 0.90 0.82 0.42 0.19 -0.19 O .52 0.16 1.00
NOTES : (a) All variables are positive unless otherv/ise shown.
(b) For the key to the variables see text (12.1 and 12.2)
REGRESSION E RATIONS - ALL VARIABLES WITH THE PREDICTED SIGN
( 13 . 9 ) Y-i -  927 .09  + 0 .3 4 X 2 *^  4 344.09X4, -  3 .38X5 4 596.67X3'"' ' '
(0 .08) (241.23) (2 .02) (116.42)
R = +0.93 R2 “  +0 .8 6
(13.10) Yg - 219.87 + 0 .25X2'"'" + 148.89X 4 - 1 .32X 5 + 218.19X8 ^
(0.04) (121.50) (1 .02) (58.64)
R » +0.94 R2 « VO,38
(13.11) Y3 - 545.32 V 0 .01X 2 •f' 284.85X4 - 2 .37X 5 + 589.40X3"'"'
(0 .05) (149.87) (1 .26) (72.33)
R “ +0.93 R2 « +0.86
, . -K-+ +-M-
(13.12) Y4 = 10.25 + O.O8X2 f 93.50X 4 - 0 .65X5 + 202.51X3
(0 .02) (68.39) (0.57) (3 3 .01)
R “ +0.93 r 2 “ +0.86
NOTES : (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors
of the regression coefficients,
(b) * - significant at the 93}l level
~ significant at the 99/3 level
REGRESSION EQUATIONS - ALL SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
( 13 . 13) Y-i -  - 264 .03 + 0 . 4 0 X 2 " "  + 6 3 1 . 01X q " "
( 0 . 0 7 ) (1 1 7 .9 5 )
R “  +0 .9 2  R2 =» +0 .8 4
(13.14) Yg = -220.51 + 0.28X2" + 232.26X3
( 0 . 0 4 ) ( 5 7 . 8 6 )
R « +0.93 R2 « +0 .86
(13.15) Y3 « 581.53 2 5 5 .45X 4" - 2 .46X 5 " + 5 9 3 .31X3 ""
( 1 3 4 .3 0 )  ( 1 .1 3 ) ( 6 7 .2 1 )
R = +0 .93  R2 "  +0 .86
( 1 3 . 1 6 )  Y4 = - 1 6 8 .50 + 0 .09X2 + 210.32X3
(0.02) (3 2 .59)
R “  +0 .9 2  r 2 = +0 .94
NOTES : (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors
of the regression coefficients
(b) * - significant at the 95/t level
** - significant at the 99/% level
TAELE 13.4 BETA A EIGHT V/iUES - y\LL SIGNIPICAHT VARIABLES
.... ........ .. ^
Dependent
Variable ^4 ^5
Ï 1 fO.55 - - 4-0.53
Ï2 +0.71 “ - 4-0.37
^3 4.0,22 -0.22 4.0.82
Ï4 fO.43 - “ +0.63
^ I (
13.3 THE 1960-65 PERIOD
During this period regional policy was greatly strengthened, 
resulting in an increase in the volume of inter-regional industrial 
movement (.vloore and Rhodes, 1973). Financial incentives were 
introduced, IDC policy was tightened and advance factory building 
was re-started by central government as well as being greatly 
expanded by the new towns and started for the first time by local 
authorities. In addition the areas eligible for government 
assistance were extended, thereby effectively widening the 
potential choice of locations for immigrant industry.
The structure of immigrant industry underwent pronounced changes 
in this period. Electrical engineering and clothing establishunents 
provided a growing share of the incoming employment, whereas 
mechanical engineering plants provided fewer jobs. This resulted 
in demand shifting from male to female labour, although the arrival 
of two large motor vehicle plants disguises this trend.
Consequently female labour became increasingly important as a
location factor. The preference of both electrical engineering 
and clothing plants for available factory space, particularly in 
the form of new advance factories, suggests that the availability 
of premises is again lihely to be a relevant consideration.
Differences in the results for immigrant industry in general and 
for the engineering industry on its ov/n mean that the respective 
findings are considered separately. Six variables appear to be 
relevant to the location decisions of immigrant industry and 
together they '’explain” at least 65^ of the total variance 
(Equations 13.17 and 13.19). End of period employment continues
to produce the highest values.
Two equations are shown for each dependent variable. The 
difference between them is that physical image is substituted for 
accessibility in the second equation. It was hypothesised 
previously that psychic income/cost factors would become increasingly 
relevant as the IRoOs progressed and the results arguably provide 
some evidence for this trend.
Unfortunately the physical image and labour supply variables are 
very higrily correlated (t-0,36), so that it is not possible to 
identify satisfactorily the individual impact of image factors.
The results for immigrant industry as a whole show however that 
the overall level of "explanation" (R^) increases when the image 
variable is incorporated into the equations. This indicates that 
it makes a valuable contribution to the overall level of 
explanation. In addition this is the first period in which the 
image variable has the predicted sign. Problems of collinearity 
are so severe that they prevent a more precise identification of 
its relative importance from being established.
Nevertheless the equations (13*17 - 13*20) agree that female labour 
availability, as measured by both actual and percentage unemployment 
the presence of sites and factories, and local authority activity 
were all relevant considerations for incoming industry. This is 
also the first time in which advance factory space can be 
separately identified from the overall provision of industrial 
estate sites and factories. The correlation of fO.33 between these 
variables compares to one of 4-0,92 between 1945 and 1951. As far 
as the significant variables are concerned there is general 
agreement that labour, site and/or factory availability are the 
major location factors (Equations 13*25 - 13*28).
There is some divergence amongst the different equations in terms
of the outstanding location factor. Assuming that employment at
the end of the period is a oetter indicator than maximum
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employment, in that it has a higher R value, the availability of 
sites/factory space seems to be the most important location factor. 
It has the highest beta weight score whether or not the physical 
image variable is included in the equations (Table 13*6). However, 
there is a marked difference between the equations in the 
contribution of female labour to the overall level of explanation. 
Its full impact will be hidden if an area’s physical image is not 
taken into account because the advantages of a large labour supply 
can be partly offset by a poor physical environment.
Consequently when the physical image variable is ignored, female 
labour supply, whether measured by the actual or percentage 
unemployment rate, only carries half the Aci. nt of sito/fo c tory
availability. However when allowance is made for the negative 
effect of a poor environment the actual size of the labour supply 
becomes much more significant. It then ranks above the relative 
availability of labour (ie the rate of unemployment) and much 
closer to considerations of factory a.vailability (Table 13.6).
The fact that the percentage rate of female unemployment is a 
significant factor provides some support for the impact of 
government policy. Development Districts were designated largely 
on the basis of their unemployment rate and there is a high 
correlation (+-0.86) between the female and total unemployment 
rates. The concentration of advance factory building in the 
Assisted Areas can be seen in the correlation of -t-0.61 between the 
advance factory and female unemployment rate variables.
When employment is measured at its maximum a different ranking of 
significant factors becomes apparent. Female labour supply either 
ranks equal to or higher than the availability of factory space, 
depending on whether or not the physical image variable is included 
in the equation (Table 13.6). A further change is that advance 
factory space shows up as a significant factor in its own right, 
rather than being subsumed by the industrial estate variable.
The conclusion arising from this discussion is that the size of 
the female labour supply and the availability of factory space 
(whether new or second hand) are the outstanding attractions to 
immigrant industry in this period. Their relative ranking depends 
on how the volume of incoming industry is measured. Physical image 
is also a relevant consideration, although collinearity problems 
prevent the real extent of its impact from being satisfactorily 
identified.
Interpretation of the regression equations becomes even more 
difficult in the case of engineering immigrants. Before the 
inclusion of the physical image variable the overall levef of 
"explanation" is extremely low at 52/ and none of tne three factors 
included in the equation is significant (Equations 13.21 and 13.23). 
This is in direct contrast to the situation for all immigrant plants, 
where the stepwise multiple regression procedure identified four 
significant factors when physical environment 'was excluded from 
the analysis.
The effect of adding the physical image variable is a dramatic 
rice in the overall explanation from about 50/ to 72/ (Equations 
13.22 and 13.24). No comparable increase occurred for immigrant 
firms as a whole. The other impact is to render the supply of 
both female labour and advance factory space significant. Such a 
pronounced effect is consistent with the view that an attractive 
environment is particularly important to the engineering industry.
The fact that the advance factory rather than the industrial estate 
variable is significant supports the argument advanced in Part II 
that the availability of new factory premises is particularly 
important to electrical engineering, which dominated the 
engineering sector at this time. However the correlation of tO.55 
with the industrial estate variable suggests that it also acts as 
a partial surrogate for the previously occupied premises found on 
such estates.
The severe collinearity problems arising from the physical image 
variable make any sensible interpretation of the results extremely 
difficult. As far as the engineering sector is concerned, the best 
that can probably be done is to conclude that the availability of 
both female labour and factory space are particularly important, 
while an area's physical environment can also sway the location 
decision.
221 .
table 13.5 CORRELATIONS BETAEEN TEE VARIABLES: 1960-1965
Y 1 Y2 Y^ Y ^ X-| %2 ^3 ^4 ^6 ky Xg Xg X40
Y-) 1.00
Y2 0.95 1.00
Y3 0.80 0.68 1.00
Y^ 0.78 0.68 0.99 1.00
0.58 0.48 0.56 0.56 1,00 
X2 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.94 1.00
X3 0.76 0.68 0.59 0.57 0.46 0.22 1.00
X4 0.63 0.53 0.47 0.45 0,61 0.47 0.87 1.00
X3 -0.39 -0.38 -0.22 -0,22 -0.38 -0.31 -0.20 -0.20 1.00
Xg 0.46 0.44 0.29 0.28 0.85 0.69 0.32 0.53 -0.31 1.00
Xy -0.43 -0.47 -0.37 -0.37 -0.53 -0.45 -0.45 -0.33 O.I6 -0.53 1.00
Xg 0.57 0.77 0.22 -0.37 0.04 -0.01 0.32 0.15 -0.24 0.22 -0.37 1.00
Xg 0.78 0.74 0.-58 0.56 0.31 0 .I5 0.61 0.54 -O.32 0.34 -0.14 0.55 1.00
X]_o 0.18 0,27 0.04 0.06 -0.21 -0.27 0.09 "0.15 -0.10 -0,10 -0.05 0.42 0.23 1.00
MOTES ; (a) All variables ore positive unless otnerwise stiown.
(b) ior the key to the variables see text (12.1 and 12,2).
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REGRESSION EQUATIONS - iU.L VARIABLES ,71TH THE PREDICTED SIGN
(13.17) = -1062.93 4- 0.6l%i 4- 492.0X3 ’ - 0 .82X 3 + 34.43Xg *■ 35-57Xg + 2.23%io
(0.25) (2 0 5.1 3) (2,38) (1 7 .0 6 ) (15.49) (7.77)
R " +0 ,9 2 r2 “ +0.85
* * -*-* **
(13.18) Y,, “ 1776.69 + 1 .48X1 + 3 2 9.93X3 - 363.93Xg + 4 8 .15X3 + 40.23Xg + 2.56Xi(
(0.39) (184.45) (147.37) (15.44) (13.17) (6.60)
R - 4-0.94 r2 = +0.89
( 13. 19) Yg = - 5 5 1 . 1 3  4- 0 . 3 5 X 1  + 2 5 8 . 6 6 X 3  -  0 , 4 7 X 5  -I- 48 . 55Xg + 9 . 93Xg i- 1 . 27X i q
(0.13) (107.04) (1 .25) (8.90) (8 .09) (4.05)
R = 0.95 r2 = +0.89
* *-*
(13.20) Yg = 914.01 + O.8OX1 + 173.43X3 - 190.51Xg + 55.7BX3 + 12.41Xg + 1 .45X 10
(0.20) (96.22) (76.88) (8 .05) (6.87) (3.44)
R “ 0.96 r2 = +0.92
(13.21) Y3 - -788.17 4- 0 .43X1 + 195.22X3 + 22.51Xg
(0.21) (199.55) (13.10)
R = +0.72 r2 = 0.52
** ** *
(13.22) Y3 * 3278.39 + 1.47Xi + 3 .27X3 - 456.74Xg + 8 .62X3 + 30.20Xg + 1.73Xiq
(0.38) (179.96) (143.79) (15.06) (12.84) (6.44)
R = +0.84 r2 " +0.71
(13.23) Y4 = 405.89 + 0 .25X 1 + 99.73X3 + 11.93Xg
(0 .12) (113.13) (7.43)
R - +0.71 r2 “ +0.50
* * * » *
( 1 3 . 2 4 )  Y4 = 1956.09  + 0 . 88X 1 -  2 7 2 . 5 3 X g  + 7 . 74X3 + 1 4 . 5 3 X g  + 1 . 3 5 X i q
(0.13) (71.39) (7.88) (5.93) (3.39)
R = +0.85 r2 " +0.72
NOTES : (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors of the regression
coefficients.
(b) * - significant at the 95/ level
- significant at the 99V.' level
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REGRESSION EQUATIONS - AI,L SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
(13.25) Yi = -1384,23 + 0.63%i**  ^4 8 6.OOX3 * + 3 6 .85X3* + 36.69Xg*
(0.21) (192.92) (15.21) (14.50)
R = +0.92 R2 = +0.85
(13.26) Y-i = 3460.81 + l.TSX^ ** - 453.30X&** + 53.80Xq ** + 52.06Xg'
(0 .36) (144.17) (15.10) (11.93)
R = +0.93 R2 “ +0.87
(1 3.2 7) Y2 = 873.72 + 0 .37X 1** + 3 2 2.31X3** + 5 5.37X3**
(0.11) (90.77) (7.11)
R = +0.94 ~ +0.83
(13.28) Y2 = 680.39 + 0.77Xi** + 26O.9IX3 ** - 173.76Xg* + 6 2.58X3 **
(0.21) (87.55) (79.55) (7.28)
R = +0.95 R^ = +0.91
(1 3.2 9) Y3 = 3 1 7 0 .2 2 + 1 .38X 1** - 426.09Xg** + 3 4 .93X9**
(0 .29) (119.04) (8.72)
R *= +0.84 r2 = +0.70
(13.30) Y^ - 1837.33 + 0 .79X 1** - 244.77X5** + 18.6lXg**
(0 .16) (66.36) (4.86)
R = +0.84 r2 “ +0.70
NOTES ; (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors of the
regression coefficients,
(b) * - significant at the 95^- level
** “ significant at the 99%- level
TABLE 13.6 BETA ,/EIGHT V/JLUE3 ~ AJLL oIGEIPICAET VARIABLES
Dependent
Variable % ^6 %8
Xg
+0.32 +0.32 — +0.27 +0.34
^1 +0.90 - "0.57 +0.40 +0. 48
^2 +0.30 +0.34 +0.66 -
^2 +0.62 +0.27 -0,85 +0.74 -
^3 +1.15 -0.68 - +0.54
+1.18 -0.91 — +0.51
13.4 THE 1966-70 PERIOD
At the start of this period the whole of Scotland, with the 
exception of Edinburgh, becane a Development Area and the following 
year a number of mining centres were designated as Special 
Development Areas (SDAs), with enhanced incentives. Aith the 
exception of Edinburgh and the SDAs, nowhere was particularly 
advantaged or disadvantaged in respect of the financial assistance 
available so that government policy effectively became spatially 
neutral. Consequently it can in general be ignored as a location 
factor.
Advance factory building by central and local government and new 
town development corporations more than doubled, to the benefit of 
a wider I'ango of locations. The attraction of female labour 
supplies grew as electrical engineering and clothing plants began 
to dominate the structure of incoming industry. The rising 
unemployment, together with the additional new factory space, 
meant that more areas than previously were able to meet the labour 
and factory requirements of incoming industry. As a result spatial 
cost differences declined, thereby allowing non-economic factors 
to exert a greater influence on the cnoice of site within Scotland.
The correlations between the independent variables in Table 13.7 
show that the areas most competitive in terms of advance factory 
space also tended to be those with the most land developed in the 
form of industrial estates (r “ +0.60). The variables measuring 
an area's image are hypothesised as being particularly relevant 
in this period and it is fortunate that collinearity problems, 
although not absent, are much reduced in comparison with earlier 
periods. Those areas with the worst physical image in general had 
the highest levels of unemployment but the correlation of +0.65 
compares with +0,36 in the early 1960s. The corollary is that it 
is more I'easonable to assume that image can now be identified as 
a significant factor in its own right.
Once again the value is higher for all immigrant employ.nent 
than for engineering employment on its own. However this is the 
only time during which maximum employment gives rise to a higher 
than employment at the end of tne period (Equations 13-31 and
13.32). In some ways this is to be expected. In previous periods 
the maximum number of jobs from a project usually occurred in 
subsequent periods when conditions differed from those prevailing 
at the time the development was initially undertaken. In contrast 
in the late 1960s there is no later period identified during which 
such an employment build-up can occur. Since employment at the 
end of the period in 1970 excludes closures, unlike the maximum 
employment figure, it is perhaps not surprising that the latter 
seems to provide a clearer picture of the development occurring 
during the period itself.
The regression equation shows that four factors stand out as 
relevant to the location decisions of immigrant industry. These 
are the supply of female labour, physical image, the availability 
of serviced sit es/previously occupied premises and new advance 
factories. Together they "explain” about 87/ of the overall 
spatial variation in immigrant industry employment (Equation 13.31) 
This is the first period in wnich accessibility is not a relevant 
factor, possibly because the dominant industries such as 
electrical engineering and clothing were least constrained by the 
need for market access. The rate of unemployment is also 
unimportant, possibly reflecting the cessation of the link with 
■Assisted Area status.
When the analysis is restricted to the significant variables there 
is only a marginal decline in the value (Equation 13.35). The 
beta weight figures indicate that the availability of female labour 
exerted the strongest influence on the location decision, carrying 
about 50/ more weight than the availaoility of factory, 
particularly new, floorspace. This in turn has about one-third 
more impact than an area’s physical image (Table 13.8). The 
rankings re..iain unchanged in the case of employment at the end of 
the period, although physical image exerts a relatively stronger 
influence.
The correlation between the industrial estate and advance factory 
variables suggests thet the latter subsumes some of the influence 
of the former anon the analysis is confined to the significant 
variables. It therefore appears that the advance factory variable, 
at least in part, acts as a surrogate for previously occupied 
floorspace. It seems safer to conclude that the availability of
premises as a ..hole was a significant factor, although new advance 
factories were particularly attractive. Since the industrial 
estates and advance factories were either developed by central or 
local government and their agencies, they also represent success 
for public policy initiatives.
Engineering immigrants seem to have been more conscious of an 
area’s image than immigrant establishments as a whole, and displayed 
a stronger preference for places with an attractive physical 
environment. There are two pieces of evidence for this view. 
Firstly, this was the only period when social image, as reflected 
by the proportion of managerial and professional workers living in 
an area, was a relevant, albeit minor, factor. Secondly, an area's 
physical image ranked more highly amongst the significant variables 
than was the case with all immigrants. Its beta weight score 
exceeded that of factory space, although it was still below that 
for female labour (Table 13.8).
The statistical results therefore support the hypothesis advanced 
in Part II that non-economic location factors, such as psychic 
costs or income, only became significant during the course of the 
1960s, Furthermore it was also hypothesised that they were likely 
to be of oarticular concern to engineering firms.
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TABLE 13.7 CORRELATIONS BET A TH5 VARIABLES: 1966-1970
Y-| Yg Y^ X.  ^ Xg X^ Xg X^ Xg Xg X.^q
Yi 1.00
Yg 0 . 9 9  1 . 0 0
Yg 0.91 0.92 1.00
Y4 0 . 9 1  0.91 0 . 9 9  1 . 0 0
X., 0 , 6 6  0.59 0 . 5 9  0.59 1 . 0 0
Xg 0 , 3 9  0 . 3 0  0 . 2 4  0 . 2 3  0.89 1 . 0 0
Xg 0 . 3 0  0 . 3 1  0 . 3 7  0 . 3 8  0 . 2 1  - 0 . 0 5  1 . 0 0
X4 0 . 0 2  0 .0 1  0 . 0 5  0 . 0 6  0 . 1 6  0 . 0 8  0 . 8 4  1 . 0 0
Xg - 0 . 3 5  - 0 . 3 3  - 0 . 3 2  - 0 . 3 2  - 0 . 3 7  - 0 . 3 0  0 . 1 9  0 . 4 0  1 , 0 0
Xg 0 . 1 0  0 . 0 1  - 0 . 0 2  - 0 . 0 4  0 . 6 5  0 . 8 9  - 0 . 2 0  O.O6 - 0 . 1 7  1 . 0 0
Xr  ^ - 0 . 3 7  - 0 . 3 6  - 0 . 2 2  - 0 . 2 3  - 0 . 2 4  - 0 . 1 9  - 0 . 4 5  - 0 . 3 2  0 . 0 6  - 0 . 0 2  1 . 0 0
Xg 0 . 4 1  0 . 4 2  0 . 2 6  0 . 2 6  - 0 . 1 1  - C . I S  0 . 3 0  0.09 0 . 0 7  - 0 . 2 1  - 0 . 3 9  1 . 0 0
Xg 0 , 6 8  0 . 6 8  0 . 6 1  O.bO 0 . 1 5  - 0 . 0 3  0 . 2 5  - 0 . 0 5  - 0 . 4 1  - 0 . 1 5  - 0 . 2 2  0 . 6 0  1 . 0 0
X -,0 0 . 2 0  0 . 2 4  0 . 1 7  0 . 1 8  - 0 . 2 2  - 0 . 3 0  - 0 . 1 0  - 0 . 4 2  - 0 . 1 2  - 0 . 3 7  - 0 . 0 4  O . 5O 0 . 4 7  1 . 0 0
NOTES : (a) All values are positive unless other',vise stated.
(b) For the key to the variables see text (12.1 and 12.2).
REGRESSION EQUATIONS - ALL VARIABLES V/ITE THE PREDICTED SIGN
Mr¥r
(13.31) Y-] « 355.91 + 1.29%i - 267.87X5 + 16.02Xq + 7.82Xg
(0.18) (84.42) (8.29) (2,40)
R “ to.93 R2 “ +0.87
(13.32) Y2 = 404.29 t 1 .03X 1 - 265.71X 5 + 1 2 .85X3 + 6 .18X 9
(0.16) (7 7 .54) (7.61) (2.21)
R “ +0.92 r 2 = +0.84
-K- * *
(13.33) Yg = 98.69 + O.88X 1 - 263.74X 5 + 3 .07X3 + 5.52Xg
(0 .15 ) (69.64) (4.28) (1.57)
R = +0.89 = +0.80
. . -ît* * *
(13.34) Y4 “ 84.46 + 0 .77X 1 - 237.19X 5 + 2 .73X7 + 2.73Xg + 4.09Xg
(0.14) (62.33) (4 .20) (6.66) (1.77)
R « +0.89 r2 ” +0.79
NOTES : (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors
of the regression coefficients.
(b) * - significant at the 95/ level
** - significant at the 99/ level
REGRESSION EQUATIONS - ALL SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
(13.35) Yi “ 477.76 + l.SlXq - 26I.2IX5 + 10.67X 9
(0.18) (90.22) (2.03)
R - +0.92 r2 « 0.85
i t *  X--K- _  * *
(13.36) Yg = 562.04 + 0 .97X 1 - 260.36X 5 + S.46X 9
(0 .1 7 ) (31.16) (1.83)
R « +0.90 r 2 = +0.81 ■
(13.37) Yg - 468.08 0 .85X 1* - 257.35%6* + 5.36Xg*
(0 .1 4 ) (68.1 8 ) (1 .53)
R == +0.89 = +0.79
- ,  *  *  *  *  #  *
(13.38) Y4 - 433.35 + 0 .74X-, - 230.38X5 + 4.43X9
(0 .12) (58.92) (1 .33)
R = +0,89 R2 EJ +0.79
NOTES : (a) Figures in brackets are the standard errors
of the regression coefficients.
(b) * - significant at the 95/ level
** significant at the 99/ level
TABLE 13.8 BETA WEIGHT V/iUES - ALL SIGNIPICANT VARIABLES
Dependent 
Variable %1 %6 %9
Y1 +0.82 -0.36 +0.50
^2 +0.81 -0.45 +0.49
^3 +0.50 -0.56 +0.39
+0.91 -0.58 +0.38
1_3^ 5 lAnlGRANT INDUSTRY - RESIDUALS
The residuals derived from the regression equations indicate those 
places which have attracted either more or less industry than 
expected on the basis of the variables identified as being relevant 
to the location decision. The equations used to produce the 
residuals were those with the highest r 2 value for all the 
variables with the predicted sign. Areas which regularly obtain 
more industry than predicted appear to enjoy additional advantages, 
whereas those with a persistent deficit can be assumed to be 
particularly disadvantages.
The residuals are plotted on Maps 13.1 to 13.4 for those areas 
with the largest values, as determined by both their actual and 
relative magnitudes. A completely arbitrary cut-off point was 
chosen to isolate the more extreme scores, which are of most 
interest. The criterion adopted was a residual in excess of both 
- 200 jobs and - 10/ of the predicted value. In this way areas 
attracting few jobs but with a large percentage residual and those 
with a residual large in absolute, but small in relative, terms, 
were excluded.
In the V/est of Scotland, Lanarkshire stands out as a particularly 
attractive area in that it obtained more jobs tnsn expected in 
every period, even though this was only just the case in the latter 
1960s . Glasgow's fortunes fluctuated over time. The city 
attracted fewer jobs than expected on tne basis of its available 
labour and factory space prior to 1951, but about the expected 
volume of employment during the 1950s. Consequently there is no 
consistent evidence at this time to show that a distinctive 
Glasgow factor was operating to deter incoming firms. There is 
however some evidence for this in the 1960s, when psychic cost/ 
income factors became important. Prior to 1965 the city 
experienced an extremely large shortfall of immigrant employment, 
totalling 670/1130 jobs or a deficit equal to about 50/ of the 
expected number of jobs. Failure to isolate satisfactorily the 
image factor because of collinearity problems probably accounts 
for this large negative residual. In the following period Glasgow's 
volume of new industry, although small, was about the expected, 
size. The principal explanation for the city's lack of attraction
at this time is its exceedingly poor image, as measured by the 
particular variable (ovorcro\;ding) used in the equation, Glasgow 
experienced a far high degree of overcrowding than any part of 
Scotland. Consequently a poor physical environment seems to have 
exerted a powerful deterrent to incoming industry. Before this 
factor is taken into consideration the city’s expected volume of 
new industry after 1965 was approximately 4,000 jobs, but the 
inclusion of image considerations dramatically reduces this to 
1,500 jobs. From the evidence available therefore it seems 
reasonable to conclude that Glasgow's efforts to attract new 
industry are severely handicapped by an unfortunate image.
Dunbartonshire held less attraction than expected for immigrant 
firms after making allowance for its location, supplies of labour 
and factory space and its physical image. The fact that it also 
contained a new town specifically geared to attracting industry 
only adds to the complication in trying to explain this situation.
A possible reason is the somewhat peculiar spatial arrangement of 
the county. It is the only one to be physically split into two 
separate areas, with most of the new factory space concentrated in 
the eastern sector around Cumbernauld and most of the labour in 
the western part around Clydebank and Dumbarton. By considering 
the county as a single spatial unit this peculiar geographical 
situation is ignored.
Both Renfrewshire and Ayrshire became less attractive in the latter 
1960s and this cannot be accounted for simply by any change in the 
cost and availability of their factor inputs. In the former county 
a possible explanation is the build-up in employment at the Rootes 
Company car plant at 1 inwood, which is likely to have discouraged 
additional new firms from moving into the area.
Elsewhere in central Scotland, Stirlingshire proved more attractive 
than expected in both the 1950s and latter 1560s, but less 
attractive in the intervening periods. Midlothian experienced a 
very large and persistent deficit of incoming industry from I 960 
and obtained little now industry despite a reasonably good supply 
of labour, sites and factories. Prior to i 960 the lack of Assisted 
Area status was a handicap, but it does not explain the continued 
lack of new industry, Tne most likely explanation appears to be
that the county was successful in attracting firms out of 
Edinburgh and had less incentive than other areas to seek 
immigrant industry from outv/ith Scotland.
west Lothian's success in attracting new industry can be largely 
attributed to its plentiful supply of industrial land and factories 
developed mostly by the local authorities and new town development 
corporation. Edinburgh, as expected, attracted no new industry 
in the 1960s. This reflected the lack of sites and factories, a 
relatively tight female labour market and exclusion from Assisted 
Area status. Fife's appeal to incoming industry can mainly be 
attributed to its supply of sites and premises and relatively 
plentiful female labour reserves. These factors do not account 
for the whole of its attraction, because in both periods during 
the 1960s the county had a positive residual, A possible 
explanation is the extremely active local authorities (including 
a new town development corporation) who paid particular attention 
to the requirements of immigrant industry.
The appeal of the Borders seems to have been closely related to 
its supply of labour and factories. In contrast, the South West 
of Scotland attracted fewer jobs than might reasonably have been 
expected on the basis of its factor inputs during the 1960s.
The only time that Dundee and the Tayside counties experienced an 
unexpected snortfall of new industry was in the 1950s, when 
Dundee failed to attract a volume of industry commensurate with 
its supply of labour and sites/factories. This can probably be 
attributed to the continued build-up in employment by two lai’ge 
immigrant firms, NCR and Timex, who arrived in the previous 
period.
In the North East, Aberdeen county obtained its expected share of 
new jobs with the exception of the latter 1960s, when Aberdeen 
city proved more successful than expected. In this latter 
instance, however, the number of jobs involved was fairly small.
In general tnis region was less competitive than much of the 
central belt owing to its remote location and fewer sites and 
new factories.
The Highlands display somewhat curious results, hut in practice 
they are readily explicable. There were large negative residuals 
in Argyll and Caithness/Sutherland just after the war and again 
in the latter county after 19o0. The presence of high 
unemployment rates in tnese areas has the effect of boosting the 
predicted level of employment to unreasonably high levels despite 
the lack of sites, factories and a large pool of labour. The 
very large notional surplus of jobs in Ross-shire and 
Inverness-shire after 1965 arises from the arrival of the large 
new pulp and paper mill near Fort (Villiam
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MAP 13. 1 1945-51 RESIDUALS' FOR TOT^J, M I G R A N T  E%PLOY:,:E::T (BQUAT ION 13 .2 )
Negative
Positive
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[AP 13.2 1992-59 RESIDUALS FOR TOTAL Il-i.lIGRANT SmOYI.IElPT (EQUATION 13.10)
Negative
Positive
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MAP 13.3 1960-65 RESIDUALS' PGR TOTAL lUMIGRAKT E:APL0YI.1EI;T (EQUATION Î3 .2G)
Negative
Positive
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MAP 13.4 1966-70 RESIDUj\L3 FOR TOTAJ. IMMIGRANT EMPIOYMKIIT (EQUATION 13.31)
Positive
IV
13.6 SIJLCvIARY OF TJÜ REGRESSION AXAJ.YSIS RESULTS
The statistical analysis provides encouraging support for the 
hypotheses advanced in the earlier sections. It is therefore 
possible on the basis of these results to identify the reasons for 
the changing distribution of immigrant industry during the course 
of the post-war period.
The availability of labour and factory space stand out as the only 
variables which are significant in every period both for all 
immigrants and for the engineering sector. Their relative 
importance does however vary from period to period. The peculiar 
conditions of the immediate post-war era, when factory space was 
at a premium, are apparent in that this was the outstanding location 
factor. Since this variable was also a surrogate for government 
policy at this time, it is clear that central governraent activity 
exerted a strong influence on the choice of location within 
Scotland. The concentration of government factory building and 
site development in the west of Scotland and Dundee, together with 
the large labour reserves in these areas, explains their attraction 
for incoming industry.
As the factory supply situation eased during the 1950s and regional 
policy effectively went into abeyance, the impact of government 
activity and of site and factory availability declined. They were 
replaced by labour supply as the outstanding requirement for 
incoming firms. The engineering industry proved an exception since 
it continued to place priority on the need for factory space. The 
V/est of Scotland with its abundant labour reserves and supply of 
factories continued to offer the most attractive locations to 
incoming establishments.
During the 1960s nev/ immigrant industry began to spread away from 
the West of Scotland as other areas began to benefit from their 
own or central government advance factory and industrial estate 
development programmes. In addition female labour, which was 
demanded by the growing number of electrical engineering and 
clothing immigrants, became more readily available tnroughout 
Scotland at a time of rising unemployment.
hon-'financial considerations such as an area’s physical environment 
and the attendant image to whicn it gave rise also entered into 
the location decision process. This became possible as spatial 
cost differences within Scotland were eroded and both labour and 
factory space became more easily obtainable than previously 
outwith Clydeside. As a result the cost advantages previously 
enjoyed by the lest of Scotland declined and for many firms were 
offset by the area’s perceived higher psychic costs. This was 
particularly true in the case of Glasgow. Consequently incoming 
firms moved into new parts of Scotland and away from many of the 
traditional manufacturing centres which they had preferred in 
earlier periods.
CHAPTER 14
SÜHHARY Aim CGHCLUSIOi'JS
The findings of this study have a relevance for those regional 
industrial development policies which embrace the concept of 
attracting mobile manufacturing investment. Competition for nev/ 
incoming industry has gronn and is now particularly severe as a 
result of two trends, firstly, both national and international 
economic difficulties in recent years, following the rapid 
increase in oil prices, have drastically reduced tne supply of 
mobile industry, since it is closely dependent on industrial 
expansion. The decline in international growth rates has reduced 
the pressure to expand output since over rather than under­
capacity has become a major problem in many countries and in 
particular in the UK.
Secondly, the demand for mobile industry has grown. One reason 
for this is the larger number of districts experiencing severe 
economic difficulties. This has led to an extension in the size 
of the areas eligible for assistance. For instance, Edinburgh is 
now a Development Area and no longer competing for incoming 
industry at a disadvantage co.:;pared with the rest of Scotland.
In the non-assisted regions, ÎDC control has been relaxed in 
response to economic problems and this is likely to reduce further 
tne. potential supply of mobile industry to Assisted Areas such as 
Scotland. A further reason for a growing de sand for new industry 
is the active development programmes undertaken since the 
mid-1960s by both local and central government in an ever-widening
range of locations. These have resulted in serviced sites and 
advance factories appearing in far cioi-e places tnan formerly. 
Competition to fill these additional sites and premises has 
increased accordingly.
As a consequence of these trends the supply of mobile industry has 
diminished at a time when demand for it is greater than ever, and 
so competition for mobile industry is now particularly acute. Any 
area unable to offer comparable facilities to its rivals is 
unlikely to attract new industry. Publicity alone is no substitute 
for positive development planning because in the absence of 
suitable sites, premises and labour supply industry will find 
little to attract it to an area. Gleaming factories rather than 
glossy publications are one prerequisite of a successful programme 
to attract new industry.
The analysis has shown the importance of available factory space 
as an inducement to immigrant industry. However, the typo of 
floorspace is a relevant consideration, since old decrepit 
premises are likely to hold little appeal for most incoming firms. 
After all, by the late 1960s nearly two-thirds of immigrant 
industry started production in new premises and many of the remainder 
would subsequently move into new buildings. Those authorities 
able to offer modern factories or attractive sites on which new 
premises can either initially or subsequently be built will enjoy 
the strongest competitive position. The larger the choice of 
floorspace, tne higher the probability tnat a firm’s particular 
needs can be met. This places those areas with tne biggest stock 
of modern premises or the largest building programmes at an 
advantage.
The results of the study suggest that development agencies should 
initially give priority to reducing costs by means of factory 
building and site development rather than to general environmental 
ii.:provement designed to upgrade an area’s physical image. Psychic 
costs become increasingly relevant as spatial cost differences 
decline so that they arc only likely to operate in an area’s 
favour if the cost cind efficiency of its factor inputs approximate 
to those of competing areas. In the absence of suitable sites
and factories this is extremely improbable. Any such area is 
unlikely to bo seriously considered by mobile industry, even thougn 
it might project a highly favourable image.
Edinburgh appears to illustrate this point in the 1960s, because 
despite a seemingly attractive image it failed to attract a single 
incoming plant. The reason v/as the unfavourable cost structure 
existing in the city. No government financial assistance was 
available since Edinburgh was outwith the Development Area and 
there was an acute shortage of modern premises and serviced sites. 
All these cost reducing features were readily obtainable just 
outside the city, thereby allowing the adjacent areas to benefit 
from Edinburgh’s favourable image in their efforts to attract new 
industry.
This is not to conclude that considerations of environment are 
irrelevant. In fact the analysis has shown the opposite. However, 
they are only likely to operate in an area's favour if other costs 
are competitive. In such circumstances an area is likely to 
attract more industry than might reasonably be expected. The 
results also show that even those districts witn poor physical 
and social environments can attract new industry provided that 
production costs can be reduced by the presence of suitable labour 
and sites or factories. This means that the efforts of central 
and local government in developing industrial facilities in even 
the most deprived areas can be extremely effective. The 
attraction of industry in the late 1960s to many small and 
relatively isolated mining communities in response to their 
designation as Specicil Development Areas and to the building of 
government advance factories illustrates this point very well. It 
is therefore quite possible to enhance the attraction to mobile 
industry of the most difficult areas by an active industrial 
development programme.
Nevertheless, the study shows that such policies are not without 
their costs because those places with an unfavourable image are 
likely to attract less industry than otner areas with comparable 
facilities. This consideration appears to lie at the heart of 
Glasgow's inability to attract the volume of industry during the 
1960s tnat might reasonably ha.ve been expected on the basis of tne
factor inputs available in the city. Certainly the relative 
shortage of modern factory space was an additional handicap, but 
it alone cannot explain the dearth of incoming industry.
The development of additional sites and factories in new locations 
has several important implications at a time of a reduced inflow 
of mobile industry. It raises the question of the best use of 
resources because there is the possibility of an over-provision of 
new factories and sites, with a surplus persisting for some time. 
Normally an excess of promises is necessary during a recession to 
ensure that sufficient factory space is available for the ensuing 
upturn in the economy. The situation is hov/ever made particularly 
difficult at the present time. The supply of factories now 
appears to be very large by historical standards, reflecting active 
central and local government and new town building programmes, 
whereas the demand for new premises is likely to recover more 
slowly than previously if economic recovery continues at a slower 
speed than in the past. An additional complication would arise 
if the structure of mobile industry were to change. Incoming 
industry in the'1960s was dominated by plants in the electrical 
engineering and clothing industries, which were also those 
displaying the strongest demand for ready built premises. If 
these industries decline in relative prominence amongst mobile 
firms and are replaced by others such as the oil related sector 
wnich might be less dependent on existing factory space then the 
demand for available premises could fall. As a result the presence 
of an existing building could exert a less powerful influence on 
the location decisions of immigrant industry than formerly.
The greater availability of modern premises and their presence in 
a wider range of locations is likely to have further reduced 
spatial cost differences. The consequence of this, in the absence 
of any increase in other production or transport cost differences, 
could be that psychic costs continue to exert an increasing 
influence on the location decision. An industrialist's production 
requirements can now be met in a larger number of locations than 
formerly. This widens his choice of potential sites and allows 
him to locate in the district he finds most attractive on personal 
grounds. In such circumstances those places with the least 
favourable physical and social environments are likely to experience
growing difficulties in attracting new industry. Previously they 
could, at least to some extent, offset these drawbacks by 
developing serviced sites and advance factories which were not 
available in other more attractive areas. The wider distribution 
of factories has eroded, if not eliminated, any advantages they 
formerly enjoyed in this respect.
This study has concentrated on the changing distribution of 
incoming industry in the post-war period up until 1970. It has 
identified likely reasons for these changes and some implications 
have been drawn for industrial development policies. Since 1970 
a number of important changes have affected mobile industry. New 
incentives have been introduced, the Assisted Area has been 
extended, the structure of immigrant industry has once again 
changed with the influx of the oil related sector into Scotland, 
and perhaps most important of all both the UK and the West have 
experienced a changed and more hostile economic climate. One 
effect has been to reduce greatly the volume of mobile industry 
moving to the Assisted Areas and policy is shifting towards a 
greater reliance on established industry for future employment 
growth. Nevertheless incoming industry is likely to remain of 
interest and importance to policymakers.
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